scholarly journals Intertemporal discoordination in the 100% reserve banking system

2021 ◽  
pp. 43-80
Author(s):  
Romain Baeriswyl

The 100%-Money plan advocated by Fisher (1936) has a Misesian flavor as it aims at mitigating intertemporal discoordination by reducing (i) the discrepancy between investment and voluntary savings, and (ii) the manipula­ tion of interest rates by monetary injections. Recent proposals to adopt the 100% reserve banking system, such as the Chicago Plan Revisited by Benes and Kumhof (2013) or the Limited Purpose Banking by Kotlikoff (2010), take, however, a fundamentally different attitude towards the role of the central bank in the credit market and ignore that intertemporal discoordination arises inde­ pendently from whether the credit expansion is financed by the creation of outside or inside money. These plans allow the central bank to inject outside money into the credit market and to effectively lower interest rates in negative territory in order to overcome the limit that the liquidity trap sets to credit expan­ sion in the fractional reserve system. Although such an attempt may succeed in stimulating the economy in the short run, it exacerbates intertemporal discoor­ dination and weakens economic stability in the long run. Key words: monetary systems, 100% reserve banking, Chicago Plan, Austrian Business Cycle Theory. JEL Classification: E30, E42, E58, B53. Resumen: El plan «dinero 100%» defendido por Fisher (1936) tiene connotacio­ nes misianas en el sentido en que tiene como objetivo mitigar la descoordinación intertemporal reduciendo (i) la diferencia entre la inversión y el ahorro voluntario y (ii) la manipulación de los tipos de interés a través de inyecciones de dinero. Las recientes propuestas para adoptar un sistema de coficiente de reservas ban­ carias del 100%, tales como el Chicago Plan Revisited de Benes y Kumhof (2013) o el Limited Purpose Banking de Kotlikoff (2010), toman, sin embargo, una actitud esencialmente diferente hacia el papel del banco central en el mercado de cré­ dito, e ignora que la descoordinación intertemporal surge independientemente de si la expansión crediticia se financia mediante la creación de dinero desde dentro (inside money) o fuera (outside money). Estos planes permiten al banco central inyectar dinero desde fuera en el mercado de crédito y reducir los tipos de interés de manera efectiva en valores negativos con el fin de superar el límite que establece la trampa de la liquidez a la expansión del crédito en el sistema de reserva fraccionaria. Aunque tal intento puede tener éxito a la hora de esti­ mular la economía en el corto plazo, acentúa la descoordinación intertemporal y debilita la estabilidad económica a largo plazo. Palabras clave: Sistemas monetarios, banca de reserva del 100%, Plan Chica­ go, teoría austriaca del ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: E30, E42, E58, B53.

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 1219-1249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrizio Lainà

Abstract This paper presents a stock–flow consistent model of full-reserve banking. The paper investigates money creation through government spending in a full-reserve banking system. The results are contrasted against the cases in which government spending is increased under full-reserve banking without money creation and under endogenous money, that is, the current monetary system. It is found that output, employment and inflation evolve almost identically. In contrast to other cases, money creation in a full-reserve banking system leads to a permanent reduction in consolidated government debt. Monetary policy transmits effectively as an increase in central bank reserves translates into an almost equal increase in demand deposits. Furthermore, an unusually large change in the money supply induces only smooth and relatively small changes in interest rates. In addition, the paper compares three additional ways to create money. Money creation through tax cuts or citizen’s dividend generates roughly the same results as creating money through government spending. In contrast, money creation through quantitative easing affects only monetary aggregates and interest rates but not the real economy. Although in every money creation experiment banks are able to fully satisfy the demand for loans, temporary credit crunches can occur under full-reserve banking. The occurrence of credit crunches depends on changes in private behaviour and economic policy as well as safety margins adopted by banks.


Author(s):  
Philipp Bagus ◽  
David Howden

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system —even a free banking one— is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of «MV» by a FRFB system causes. Key words: Free banking, fractional reserve, monetary equilibrium, credit expansion, economic cycle. JEL Classification: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34. Resumen: En este artículo respondemos a George Selgin, que a su vez respondió a nuestro artículo «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin considera que los saldos de tesorería son ahorros, mientras nosotros nos fijamos en los ahorros reales necesarios para mantener proyectos de inversion. Ahorros reales son ingresos reales no consumidos. Variaciones en los ahorros reales no necesariamente coinciden con las variaciones en los saldos de tesoreria. Mostramos que una expansión crediticia coordinada es posible en un sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria (FRFB) y que las reservas prudenciales no constituyen necesariamente un limite a la expansión co - ordinada. Discutimos varios escenarios en los que el sistema FRFB puede expandir los créditos sin un aumento previo en los ahorros reales. Todas estas facetas muestran que un sistema bancario de reservas fraccionarias —incluso uno de banca libre— es inherentemente inestable y produce incentivos para imponer un banco central estabilizador. Mostramos que el origen de nuestras diferencias con Selgin está en un enfoque diferente a la teoría monetaria. Selgin es partidario de la ecuación de intercambio que es muy agregada y que le impide ver los problemas microeconomicas que la estabilización de «MV» por parte del sistema FRFB produce. Palabras clave: Banca libre, reserva fraccionaria, equilibrio monetario, expansión crediticia, ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.


2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sviatlana Hlebik ◽  
Giovanni Verga

Abstract In 2008 the European Central Bank added a new quantitative policy strategy to its traditional control of the interest rates. This new policy, sometimes called “enhanced credit support”, consists of fully satisfying the demand for liquidity of banks, with the European Central Bank deciding only the timing and characteristics of its interventions. This study analyses the market conditions in which these measures have been taken and their consistency with the demand for liquidity by the banking system. Measures in favour of the sovereign debt of PIIGS countries are also considered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 285-304
Author(s):  
M. Pilar García-Alcober ◽  
Diego Prior ◽  
Emili Tortosa-Ausina ◽  
Manuel Illueca

After the financial crisis of 2007–2008, some bank performance dimensions have been the subject of debate, two of which are bank efficiency and bank risk-taking behavior. The literature on bank efficiency and productivity has grown considerably over the past three decades, and has gained momentum in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Interest in bank risk-taking behavior, usually focusing on its links to monetary policy, has been relatively low, but has also increased exponentially in more recent years. This article combines these two streams of research. Specifically, we test whether more inefficient banks take greater risks when selecting borrowers, charging interests, and requiring collateral, and whether these links between inefficiency and risk change according to the type of bank. Our analysis centers on the Spanish banking system, which has been severely affected by the burst of the housing bubble and has undergone substantial restructuring. To test our hypotheses, we created a database with information on banks and savings banks, their borrowers (non-financial firms), and the links between them. The study also contributes to the literature by considering a novel profit frontier approach. Our results suggest that more inefficient banks take greater risks in selecting their borrowers, and that this high-taking behavior is not offset by higher interest rates. JEL CLASSIFICATION C14; C61; G21; L50


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Abstract Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under-’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 220-244
Author(s):  
Rafael García Iborra

The classical Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT) is based on an inverse relationship between the so-called Average Period of Production (APP) or ‘roundaboutness’ and the interest rate. According to Böhm-Bawerk (1884 [1891]), the APP is the weighted average time that a unit of labor is locked up in the production process1; moreover, there is a positive relationship between savings (the ‘subsistence fund’) and the APP: the higher the latter the higher the former, which implies an inverse relationship between interest rates and the APP. Thus, a lower interest rate will lead to a higher APP ceteris paribus. Hayek (2008) based his Hayekian triangles on Böhm-Bawerk’s work: a lower (higher) interest rate leads to a more (less) rounda- bout structure of production, increasing (decreasing) the APP. Including Mises’s (1921) business cycle theory into the analysis, whenever the interest rate is pushed lower than its ‘natural level’, either by the central bank or the banking system, there is an unsus- tainable extension of the APP that will generate an economic boom; the crisis will irremediably follow, as the APP will pull back towards its natural level. From this brief characterization of the ABCT, it is easy to notice the key role of the inverse relationship between interest rates and roundaboutness; without it, there is no connection from changes in interest rates and roundaboutness, and the ABCT falls apart. The reswitching of techniques is precisely a counterexample to that relationship, as it claims there are situations in which lower interest rates do not lead to more roundabout productive struc- tures. The organization of this paper is as follows: the next section describes the reswitching of techniques as stated by Samuelson (1966) and the implication for the classical ABCT, based on a phys- ical measure of roundaboutness; section 3 analyzes the alternative of applying corporate finance to the ABCT following Cachanosky and Lewin (2014). Section 4 is a financial analysis of Samuelson’s example, argues why modified duration should replace Böhm- Bawerk’s APP as a measure of roundaboutness, and shows why it does not represent a paradox to the ABCT when the financial approach is used. Sections 5 and 6 address the question from two additional perspectives: a neoclassical with fully flexible prices but fixed techniques and the Austrian related dynamic efficiency.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractThis chapter develops further the role of a central bank and its interplay with commercial banks. Together, the two ensure the provision of liquidity to the economy, such that the real sectors are shielded from flows of funds originating from household and investors. We also disaggregate the banking system into two banks to represent deposit flows between banks and their impact on the central bank’s balance sheet, and to distinguish between what we call “relative” and “absolute” central bank intermediation. We then integrate deposit money creation by commercial banks into our system of financial accounts, and revisit some old debates, such as the limits of bank money creation and the role of related parameters that the central bank can set (not only the reserve requirement ratio, but also the collateral framework). Finally, we explain the concepts of “plain money” and “full reserve banking” within the financial accounts, and also discuss in this framework the recent proposals regarding central bank digital currency (CBDC).


Author(s):  
Gunther Schnabl

This chapter analyzes the evolution and effects of central bank crisis management since the mid-1980s based on a Hayek-Mises-Wicksell overinvestment framework. It is shown that given that the traditional transmission mechanism between monetary policy and consumer price inflation has collapsed, asymmetric monetary policy crisis management implies a convergence of interest rates toward zero and a gradual expansion of central bank balance sheets. From a Wicksell-Hayek-Mises perspective, asymmetric central bank crisis management has contributed to financial market bubbles, decreasing marginal efficiency of investment, increasing income inequality, and declining growth dynamics. The economic policy implication is a slow but decisive exit from ultra-expansionary monetary policies.


2020 ◽  
pp. 123-171
Author(s):  
William Hongson Wang ◽  
Antonio Vegas García

The importance of China’s economy and the instability of China’s fi-nancial system are in the spotlight recently. This paper uses Austrian Business Cycle Theory to gauge the potential risks of China’s economy. The approach of this paper is a sector analysis, focusing on China’s monetary and financial system, shipping industry, and real estate industry, especially the state-owned enterprises in those sectors. We conclude that China’s central banking system is hurting China’s economy and we also propose reforms to overhaul the system, according to the perspective of praxeology and Austrian School Econom-ics. Keywords: Austrian Business Cycle Theory, China’s banking system, China’s economy. JEL Classification: B53, D8, E310, E32, E52, H12, N15, N27, N45, N65, O53, P11, R3, R4, Y10. Resumen: La importancia de la economía china junto con la reciente inestabili-dad del sistema financiero de China, preocupan al resto del mundo. Este artí-culo usa la Teoría Austriaca del Ciclo Económico para identificar los riesgos potenciales de la economía de China. En este artículo realizaremos un análisis sectorial, enfocado en el sistema monetario y financiero de China, el sector de la construcción, la industria marítima y, en especial, las empresas estatales de dichos sectores. Concluimos que el actual sistema de banca central en China está dañando a su economía y proponemos soluciones desde la perspectiva de la praxeología y la Escuela Austriaca de Economía. Palabras clave: Teoría austriaca del ciclo económico, sistema bancario chino, economía china.


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