Kefaya and the New Politics of Anti-Americanism

Author(s):  
Manar Shorbagy

This essay examines the Kefaya movement in Egypt and what the author calls the new politics of anti-Americanism in Egypt. The essay provides some needed historical background to the era of George W. Bush’s politics and the U.S. hopes for an “Arab Spring.” The essay argues that there has long been a policy in Washington, D.C., toward the Middle East that is a vision and not just a policy, and that it preceded regime change in Iraq. The author argues, moreover, that the U.S. has long sought a Middle East devoid of any resistance to the United States and Israel, that the U.S. has colossally failed in the Middle East, and that this demonstrates the perils of ignoring the complex realities of that area of the world. This essay (drawing on open-ended interviews, statements, newspaper articles, reports, and unpublished documents) presents the Kefaya movement as an example of a Middle Eastern movement with transformative potential, at once a cross-ideological force and an alternative mode of resistance to American imperialism.

Author(s):  
Michael C. Hudson

This chapter examines the roots of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It begins with an overview of the origins and development of the United States’s involvement in the region over the past century, focusing on the traditional American interests. It then considers the structure of Middle Eastern policymaking and its domestic political context, as well as Washington’s response to new regional tensions and upheavals since the late 1970s. It also discusses new developments in the region, including the rise of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Palestinian–Israeli impasse. The evolution of U.S. policy since 2000 in the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama is explored as well. The chapter concludes with an analysis of an ‘Obama doctrine’ and ‘American decline’ in the Middle East and the world.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geraint Hughes

This article analyzes the impact on transatlantic relations of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, focusing on the discrepancy between U.S. and British views of Middle Eastern security before and during the conflict. Despite the institutional factors shaping the U.S.-British “special relationship” and the much greater power of the United States compared to Britain, British policy during the 1973 war was sharply at odds with U.S. policy. This article shows that British policy toward the Middle East was shaped not only by economic concerns (namely the importance of Arab oil to the UK economy) but also by the strategic requirement to undermine Soviet influence in the region and strengthen ties between the Western powers and the Arab states.


2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thierry Hentsch

The Middle East is generally perceived in the West, often in simplistic terms, as an area which is crucial to the West's economic and strategic interests. Given the complexity of this new « Eastern question », the Western perspective is important because it counts for a lot in determining the future of this region and in defining the position the Middle East holds in the world System. This dominant perspective has nonetheless the defect of putting on the back burner the interests of the peoples of the Middle East and the possibilities of a different scenario which corresponds less with the designs of the great powers today and more with the needs of the Middle Eastern countries. The present and future position of the Middle East in the world System should thus be examined from an internal viewpoint as much as from an external one. Seen from the outside, the region appears essentially as a pawn. From this perspective, the deterioration of the Palestinian question permits the great powers (particularly the United States) to keep the Arab governments divided and thus blocks the way to regional cooperation susceptible to putting the energy resources of the oil producers at the service of self-directed development in the region. Seen from the inside, however, this cooperation, beyond its economic advantages, has interesting social and cultural possibilities, It is thus a question of knowing which conditions would develop these possibilities. The question is important because, to a certain extent, the outcome of the Middle Eastern situation will serve as an example to the Third World as a whole to the extent that the Middle East develops a strategy for a new kind of development defined and carried out free from dependency on external powers. The precondition to this effort is clearly the formulation and effective maintenance of a common Arab position which is coherent and realistic on the Palestinian question ; inevitably this is central to all Middle Eastern policy.


2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Mart

AbstractIn the 1950s, the United States experienced a domestic religious revival that offered postwar Americans a framework to interpret the world and its unsettling international political problems. Moreover, the religious message of the cold war that saw the God-fearing West against atheistic communists encouraged an unprecedented ecumenism in American history. Jews, formerly objects of indifference if not disdain and hatred in the United States, were swept up in the ecumenical tide of “Judeo-Christian” values and identity and, essentially, “Christianized” in popular and political culture. Not surprisingly, these cultural trends affected images of the recently formed State of Israel. In the popular and political imagination, Israel was formed by the “Chosen People” and populated by prophets, warriors, and simple folk like those in Bible stories. The popular celebration of Israel also romanticized its people at the expense of their Arab (mainly Muslim) neighbors. Battling foes outside of the Judeo-Christian family, Israelis seemed just like Americans. Americans treated the political problems of the Middle East differently than those in other parts of the world because of the religious significance of the “Holy Land.” A man such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who combined views of hard-nosed “realpolitik” with religious piety, acknowledged the special status of the Middle East by virtue of the religions based there. Judaism, part of the “Judeo-Christian civilization,” benefitted from this religious consciousness, while Islam remained a religion and a culture apart. This article examines how the American image of Jews, Israelis, and Middle Eastern politics was re-framed in the early 1950s to reflect popular ideas of religious identity. These images were found in fiction, the press, and the speeches and writings of social critics and policymakers. The article explores the role of the 1950s religious revival in the identification of Americans with Jews and Israelis and discusses the rise of the popular understanding that “Judeo-Christian” values shaped American culture and politics.


2005 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 21-28
Author(s):  
Graham E. Fuller

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? GEF: Who is a moderate Muslim? That depends on whom you ask and what that person’s (or government’s) agenda is. Moderate is also a quite relative term, understood differently by different people. For our purposes here, let’s examine two basically different approaches to this question: an American view and a Middle Eastern view of what characterizes a moderate Muslim. Most non-Muslims would probably define a moderate Muslim as anyone who believes in democracy, tolerance, a non-violent approach to politics, and equitable treatment of women at the legal and social levels. Today, the American government functionally adds several more criteria: Amoderate Muslim is one who does not oppose the country’s strategic and geopolitical ambitions in the world, who accepts American interests and preferences within the world order, who believes that Islam has no role in politics, and who avoids any confrontation – even political – with Israel. There are deep internal contradictions and warring priorities within the American approach to the Muslim world. While democratization and “freedom” is the Bush administration’s self-proclaimed global ideological goal, the reality is that American demands for security and the war against terror take priority over the democratization agenda every time. Democratization becomes a punishment visited upon American enemies rather than a gift bestowed upon friends. Friendly tyrants take priority over those less cooperative moderate and democratic Muslims who do not acquiesce to the American agenda in the Muslim world. Within the United States itself, the immense domestic power of hardline pro-Likud lobbies and the Israel-firsters set the agenda on virtually all discourse concerning the Muslim world and Israel. This group has generally succeeded in excluding from the public dialogue most Muslim (or even non-Muslim) voices that are at all critical of Israel’s policies. This de facto litmus test raises dramatically the threshold for those who might represent an acceptable moderate Muslim interlocutor. The reality is that there is hardly a single prominent figure in the Muslim world who has not at some point voiced anger at Israeli policies against the Palestinians and who has not expressed ambivalence toward armed resistance against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. Thus, few Muslim leaders enjoying public legitimacy in the Muslim world can meet this criterion these days in order to gain entry to the United States to participate in policy discussions. In short, moderate Muslimis subject to an unrealistic litmus test regarding views on Israel that functionally excludes the great majority of serious voices representative of genuine Muslim thinkers in the Middle East who are potential interlocutors. There is no reason to believe that this political framework will change in the United States anytime soon. In my view, a moderate Muslim is one who is open to the idea of evolutionary change through history in the understanding and practice of Islam, one who shuns literalism and selectivism in the understanding of sacred texts. Amoderate would reject the idea that any one group or individual has a monopoly on defining Islam and would seek to emphasize common ground with other faiths, rather than accentuate the differences. Amoderate would try to seek within Islam the roots of those political and social values that are broadly consonant with most of the general values of the rest of the contemporary world. A moderate Muslim would not reject the validity of other faiths. Against the realities of the contemporary Middle East, a moderate Muslim would broadly eschew violence as a means of settling political issues, but still might not condemn all aspects of political violence against state authorities who occupy Muslim lands by force – such as Russia in Chechnya, the Israeli state in the Palestine, or even American occupation forces in Iraq. Yet even here, in principle, a moderate must reject attacks against civilians, women, and children in any struggle for national liberation. Moderates would be open to cooperation with the West and the United States, but not at the expense of their own independence and sovereignty. 


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Eversman

This ongoing dispute clearly concerns the United States, the long-term third party in peace negotiations, and a close ally of Israel. However, now more than ever European and Middle Eastern states are invested in the resolution of this conflict. The stability of Israel and the humanitarian status of the Palestinians depend upon the resolution of this conflict. So, what should President Barack Obama hope to accomplish in the coming months, in light of the overwhelming array of issues already on his agenda? And what should the rest of the world expect from U.S. foreign policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under Mr. Obama’s administration? Political maneuvering is already underway and the recent elections in Israel have shifted the power structure of Israeli politics significantly to the right with Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud Party, elected as Prime Minister and sworn in at the end of March 2009. Furthermore, Egyptian negotiators are attempting to bridge the deep divide between Fatah and Hamas in order to strengthen the unity of Palestinian politics, but the outcome of this endeavor remains to be seen. As the global economic crisis continues to worsen, the attention of the world shifted from the Israeli- Palestinian conflict to the G-20 Summit and NATO meetings. Therefore, it is the role of world leaders, particularly the United States, to maintain focus on rebuilding Gaza and acting as intermediaries in any Israeli and Palestinian negotiations. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton must ensure the State Department keeps its finger firmly on the pulse of political and social activities in the region in order to prevent renewed fighting. The United States and Europe should have anticipated more aware of this impending crisis and in the aftermath of the conflict, neither can afford to watch from the sidelines. Dialogue and diplomacy are the way out of this mess, and it is in the interests of both Europe and the U.S. to engage both sides in this dispute if further violence is to be prevented. If Mr. Obama wants to have peace in the Middle East in our time, he will have to persuade all of the actors to sit around a table and to talk about the conflict. The Bush administration’s strategy of strengthening Fatah and isolating Hamas has not worked. Secret negotiations are just as ineffectual as the exclusion of certain actors. Only a common platform for dialogue will enable the U.S. and the European Union to fulfill their peacemaking mission.


1997 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. A. LEE

This study represents part of a long-term research program to investigate the influence of U.K. accountants on the development of professional accountancy in other parts of the world. It examines the impact of a small group of Scottish chartered accountants who emigrated to the U.S. in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Set against a general theory of emigration, the study's main results reveal the significant involvement of this group in the founding and development of U.S. accountancy. The influence is predominantly with respect to public accountancy and its main institutional organizations. Several of the individuals achieved considerable eminence in U.S. public accountancy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-429
Author(s):  
Robert N. McCauley

Abstract Since the late 1950s, the rest of the world has come to use the dollar to an extent that justifies speaking of the dollar’s global domain. The rest of the world denominates much debt in U.S. dollars, extending U.S. monetary policy’s sway. In addition, in outstanding foreign exchange deals, the rest of the world has undertaken to pay still more in U.S. dollars: off-balance-sheet dollar debts buried in footnotes. Consistent with the scale of dollar debt, most of the world economic activity takes place in countries with currencies tied to or relatively stable against the dollar, forming a dollar zone much larger than the euro zone. Even though the dollar assets of the world (minus the United States) exceed dollar liabilities, corporate sector dollar debts seem to make dollar appreciation akin to a global tightening of credit. Since the 1960s, claims that the dollar’s global role suffers from instability and confers great benefits on the U.S. economy have attracted much support. However, evidence that demand for dollars from official reserve managers forces unsustainable U.S. current account or fiscal deficits is not strong. The so-called exorbitant privilege is small or shared. In 2008 and again in 2020, the Federal Reserve demonstrated a willingness and capacity to backstop the global domain of the dollar. Politics could constrain the Fed’s ability to backstop the growing share of the domain of the dollar accounted for by countries that are not on such friendly terms with the U.S.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 132-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toby Dodge

Even before its hundredth year anniversary on 16 May 2016, the Sykes-Picot agreement had become a widely cited historical analogy both in the region itself and in Europe and the United States. In the Middle East, it is frequently deployed as an infamous example of European imperial betrayal and Western attempts more generally to keep the region divided, in conflict, and easy to dominate. In Europe and the United States, however, its role as a historical analogy is more complex—a shorthand for understanding the Middle East as irrevocably divided into mutually hostile sects and clans, destined to be mired in conflict until another external intervention imposes a new, more authentic, set of political units on the region to replace the postcolonial states left in the wake of WWI. What is notable about both these uses of the Sykes-Picot agreement is that they fundamentally misread, and thus overstate, its historical significance. The agreement reached by the British diplomat Mark Sykes and his French counterpart, François Georges-Picot, in May 1916, quickly became irrelevant as the realities on the ground in the Middle East, U.S. intervention into the war, a resurgent Turkey and the comparative weakness of the French and British states transformed international relations at the end of the First World War. Against this historical background, explaining the contemporary power of the narrative surrounding the use of the Sykes-Picot agreement becomes more intellectually interesting than its minor role in the history of European imperial interventions in the Middle East.


1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 98-99
Author(s):  
James F. Parr ◽  
Robert I. Papendick

Six papers in this issue were presented by Middle Eastern authors at the U.S.-Middle East Conference and Workshop on "Dryland Farming Systems and Technologies for a More Sustainable Agriculture," held at Moscow, Idaho on October 18–23, 1993.


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