ChinaMeasures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum

2015 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 616-623
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Trujillo
Keyword(s):  
Rare Earths ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Environmental Concerns ◽  
High Tech ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Export Restrictions

In a proceeding brought against the People’s Republic of China by the United States (in which Japan and the European Union joined), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled that China violated its obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT)1 by imposing export restrictions on “rare earths,” minerals used in mobile phones, hybrid cars, and other high-tech products. In upholding the earlier decision of a WTO dispute settlement panel, the Appellate Body rejected China’s argument that export duties, quotas, and other restrictions could be justified by health and environmental concerns.

scholarly journals China – Countervailing and Anti-dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States: exporting US AD/CVD methodologies through WTO dispute settlement?

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
EDWIN VERMULST
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Electrical Steel ◽  
The United States ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Target Country ◽  
Injury Analysis

AbstractIn July 2009, Chinese steel producers of grain oriented electrical steel filed anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases against US and Russian producers. The US challenged the duties for a variety a reasons, many of which involved deficiencies in the producers' application to China's investigating authority, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM). The US also challenged certain aspects of MOFCOM's injury analysis. The Panel and Appellate Body ruled in favor of the US on virtually every issue. Given the deficiencies in the application and China's handling of the case, the Panel and AB decisions were justified. In a larger sense, however, we believe China may well emerge as the ‘winner’ in this dispute as this case establishes important standards for allegations and evidence in applications, standards that other countries (including the US) likely have failed to meet when they have imposed AD and CVD orders on the largest target country, China.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

On the Legality of the United States Action of Terminating India’s GSP Status

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-129
Author(s):  
R. Rajesh Babu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Generalized System Of Preferences ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Developmental Opportunities ◽  
Enabling Clause

Since the US Presidential Proclamation terminating India status as a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) beneficiary with effect from 5 June 2019, questions are raised on the WTO legitimacy of such an action. The US measure, which appears to have a punitive element—a move precipitated by lack of reciprocity from India by not providing ‘equitable and reasonable access’ for US products in Indian markets—challenges the fundamentally premise of the GSP schemes. Since the GSP schemes are established to provide economic and developmental opportunities for developing countries, and once established must be administered as per the 1979 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Enabling Clause, meaning it must be on a ‘generalised’, ‘non-reciprocal’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ basis, can India raise a legitimate challenge against the US action at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body? Or can the GSP schemes, being voluntary and unilaterally administered, be structured by developed countries as trade policy tools with stringent trade and non-trade conditionalities? The decision of the Appellate Body in European Communities—Tariff Preferences, the contested nature of the Enabling Clause and the heterogeneous nature of developing countries at the WTO makes the interpretation knotty. In this context, this article provides a brief comment on the legal basis of the Enabling Clause in the WTO framework and the legitimacy of the US action of termination of India from the beneficiary status. Keeping aside the legal question, the author is also of the view that time is ripe for India to consider ‘graduating’ itself from such preferential arrangements and engage in binding obligations that are reciprocal and sustainable. JEL Codes: K33, O24

scholarly journals Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENRY GAO
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Issue ◽  
Recent Attempt ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us

AbstractThis paper discusses an important legal issue raised by the United States in its recent attempt to block the reappointment of an Appellate Body member. According to the US, in some of his decisions, the member has made overreaching findings that amount to obiter dicta. As obiter dictum is a unique concept in the Common Law system, the US argument may only stand if the concept may be found in the WTO legal system as well. With a careful analysis of the concept of dicta in Common Law and a close examination of the effects of past panel and Appellate Body decisions in WTO dispute settlement, the paper rejects the US argument by refuting each of the three premises of the US argument, i.e., the WTO legal system based on Common Law; WTO follows stare decisis; and the WTO has rules against dicta. In addition to original contributions on the nature of the WTO dispute settlement system in theory, the article also provides some practical advice on how the controversy may be resolved.

scholarly journals Book Review: Jens Lehne, Crisis at the WTO: Is the Blocking of Appointments to the WTO Appellate Body by the United States Legally Justified?

sui generis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Sieber-Gasser
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Legal Arguments ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The US policy of blocking new appointments to the WTO Appellate Body relied on a number of legal arguments against the body’s work and ultimately succeeded in rendering the appellate mechanism of the WTO dispute settlement system inoperable in December 2019. In his book, Jens Lehne carefully analyses the various legal arguments officially brought forward by the US until summer 2019. His analysis is proof of the vulnerability of the WTO: despite equality of WTO members enshrined in the WTO treaties, the fate of the WTO remains largely dependent on the willingness of large economies to comply with a legally binding dispute settlement system.

Precedent in the WTO: Retrospective Reflections for a Prospective Dispute Settlement Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-277
Author(s):  
Mariana Clara de Andrade
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Legitimacy Crisis ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

Abstract Several factors triggered the legitimacy crisis which paralysed the WTO Appellate Body in December 2019. This article focuses on one of them: the criticism expressed by the United States that the ‘Appellate Body claims its reports are entitled to be treated as precedent’. This work describes the origins of the problem and examines the issue of the precedential value of adopted reports within the WTO dispute settlement. It argues that the problem cannot be addressed through textual attempts to better define the value of precedent, as some have suggested, but can be alleviated through the practice of adjudicators. Moreover, it argues that the criticisms regarding the precedential value of past reports is due to the inherent hierarchy ensuing from the existence of an appeals organ. Therefore, the demise of the Appellate Body may weaken the precedential value of past adopted reports.

How China Came to Dominate the Rare Earth Industry

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophia Kalantzakos
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Rare Earth ◽  
Rare Earths ◽  
World Trade ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The World ◽  
Control Production

Once a leader in the production and trading of rare earths, the United States relinquished the reins to China in the 1990s. The People’s Republic of China declared rare earths “protected and strategic materials” and proceeded to control production and processing, introduced export quotas, and sought to dominate the supply chain for crucial applications. It also made investments in mines worldwide. The 2010 crisis caused a parabolic rise in prices, leading the United States, the European Union, and Japan to file a complaint against China at the World Trade Organization, in 2012, and to launch trilateral cooperation workshops, starting in 2011, to promote recycling, substitution, and innovation. China lost its WTO appeal and removed the export quotas in May 2015. The market corrected itself, and it may seem today that China lost an initial battle; but closer examination indicates that it may not have lost the war.

European Communities restrictions on imports of beef treated with hormones—nontariff trade barriers—control of food additives—scientific basis for restrictions—WTO dispute settlement mechanisms—scope of review

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
David A. Wirth
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Food Additives ◽  
Meat Products ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement

European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products. WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R.World Trade Organization Appellate Body, January 16, 1998.This report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both the most recent development in a long-running trade battle between the United States and the European Communities and the first dispute to be addressed under a new Uruguay Round agreement concerning food safety measures.

scholarly journals What's behind GM food trade disputes?

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEE ANN JACKSON ◽  
KYM ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Gm Food ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Eu

Over the past decade, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have implemented widely divergent regulatory systems to govern the production and consumption of genetically modified (GM) agricultural crops. In the US, many GM varieties have been commercially produced and marketed, while in the EU few varieties have been approved: a de facto moratorium limited EU production, import and domestic sale of most GM crops from late 1998 to April 2004, and since then strict labelling regulations and a slow approval process are having a similar effect. The EU policies have substantially altered trade flows and led in September 2003 to the WTO establishing a WTO Dispute Settlement panel to test the legality of European policy towards imports of GM foods. This paper seeks to better understand the economic forces behind the different regulatory approaches of the US and the EU. It uses a model of the global economy (GTAP) to examine empirically how GM biotechnology adoption would affect the economic welfare of both adopting and non-adopting countries in the absence of alternative policy responses to this technology, and in their presence. These results go beyond earlier empirical studies to indicate effects on real incomes of farm households, and suggest the EU moratorium on GM imports helps EU farmers even though it requires them to forego the productivity boost they could receive from the new GM biotechnology.

scholarly journals Is the WTO Appellate Body in Limbo? The Roots of the Crisis in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the Available Routes Navigating the Quagmire

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 ◽  
pp. 1-46
Author(s):  
Nnamdi Stanislaus Umenze
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Dispute ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

In its over 25 years' history, the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been touted as one of the most active and successful international adjudicatory systems in relation to other international dispute settlement fora. The process in the engagement of the system presents a tripartite structure consisting of consultation, panel and appellate stages, and the enforcement proceedings. The functions of these processes help to promote the trust and confidence of the member states in the WTO trade dispute settlement system. Now the Appellate Body (AB) is paralysed following the incapacitation and consequential suspension of the appellate function of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), because of the insufficient membership caused by the United States blockade on the appointment process of AB members. The paper discusses the trajectory of the WTO dispute settlement reform from the GATT regime, the root cause of the suspension of the Appellate Body, and the options available for the disputants in and outside the WTO system. It concludes that the system possesses policy defects if the attitude of a single state can render the AB non-functional and should be transformed when the appellate system is resuscitated.

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