scholarly journals The Effect of Tax Aggressiveness and Corporate Governance on Audit Fees: Evidences from Brazil

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Lopo Martinez ◽  
Rubem Cardoso Lessa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness

scholarly journals Tax Aggressiveness, Corporate Governance and Audit Fees: A Study of Listed Firms in Nigeria

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
E. A. Onatuyeh ◽  
I. Ukolobi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Female Gender ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Board Gender Diversity

The concept of audit fee has received immense empirical investigation in literature. However, these vast studies have not sufficiently explored the relation of the concept with tax aggressiveness and corporate governance. This study therefore sought to provide empirical evidence as to whether tax aggressive and corporate governance mechanisms are significantly associated with audit fees among listed firms in Nigeria. Leaning on the agency and stakeholder theories, the study examined the measures of tax aggressiveness of effective tax rate and cash tax rate as well as corporate governance mechanisms of board gender diversity, audit committee diligence, and board independence; and how these variables explain changes in external audit fees. A sample of one hundred and seven (107) firms from the entire firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at December, 2018 was utilised. Data were sourced solely from annual financial statements of the studied firms over a ten-year period (2009 to 2018). The panel regression technique, with preference for the random effect model based on the outcome of the Hausman test, was employed to estimate the balanced panel data. The results of the study showed that cash tax rate, audit committee diligence and board independence all exert positive and significant effect on audit fees. Surprisingly, the study revealed a positive but statistically insignificant link between board gender diversity and audit fees. This result may not be unconnected with the low presence of female directors on the board of the firms investigated. In light of the findings, we therefore recommend that more female gender should be allowed to sit on the boards of listed firms in Nigeria in line with the Norwegian model of 40% female gender representation and the Federal Government 35% Affirmative Action. We also recommend that board independence should be encouraged more so as to enhance their oversight functions, and promote quality financial reporting and audit amongst listed firms in Nigeria.

Corporate governance, CEO compensation and tax aggressiveness

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khamoussi Halioui ◽  
Souhir Neifar ◽  
Fouad Ben Abdelaziz
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Great Influence ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Corporate Governance Structure ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Interactive Decision Making

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on the level of tax aggressiveness. Design/methodology/approach This work analyzes a sample of 471 observations of 100 companies listed on the NASDAQ 100 for the period 2008-2012. It uses a fixed-effect panel model to analyze the effect of different model variables on the tax aggressiveness level. Findings The main finding of this study is the great influence of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on reducing tax aggressiveness. Indeed, it finds a significant negative relation between board size, CEO salary, CEO stock options and tax aggressiveness. In addition, the study reveals that there is a direct negative relation between CEO duality, tax fees and tax aggressiveness. Research limitations/implications The study was conducted using robust methods to test the effect of corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on tax aggressiveness level. The generalized least squares method was used to fit panel data and overcome heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems. The aim of the study was to prove the great effect of both corporate governance structure and CEO compensation on reducing tax aggressiveness. As this study was based on data from American companies, the results cannot be generalized to all contexts. Originality/value This paper differs from previous work and tests the effect of corporate governance structure, CEO compensation, CEO characteristics and audit fees on tax aggressiveness. The findings of this study will enrich the literature on tax aggressiveness by suggesting that corporate governance structure and CEO compensation can significantly limit tax aggressiveness behavior. Therefore, shareholders must be aware of these two variables. They need to limit tax aggressiveness behavior, as it is usually accompanied by rent diversion, as reported by Desai and Dharmapala (2006). Therefore, these findings will be helpful to investors, managers and regulators because they have implications for the interactive decision-making process.

Conditional Conservatism and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hye Seung (Grace) Lee ◽  
Xu Li ◽  
Heibatollah Sami
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Potential Benefit ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Debt Contracting ◽  
Conditional Conservatism ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Impact

SYNOPSIS In this study, we examine the impact of conditional conservatism on audit fees and, more importantly, the influence of corporate governance on this relationship. Prior literature presents evidence regarding explanations for the existence and pervasiveness of accounting conservatism such as compensation and debt contracting, shareholder litigation, taxation, and accounting regulation. However, there is very limited evidence or discussion of the potential benefit of accounting conservatism on audit risk and thus audit fees, and how the potential benefit can be attenuated by corporate governance quality. Using a sample of firm-year observations over the period of 2004–2009, we provide evidence consistent with conditional conservatism and firms' commitment to such conservatism reducing their audit fees. However, our evidence shows that this reduction in audit fees is moderated by higher corporate governance quality. These results have implications for auditors, regulators, standard setters, and firms' managers. In addition, our study extends the literature on the determinants of audit fees. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; D81; D22.

scholarly journals The Overseas Experience of Audit Committee and Audit Fees: Empirical Evidence from China

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Chengai Li ◽  
Lin Pan ◽  
Meilan Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Learning Experience ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Quality Of Accounting Information ◽  
The Impact

The complexity of audit committee experience, including the overseas experience, has an important impact on corporate governance. In this paper, we study the impact of the overseas experiences of the members of audit committee on audit fees. Our empirical analysis and results show that the audit committee overseas experience can significantly increase audit fees. Further, the positive influence of the audit committee overseas experience on audit fees is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises and regions with weak marketization. In addition, we divide the overseas experience into overseas learning experience and overseas working experience. We find that both types of experience present in the audit committee significantly increase the audit fees. Finally, we find that the audit committee overseas experience can significantly improve the quality of accounting information and play a positive role in corporate governance.

scholarly journals The effect of financial distress and earnings management on tax aggressiveness with corporate governance as the moderating variable

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 167-176
Author(s):  
Ratih Pujirahayu Nugroho ◽  
Sutrisno T Sutrisno ◽  
Endang Mardiati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Sample Collection ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness

This study aims to verify the correlation between financial distress and earnings management of tax aggressiveness moderated by corporate governance. This study uses a population of manufacturing companies that publish their financial statement on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2017 until 2018. Sample collection was performed using a purposive sampling method, resulting in a total of 212 populations that published complete financial reports. This study was tested by using the Multiple Regression Analysis test. This research gave empirical proofs that financial distress and real earnings management positively influenced the tax aggressiveness was supported, the proportion of independent commissioners weakened the financial distress and negatively impacted the tax aggressiveness was supported, the total audit committees weakened the financial distress and negatively influenced the tax aggressiveness was not supported, the proportion of independent commissioners and total audit committees weakened the real earnings management and negatively affected the tax aggressiveness was not supported

scholarly journals TATA KELOLA, KOMPENSASI CEO, KARAKTERISTIK CEO, ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES DAN TAX AGGRESSIVENESS

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Ririn Juliawaty ◽  
Christina Dwi Astuti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Analysis Model ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Independent Variable ◽  
Positive Effect

<p><em>The purpose of this research is</em><em> </em><em>to examine the effect of corporate governance, CEO characteristic, CEO compensation, and accounting irregularities on tax aggressiveness. The dependent variable in this research is tax aggressiveness, while the independent variable in this research are corporate governance, characteristic CEO and CEO compensation</em><em>.</em></p><p><em>This study used secondary data with entire population manufacture companies listed at the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for 2015 -2017. The research sample are consists of 37 companies. The sampling method used to determine the sample is purposive sampling. The analysis model used in this research is multiple regression of panel data.</em><em></em></p><p><em>Based on analytical results concluded that independent director have a significant and negative effect on tax aggressiveness while accounting irregularities has a significant and positive effect on tax aggressiveness. The board size, CEO compensation, age, and CEO tenure have no significant effect on tax aggressiveness. </em></p>

The effect of audit fees, audit quality and board ownership on tax aggressiveness: evidence from Thailand

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marziana Madah Marzuki ◽  
Muhammad Syukur Muhammad Al-Amin
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Tax Aggressiveness ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Board Ownership

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of audit fees, auditors' quality and board ownership on tax aggressiveness in Thailand.Design/methodology/approachThe sample of this study is based on 215 firm-year observations of SET-100 listed companies in Thailand during the 2010–2018 periods. This study employs a panel least square regression with period fixed effects. The study retrieved the corporate governance variables from the downloaded annual reports, whilst the remaining data were collected from the EMIS database.FindingsThis study provides evidence that audit fees reduce tax aggressiveness and board ownership enhance tax aggressiveness among the firms. Nonaudit services provided by auditors impair auditors' independence and lead to higher tax aggressiveness. The result supports the agency theory, which explains that managers and blockholders may enjoy private benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders in the absence of market control. Thus, firms need good governance practices such as incentives paid for the effort of auditors and nonaudit services monitoring to curb such exploitation.Research limitations/implicationsThe results provide implications to the firms and regulators that incentives to the monitoring parties such as auditors can reduce tax aggressiveness among the firms. Nevertheless, higher ownership given to boards as incentives may lead to concentrated ownership and thus lead to the type 2 agency problem, which is between majority and minority shareholders. The result also provides caution to the regulators to monitor the nonaudit services provided by the auditors as it might impair their independence and compromise the tax paid to IRB.Originality/valueThis study is pioneer research discussing tax avoidance in Thailand. The Thai Government has been noticing that tax avoidance is being performed in the country, but academic discussion on this topic had never been elaborated.

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