scholarly journals How Much Democracy is too Much Democracy?

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-27
Author(s):  
Mary Kathleen Dryer

Despite their widespread use, many rightfully question the prudence of using popular elections to fill state courts. A key difference between federal and state courts is that while federal judges are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the majority of jurists at the state level are elected. The reason federal judges, at least judges on the Article III courts, are made by executive selection is the same reason that Supreme Court justices are given life tenure: to insulate them from the whims of public opinion. In this passage, Hamilton articulates the fundamental paradox of democracy, a question that genuine republics have always grappled with: how can we control for the “tyranny of the majority?” In other words, how can we entrust people with the power to govern themselves but also prevent them from stripping away the rights of minority groups or from posing a danger to others?

2021 ◽  
pp. 31-68
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton

The conventional account of judicial review starts with a US Supreme Court case, Marbury v. Madison. But judicial review in truth starts with the state courts and the state constitutions, not the US Supreme Court and the US Constitution. Before the US Constitution existed, the state courts established American judicial review and were the first courts to wrestle with the complexities of exercising it. Judicial review also is foremost a structural story, not an individual-rights story. The delegation of power to the judiciary to decide the meaning of our constitutions laid the groundwork for the growth in power of American courts—especially the federal courts, which have become the go-to answer for so many who-decides questions in American government over the last seventy-five years. This chapter begins a search for insights in resolving the dilemma of judicial review by looking at how the state courts innovated the concept and the ways they initially practiced it. It shows that the early state courts were deferential to the democratic branches of government. They rarely invalidated state laws and did so only when these laws violated a clear constitutional rule. That approach offers lessons for federal and state courts alike.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan P. Kastellec

I examine how courts condition the relationship between state-level public opinion and policy. The system of federalism in the United States allows federal and state courts to establish the types of policies that states are constitutionally allowed to implement. In particular, federal courts can set “federal floors” for policy, below which no states can go. State courts, in turn, can raise the level of this floor. Thus, both federal and state courts shape whether state policy can match the preferences of the median voter in a given state. Analyzing data on public opinion, judicial decisions, and state-level policy on the issue of abortion, from 1973 to 2012, I show that changes in the set of allowable abortion restrictions, according to the combined decisions of state and federal courts, significantly affect whether states implement majority-preferred policies. I also show that ignoring the influence of courts on the policymaking environment significantly affects the estimated level of policy congruence and thus conclusions about the scope of representation. These results demonstrate the importance of placing courts in the larger study of state-level representation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lazer ◽  
Alexi Quintana ◽  
Jon Green ◽  
Katherine Ognyanova ◽  
Hanyu Chwe ◽  
...  

In every month, April through October of 2020, we surveyed individuals in every state about how federal and state governments are reacting to the pandemic. We found a remarkably consistent picture of public opinion: respondents prefer state governments over the federal government when it comes to COVID-19. Out of 8 waves in 50 states & DC − a total of 408 surveys at the state level − in 402 state-level surveys more people in the state felt the state government was reacting “about right” to the COVID-19 outbreak as compared to the federal government; and only 6 times did people in a state choose the federal government over their state government.


Author(s):  
James W. Douglas
Keyword(s):  

Little is known about the strategies used by state courts during the appropriations process. This article examines court budgetary practices in the state of Oklahoma. It reveals how court funding works in Oklahoma, what strategies are used by the state courts, and which factors are most important in determining the success of the courts in getting the funds they need. It shows that the judiciary is not necessarily at the mercy of the other branches of government when seeking resources. The findings provide the first glimpse at court budgeting strategies and determinants of these strategies’ success at the state level.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2198901
Author(s):  
Thomas Gray ◽  
Banks Miller

Chief judges stand as visible leaders of their courts. Analyses of the Supreme Court focus on the role of the chief justice as an institution-builder seeking out public-facing consensus to protect Court legitimacy. Studying the powers of chief judges and political leadership in general is difficult. Analyzing all 50 states over 16 years we find no evidence that the identity of chief judges explains consensus behavior any better than random chance. This is true even among the subset of chief judges with additional institutional powers like opinion assignment. We show that court structures explain consensus, while leader features do not. Being chief judge correlates with an elevated likelihood of being in the majority, particularly in cases decided by one vote. These results add to our understanding of leadership on courts and imply that the office of chief judge at the state level is more symbolic than uniquely powerful.


Author(s):  
Alex Ruck Keene ◽  
Mary Sealy

Australia is a common law country. Australia is a federation of five states and two territories. Laws affecting adults in need of protection are generally made at state level. In Victoria, adult protection matters are decided by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘VCAT’) in its Guardianship List. VCAT is the lowest court body—with Magistrates, County, and Supreme Court the hierarchy within the state. The High Court of Australia is the highest appellate court.


Author(s):  
Louis Fisher

This article discusses the concept of state secrets privilege which is designed to prevent private litigants from gaining access to agency documents sought in cases involving National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance, extraordinary rendition, and other intelligence programs. Before the Reynolds case, the Supreme Court recognized the state secrets privilege. Over the past half century, federal judges gave “deference” to the executive claims on sensitivity and confidentiality of agency records without ever looking at the disputed document. However in 1953, the Supreme Court was misled by the government. Since then, there has been an interest in having Congress enact legislation to assure greater independence for the federal judiciary and provide a more even playing field for private litigants.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Shor

Why do state legislators vote the way they do? Which influence is predominant: ideology, party, or public opinion? The implementation votes surrounding the Affordable Care Act (ACA) provides a unique setting to examine this question, as they make all three considerations highly salient. State roll call votes on ACA implementation were sometimes polarized and sometimes unexpectedly bipartisan. What accounts for the heterogeneity in individual legislator behavior on bills implementing the ACA at the state level? Using new data on legislator ideology and votes from 2011–2015, I show evidence that legislator ideology was by far the most important predictor of voting on implementation votes, far more so than legislator party or public opinion. Moreover, I show the influence of ideology is heterogeneous by issue area and bill.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 788-795 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward N. Beiser

The literature discussing the responses of lower court judges to decisions of the United States Supreme Court is limited, and the few comparative analyses of state and federal judicial behavior have tended to be speculative rather than empirical. It has been suggested that a controversial Supreme Court decision is likely to be supported more strongly by federal judges than by state judges, that state courts will probably construe a Supreme Court mandate more narrowly than will federal courts, and that federal courts can be expected to move in a direction hinted at by the Court more aggressively than state courts. Since all federal judges are appointed for life, it is only logical that they should be more independent of local pressures than state judges, many of whom are elected, or appointed for limited periods. The fact that state and federal judges owe their appointments to different levels of the political party hierarchy, and the historical fact that federal judges are less likely to seek future political office than are state judges, suggest a similar conclusion. Finally, the very fact of being a federal judge may produce a sense of identification with the Supreme Court which state judges would not share.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document