The fractional reserve Banking diagram

2021 ◽  
pp. 81-104
Author(s):  
Edward W. Fuller
Keyword(s):  
Default Risk ◽  
Liquidity Risk ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Banking Systems ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Rate Risk ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
Reserve Banking

Fractional reserve banking systems are inherently unstable. Fractional reserve banks create three types of risks when they make loans: liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and default risk. These risks interact to make fractional reserve banking systems unstable and prone to failure. This paper derives the Fraction­ al Reserve Banking Diagram. The diagram is used to illustrate liquidity risk, in­ terest rate risk, and default risk. Finally, the diagram is used to compare central banking, free banking, and 100 percent reserve banking. Keywords: Fractional Reserve Banking, Central Banking, Free Banking, 100% Reserve Banking, Banking Panics JEL Codes: E32, E43, E50, E52, E58, G21 Resumen: El sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria es inherentemente ines­ table. Los bancos de reserva fraccionaria crean tres tipos de riesgos cuando conceden préstamos: riesgo de liquidez, riesgo de tipo de interés y riesgo de impago. Estos riesgos interactúan para hacer de la banca de reserva fraccio­ naria inestable y propensa a la quiebra. Este trabajo deriva el Diagrama de Banca de Reserva Fracciona. Este diagrama se utiliza para ilustrar el riesgo de liquidez, el riesgo de tipo de interés y riesgo de impago. Finalmente, se utiliza para comparar la banca central, el sistema de banca libre y la banca con co­ eficiente de reserva del 100%. Palabras clave: Banca de reserva fraccionaria, Banca Central, banca libre, banca con coeficiente de reserva del 100%, pánicos bancarios. Clasificación JEL: E32, E43, E50, E52, E58, G21

Rozeff on free banking: a critique

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-136
Author(s):  
Laura Davidson ◽  
Walter E. Block
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Reserve Banking

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to correct Rozeff (2010). He contends that fractional-reserve banking is legitimate and efficacious. The authors demonstrate that it is not. Design/methodology/approach The design of this paper is to quote widely from Rozeff (2010) and then to expose his errors of analysis. Findings The authors demonstrate that fractional-reserve banking is neither legitimate nor efficacious. Originality/value Money is the lifeblood of the economy. If so, then banking is the marrow of the economy, since it is from that sector that money arises in the first place. It is crucially important, then, that the monetary system be based on sound principles. Fractional-reserve banking is a violation of these sound principles. Therefore, it is valuable to demonstrate that this is indeed the case.

scholarly journals Unanswered quibbles: George Selgin still gets it wrong with fractional reserve free banking

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Bagus ◽  
David Howden
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Real Income ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Credit Expansion ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Monetary Equilibrium ◽  
El Sistema

In this article we reply to George Selgin’s counterarguments to our article «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin regards holding cash as saving while we focus on the real savings necessary to maintain investment projects. Real savings are unconsumed real income. Variations in real savings are not necessarily equal to variations in cash holdings. We show that a coordinated credit expansion in a fractional reserve free banking (FRFB) system is possible and that precautionary reserves consequently do not pose a necessary limit. We discuss various instances in which a FRFB system may expand credit without a prior increase in real savings. These facets all demonstrate why a fractional reserve banking system —even a free banking one— is inherently unstable, and incentivized to impose a stabilizing central bank. We find that at the root of our disagreements with Selgin lies a different approach to monetary theory. Selgin subscribes to the aggregative equation of exchange, which impedes him from seeing the microeconomic problems that the stabilization of «MV» by a FRFB system causes. Key words: Free banking, fractional reserve, monetary equilibrium, credit expansion, economic cycle. JEL Classification: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34. Resumen: En este artículo respondemos a George Selgin, que a su vez respondió a nuestro artículo «Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles». Selgin considera que los saldos de tesorería son ahorros, mientras nosotros nos fijamos en los ahorros reales necesarios para mantener proyectos de inversion. Ahorros reales son ingresos reales no consumidos. Variaciones en los ahorros reales no necesariamente coinciden con las variaciones en los saldos de tesoreria. Mostramos que una expansión crediticia coordinada es posible en un sistema bancario de reserva fraccionaria (FRFB) y que las reservas prudenciales no constituyen necesariamente un limite a la expansión co - ordinada. Discutimos varios escenarios en los que el sistema FRFB puede expandir los créditos sin un aumento previo en los ahorros reales. Todas estas facetas muestran que un sistema bancario de reservas fraccionarias —incluso uno de banca libre— es inherentemente inestable y produce incentivos para imponer un banco central estabilizador. Mostramos que el origen de nuestras diferencias con Selgin está en un enfoque diferente a la teoría monetaria. Selgin es partidario de la ecuación de intercambio que es muy agregada y que le impide ver los problemas microeconomicas que la estabilización de «MV» por parte del sistema FRFB produce. Palabras clave: Banca libre, reserva fraccionaria, equilibrio monetario, expansión crediticia, ciclo económico. Clasificación JEL: B53, E32, E42, E5, G18, H11, K39, P3, P34.

The Chicago Plan Revisited: An Austrian critique

2021 ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Marius Kleinheyer
Keyword(s):  
Banking System ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Complete Control ◽  
Economic Discourse ◽  
Working Paper ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Original Plan ◽  
Fundamental Reflection ◽  
Reserve Banking

Within the context of the economic crisis since 2007 a space for fundamental reflection on the institutional structure of the finan-cial system has been opened, allowing for the introduction of sig-nificant reform proposals in the economic discourse. The IMF economists Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof published a work-ing paper in August 2012, reintroducing the Chicago Plan as such a proposal.2 Following up the work of Irving Fisher (1935)3 the au-thors propose the separation of the monetary and the credit func-tions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. This plan is designed to eliminate the possibilities for private banks to create money through fractional reserve banking and is supposed to give governments the complete control over money issuance. The central bank, upgraded as a powerful mone-tary commission, is seen as the best candidate to serve as a state’s monetary authority in the exercise of its monetary prerogative (monopoly of currency, money issuance, and seigniorage). The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the ele-ments of this reform proposal, contrast it with a recapitulatory display of the Austrian analysis and evaluate the plan based on its political desirability. In the first step, the original plan from 1935 by Irving Fisher is presented. Second, the newest version and the key findings of Ben-es and Kumhof are summarized. Third the Austrian critique of fractional reserve banking and central banking is laid out. In the fourth step, a response to a peculiarity of the working paper about the origin of money is offered. In conclusion a brief discussion on the likelihood of political implementation and the evaluation from the Austrian perspective close the argumentation.

scholarly journals INTRODUCING WAQF TO FRACTIONAL AND FULL RESERVE BANKING SYSTEMS FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Omer Faruk Tekdogan
Keyword(s):  
Ottoman Empire ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Alternative Solution ◽  
Economic Stability ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Social Functions ◽  
Financial Architecture ◽  
Banking Systems ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Reserve Banking

Fractional reserve banking is a system in which banks extend loans by creating credit/deposit money, and which can be considered the basis of modern financial architecture. Nevertheless, it has been criticised because of its inherently weak and fragile structure in terms of financial and economic stability. As a theoretical solution, full reserve banking has been supported in academic circles, with many technical variations. However, Islamic economics can help to maintain financial and economic stability with its original institution of waqf. Besides performing social functions, waqf also undertakes financial intermediary functions and preserved financial stability in the period of the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of fractional reserve banking on economic stability and to make a comparison with full reserve banking to observe its potential as an alternative solution. The study also examines the efficiency of the Islamic social and economic institution of waqf in maintaining economic stability in both fractional and full reserve systems. The results demonstrate that full reserve banking is a promising approach to maintaining economic stability and that waqf enhances economic stability in both banking systems.

scholarly journals A Digital Currency Architecture for Privacy and Owner-Custodianship

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Goodell ◽  
Hazem Danny Al-Nakib ◽  
Paolo Tasca
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Point Of Sale ◽  
Digital Currency ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Banking Relationships ◽  
Reserve Banking ◽  
Payment Mechanisms

In recent years, electronic retail payment mechanisms, especially e-commerce and card payments at the point of sale, have increasingly replaced cash in many developed countries. As a result, societies are losing a critical public retail payment option, and retail consumers are losing important rights associated with using cash. To address this concern, we propose an approach to digital currency that would allow people without banking relationships to transact electronically and privately, including both e-commerce purchases and point-of-sale purchases that are required to be cashless. Our proposal introduces a government-backed, privately-operated digital currency infrastructure to ensure that every transaction is registered by a bank or money services business, and it relies upon non-custodial wallets backed by privacy-enhancing technology, such as blind signatures or zero-knowledge proofs, to ensure that transaction counterparties are not revealed. Our approach to digital currency can also facilitate more efficient and transparent clearing, settlement, and management of systemic risk. We argue that our system can restore and preserve the salient features of cash, including privacy, owner-custodianship, fungibility, and accessibility, while also preserving fractional reserve banking and the existing two-tiered banking system. We also show that it is possible to introduce regulation of digital currency transactions involving non-custodial wallets that unconditionally protect the privacy of end-users.

Banks, private money creation, and regulatory reform

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-34
Author(s):  
Gerry Cross
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Recent Criticism ◽  
Multiple Use ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Private Money ◽  
Money Creation ◽  
Reserve Banking ◽  
New Framework

Purpose This paper aims to consider recent arguments that post-crisis regulatory reform has misunderstood the nature of banks’ activities. These arguments suggest that a bank’s role is not that of intermediation between savers and borrowers but the systemically riskier one of private money creation. Design/methodology/approach The paper assesses whether banks’ activities are best understood as private money creation rather than intermediation. It considers the argument that regulatory reform has not gone far enough to prevent a recurrence of future credit spirals ending in financial crises. Findings This paper analyses banks’ activities and finds that it is incorrect to consider that they engage in relatively unfettered money creation. While fractional reserve banking does create flows of money through the economy, these flows are tethered to banks’ funding requirements. Multiple use of that money, rather than representing an ill-understood risk, simply reflects the nature of maturity transformation. This has not been missed in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework. The revised framework contains many features that are not fully recognised by proponents of the money creation critique and goes significantly further than they allow. Once completed, it will address many of the concerns they raise. They are right to call for further consideration of whether the countercyclical features of the new framework are sufficiently developed. Originality/value The paper provides an early detailed response to recent criticism of the post-crisis regulatory reform programme coming from a money creation perspective of banks’ role in the economy.

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