scholarly journals Central Banks

Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractThis chapter develops further the role of a central bank and its interplay with commercial banks. Together, the two ensure the provision of liquidity to the economy, such that the real sectors are shielded from flows of funds originating from household and investors. We also disaggregate the banking system into two banks to represent deposit flows between banks and their impact on the central bank’s balance sheet, and to distinguish between what we call “relative” and “absolute” central bank intermediation. We then integrate deposit money creation by commercial banks into our system of financial accounts, and revisit some old debates, such as the limits of bank money creation and the role of related parameters that the central bank can set (not only the reserve requirement ratio, but also the collateral framework). Finally, we explain the concepts of “plain money” and “full reserve banking” within the financial accounts, and also discuss in this framework the recent proposals regarding central bank digital currency (CBDC).

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salomon Faure ◽  
Hans Gersbach

AbstractWe study today’s two-tier money creation and destruction system: Commercial banks create bank deposits (privately created money) through loans to firms or asset purchases from the private sector. Bank deposits are destroyed when households buy bank equity or when firms repay loans. Central banks create electronic central bank money (publicly created money or reserves) through loans to commercial banks. In a simple general equilibrium setting, we show that symmetric equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of monetary policy and capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore efficiency. Finally, we provide a series of extensions and generalizations of the results.


2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (1) ◽  
pp. 474-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Jeanne ◽  
Lars E. O Svensson

Central banks target CPI inflation; independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital. The first fact makes it difficult for a central bank to implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, because it undermines a commitment to overshoot the inflation target. We show that the second fact provides a solution. Capital concerns provide a mechanism for an independent central bank to commit to inflate ex post. The optimal policy can take the form of a currency depreciation combined with a crawling peg, a policy advocated by Svensson as the “Foolproof Way” to escape from a liquidity trap. (JEL E31, E52, E58, E62)


Author(s):  
Oleg Usherovich Avis

The paper describes the central bank monetary policy that has been heavily criticized, largely due to the banks’ inability to identify emerging risks in a timely manner and to prevent threats to the stability of the entire global financial and banking system. A more rigorous expert-theoretical and public assessment is typical for analyzing the role of commercial banks in these processes, whereby they are recognized as the main culprits of recurrent crises. The excursion into the evolution of theoretical views on the problem under study allows to conclude that it is related to the credit nature of money, in which the activities of commercial banks are of great importance. This idea was shared by many foreign and Russian scientists, who at one time offered their recipes for improving the monetary mechanism, but remained not taken into account in practice. The initial positions of bank lending processes and money making on their basis in volumes and quality, often unregulated, have been analyzed. Much attention is paid to the role of the Central Bank, the bank customers and the state in shaping the credit nature of money. As an alternative to modern methods of monetary regulation, the idea of full-value money has been described. As an example, the phenomenon of the Swiss full-value money initiative in 2018 has been given. It is noted that the initiative demanded to ban issuing electronic (non-cash) money from the commercial banks in order to stabilize the financial system. The weak points of the reform include a threat to the stability of the money value, the low degree of independence of the National Bank of Switzerland. It has been inferred that the events taking place in the modern financial system may indicate significant transformations of the design and toolkit of the modern monetary policy


The main responsibility of the central banks is to implement monetary policies. In this framework, they define interest rates and the amount of the money in the financial system. Hence, it can be said that central banks have the critical role in the development of the financial system. Because of this situation, it is obvious that central banks should satisfy some requirements, such as independence, in order to contribute to the effectiveness of the financial systems. Parallel to this aspect, this chapter aims to understand the role of the central banks in the financial system. In this context, the purpose and historical background of the central banking are explained. In addition to this situation, the subject of the central bank independence is identified as well. In the final aspect, important accounts in the analytical balance sheet of the central bank are defined.


Author(s):  
Bogusław Pietrzak ◽  
Katarzyna Wasiak

This article attempts to systematize the institutional and operational conditions of stability and security of the banking system. The intention of the authors is to analyse some factors strongly affecting the functions and principles of two members of modern banking systems - the central bank and commercial banks. The authors start the analyses by defining stability and security of the banking system. Then point out to the role of the various segments of the financial safety net in providing conditions for stable and secure system, and determine the necessary requirements of the stabilization as demanded from the banking institutions management system. In conclusion, they define the set of requirements (institutional and operational) necessary for achieving the stability and security of the banking system


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Pistoresi B. ◽  
Cavicchioli M. ◽  
Brevini G.

This paper analyses the determinants of a new index of central bank independence, recently provided by Dincer and Eichengreen (2014), using a large database of economic, political and institutional variables. Our sample includes data for 31 OECD and 49 non-OECD economies and covers the period 1998-2010. To this aim, we implement factorial and regression analysis to synthesize information and overcome limitations such as omitted variables, multicollinearity and overfitting. The results confirm the role of the IMF loans program to guide all the economies in their choice of more independent central banks. Financial instability, recession and low inflation work in the opposite direction with governments relying extensively on central bank money to finance public expenditure and central banks’ political and operational autonomy is inevitably undermined. Finally, only for non-OECD economies, the degree of central bank independence responds to various measures of strength of political institutions and party political instability.


2016 ◽  
Vol 19 (06) ◽  
pp. 1650034 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDER LIPTON

A modern version of monetary circuit theory with a particular emphasis on stochastic underpinning mechanisms is developed. It is explained how money is created by the banking system as a whole and by individual banks. The role of central banks as system stabilizers and liquidity providers is elucidated. It is shown how in the process of money creation banks become naturally interconnected. A novel extended structural default model describing the stability of the Interconnected banking network is proposed. The purpose of bank capital and liquidity is explained. Multi-period constrained optimization problem for bank balance sheet is formulated and solved in a simple case. Both theoretical and practical aspects are covered.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9697
Author(s):  
Carlos Viñuela ◽  
Juan Sapena ◽  
Gonzalo Wandosell

In this paper we set out a three-pillar monetary-financial framework to (i) analyze, categorize and compare past, current and emerging means of payment; to (ii) capture their creation and destruction processes through sectoral balance sheet dynamics; and to (iii) identify the inherent risks to the current monetary-financial system, also known as the fractional reserve banking system. These risks, which stem from sudden shifts in money demand and supply, are as follows: (I) risk of a cashless society; (II) risk of structural bank disintermediation; (III) risk of systemic bank runs; (IV) risk of currency substitution; and (V) risk of economic and financial bubbles. This framework will guide the assessment of the central bank digital currencies (CBDC), which are considered as the next step in monetary evolution. We will analyze two large groups of CBDC proposals: (i) proposals aimed at complementing cash and bank deposits; and (ii) proposals aimed at replacing all bank deposits with CBDCs. We find that once CBDCs are issued in both sets of proposals, there is always a trade-off between low levels of (I), (IV), (V), risks and high levels of (II) risk. This trade-off could also be defined as the CBDC dilemma, which states that in most CBDC proposals it is impossible to have both of the following at the same time: (1) low levels of (I), (IV) and (V) risks; and (2) low levels of (II) risk. Finally, we suggest that further research on CBDCs should focus on the second group of proposals on a phase-in basis in order to also mitigate the structural bank disintermediation risk and hence to overcome the CBDC dilemma.


Author(s):  
Haidar Diphil Shubbar ◽  
Andrey Vladimirovich Girinsky

The paper focuses on the importance of using reserve assets in order to increase the bank financial stability and the banking system as a whole. The essential requirements for reserving commercial banks have been presented. The methods of regulating the required reserves have been studied. The specific features of applying the required reserves in banking activities (reserve requirements and liquidity, monetary policy, reserve requirements as a monetary tool, reserve requirements as a fiscal tool) have been revealed. The schedule of averaging periods of required reserves for 2019 is being considered. The general principles which credit organizations are guided by when creating reserves are the following: obligatory availability of reserves for all credit organizations throughout their existence; forming reserves in relation to liabilities to legal entities and individuals; possibility of removing from the list obligations for which reserves have been created. It has been mentioned that the main objectives of the reserve requirement system are to provide banks with sufficient liquidity and to regulate the money supply. Particular attention is paid to the Central Bank as a reserve requirements regulator. In accordance with the changes of the Central Bank of July 1, 2019, the established standards on reserve requirements for deposits in national currency are set at 4%, in foreign currency at 14%. Manipulating the required reserve rate will provide the Central Bank with the opportunity to adjust the liquidity and solvency both of an individual bank and the entire banking system. The method of averaging required reserves includes the possibility for a commercial bank not to transfer reserves to the Central Bank based on a certain sum of money. The averaging coefficient is set at 0.25 to the standard volume of required reserves


Author(s):  
Bart Stellinga ◽  
Josta de Hoog ◽  
Arthur van Riel ◽  
Casper de Vries

AbstractThis chapter describes how money is created. Many people mistakenly believe that money can only be created by governments or central banks. But money today is mostly – but not exclusively – created by commercial banks. This chapter describes the ways in which this is done, it outlines the forces that drive and constrain this means of money creation, and it discusses the role of monetary policy.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document