A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior: The Reapportionment Cases

1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 788-795 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward N. Beiser

The literature discussing the responses of lower court judges to decisions of the United States Supreme Court is limited, and the few comparative analyses of state and federal judicial behavior have tended to be speculative rather than empirical. It has been suggested that a controversial Supreme Court decision is likely to be supported more strongly by federal judges than by state judges, that state courts will probably construe a Supreme Court mandate more narrowly than will federal courts, and that federal courts can be expected to move in a direction hinted at by the Court more aggressively than state courts. Since all federal judges are appointed for life, it is only logical that they should be more independent of local pressures than state judges, many of whom are elected, or appointed for limited periods. The fact that state and federal judges owe their appointments to different levels of the political party hierarchy, and the historical fact that federal judges are less likely to seek future political office than are state judges, suggest a similar conclusion. Finally, the very fact of being a federal judge may produce a sense of identification with the Supreme Court which state judges would not share.

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.


2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Hugh King

Since the seminal case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala in 1980, the controversial Alien Tort Claims Act has regularly been invoked in United States federal courts to sue foreign perpetrators of international human rights violations. In Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, decided in 2004, the United States Supreme Court for the first time ruled on the Act’s proper application. This article, after first identifying three different approaches taken towards the Act by federal courts over the last 25 years, examines the Supreme Court decision. While welcoming the Court’s affirmation of the Act as a mechanism for addressing certain international law violations, it critiques the Court’s conservative and problematic test to determine the extent of the international law violations falling within the Act’s ambit, and highlights many ambiguities in the decision with which lower courts will have to grapple.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-58
Author(s):  
John J Magyar

Abstract The generally accepted belief about the rule prohibiting recourse to legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation is that it began in the case of Millar v.Taylor in 1769, and it was followed thereafter in England and throughout the United States through to the 20th century. However, all four judges on the panel in Millar v.Taylor considered evidence from the Journal of the House of Commons and changes made to the relevant bill in their opinions. Meanwhile, the case was widely cited for several substantive and procedural matters throughout the 19th century, but it was not cited by a judge as a precedent for the rule against legislative history until 1887. A careful examination of the relevant cases and secondary literature from the 18th and 19th centuries reveals a much more nuanced and complex history to the rule. Its emergence becomes less clear because it is shrouded in judicial silence. Its beginnings must be inferred from a general and often unarticulated principle that lawyers felt free to disregard. Furthermore, the development, refinement, and decline of the rule followed a different timeline in England, the US federal courts and the state courts.


2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 989
Author(s):  
Georgia L. Holmes ◽  
Penny Herickhoff

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">On January 11, 2012 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School v. Equal Opportunity Commission, et al.</span></span><a name="_ftnref1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftn1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="color: black; font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast; mso-themecolor: text1;">[1]</span></span></span></span></span></a><span style="color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"> that the First Amendment free exercise of religion clause requires the recognition of a ministerial exception from the application of the discrimination provisions of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Lower federal courts had long recognized such an exemption in federal anti-discrimination statutes, yet the U.S. Supreme Court had never formally done so.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The decision of the Court was unanimous, although separate concurring opinions were filed by Justice Thomas and by Justice Alito, who was also joined by Justice Kagan.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Thus, in its decision, the Court has mandated immunity for religious organizations from the laws that prohibit discrimination, and retaliation in the workplace.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>The Hosanna Tabor decision raises issues of how far such a ministerial exemption extends and to what extent it immunizes religious organizations from liability for other types of statutorily prohibited and tortious conduct.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is concern in some sectors that too broad an exemption would immunize religious organizations under numerous neutral, generally applicable laws, such as those governing sexual abuse, unemployment compensation, employer social Security deductions, and sales taxes, all of which have previously been applied to religious organizations.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><div style="mso-element: footnote-list;"><br /><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> <hr size="1" /></span><div style="mso-element: footnote;" id="ftn1"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt; text-align: justify;" class="MsoFootnoteText"><a name="_ftn1" style="mso-footnote-id: ftn1;" href="http://journals.cluteonline.com/index.php/JABR/author/saveSubmit/3#_ftnref1"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote;"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; font-size: 10pt; mso-fareast-font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; mso-ansi-language: EN-US; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt; mso-fareast-theme-font: minor-fareast;">[1]</span></span></span></span></a><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"> </span><span style="font-size: 9pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;">____ U.S. ____.</span><span style="font-size: 11pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 12.0pt;"></span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span></div><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 736-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malvina Halberstam

In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of a U.S. court to try a Mexican national, charged with various counts of conspiracy, kidnaping and the murder of a U.S. drug enforcement agent in Mexico, even though his presence in the United States was the result of abduction rather than extradition pursuant to the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. The Court did not hold, as widely reported in the media, that the Treaty permits abduction, that abduction is legal, or that the United States had a right to kidnap criminal suspects abroad. On the contrary, the Court acknowledged that the abduction may have been a violation of international law. It stated, “Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent’s abduction was ’shocking’ and that it may be in violation of general international law principles.”


1984 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 507-525
Author(s):  
Winsor C. Schmidt

The United States Supreme Court's decision making on the Jones v. United States issue of an insanity acquit tee's disposition, when his mental hospitalization exceeds his maximum prison sentence if convicted, is analyzed from the perspective of relevant behavioral science research. The Court's “common sense” that insanity acquittal reflects a likelihood of remaining mentally ill and in need of treatment is not sustained by the available empirical evidence. The Court's assertion of no necessary correlation between acquittee offense severity and length of recovery is also belied by the available research. The Supreme Court has ratified social judgments concerning insanity acquittees rather than utilizing available behavioral research to make more rational policy determinations. The statistically insignificant insanity acquittal disposition could be assessed from a more informed perspective.


2012 ◽  
Vol 38 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 269-287
Author(s):  
Gary Lawson ◽  
David B. Kopel

On August 22, 2009, when then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi was asked by a reporter whether the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) was constitutional, she answered: “Are you serious? Are you serious?” Two years later, many federal judges, more than half of the States, and a flood of distinguished constitutional scholars have examined the PPACA and found at least part of it to be unconstitutional. The question was indeed serious.It remains serious today, as a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of the PPACA is expected in June 2012. Because the legality of the PPACA has emerged as perhaps the most publicly visible constitutional question since Roe v. Wade, clarity is vital not only for the PPACA itself, but also for general public understanding of the Constitution. Accordingly, our goals in this Article are to provide an opinionated but hopefully fair-minded guide to the constitutional issues of the PPACA and to clarify some misunderstandings that plague both popular and professional discussions of the issues.


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