scholarly journals Crocifisso “per scelta”. Dall’obbligatorietà alla facoltatività dell’esposizione del crocifisso nelle aule scolastiche (in margine a Cass. civ., sez. un., ord. 9 settembre 2021, n. 24414)

Author(s):  
Angelo Licastro

SOMMARIO: 1. La giusta presa di distanza da paradigmi di approccio dello Stato verso l’esperienza religiosa estranei al nostro modello costituzionale di diritto ecclesiastico - 2. L’esclusione del carattere discriminatorio del provvedimento adottato dal dirigente scolastico - 3. Il principio di laicità e l’interpretazione conforme a Costituzione dell’art. 118 del r.d. 30 aprile 1924, n. 965 - 4. L’ipotesi di una “incompletezza” della norma regolamentare in rapporto alle diverse esperienze e convinzioni di fede ridefinite in una dimensione prettamente storico-culturale - 5. I residui profili di peculiare rilevanza del crocifisso rispetto agli altri simboli religiosi - 6. Le competenze degli organi di autonomia scolastica in tema di esposizione dei simboli religiosi e la composizione dei conflitti affidata agli “accomodamenti ragionevoli” - 7. Brevi notazioni conclusive. Crucifix “by Choice”. From Compulsory to Optional Display of Crucifixes in Italian Classrooms (Some Remarks on the Decision September 9th, 2021, no. 24414 of the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation) ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the decision September 9th, 2021, no. 24414, of the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, concerning the display of the crucifix in the classrooms. The Court has ruled that the presence of the crucifix on the wall does not discriminate against anyone. However, not the government authorities, but the students during an Assembly and the Class council must decide if display the crucifix and if eventually place other religious symbols next to it, seeking “reasonable accommodation” between the different positions of people in the school community.

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.


Author(s):  
Marcello Toscano

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. La decisione (in sintesi): una soluzione subottimale - 3. Il ruolo determinante del principio supremo di laicità - 4. Laicità sostanziale, laicità procedurale, accomodamento ragionevole - 5. Discriminazione diretta e indiretta. - 6. Conclusioni. The crucifix ‘accommodated’. Considerations at first reading of the judgment no. 24414/2021 by the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court of cassation ABSTRACT: With decision no. 24414/2021 the United Sections of the Italian Supreme Court of cassation have provided an unprecedented solution to the issue of religious symbols in the classrooms of public schools. In this essay the author analyses the judgment, focusing in particular on three aspects: the relationship between the so-called ‘Italian principle of secularism’ and the reasonable accommodation; the existence or not of discrimination against the teacher who has been obliged to teach under the crucifix; the practical ways in which this ruling can become 'living law' in the Italian legal system.


2020 ◽  
pp. 43-94
Author(s):  
Howard Gillman ◽  
Erwin Chemerinsky

Over the last few decades, there have been three competing views of the meaning of the Establishment Clause held by members of the Supreme Court. One, favored by the liberal justices, is that the Establishment Clause should be understood as creating a wall separating church and state. An alternative view, favored by the conservative justices, is that there should be “accommodation” between religion and government. Under this view, the government violates the Establishment Clause only if it creates a church, coerces religious participation, or discriminates among religions in giving financial benefits. A third position is that the government acts unconstitutionally if it endorses religion or a specific religion. The chapter argues that separation is the best view of the Establishment Clause and applies this to prayers at government activities, religious symbols on government property, and government aid to religious institutions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 127-137
Author(s):  
Noura Erakat

In late November 2019, the Israeli Supreme Court upheld the Ministry of Interior's order to deport Human Rights Watch (HRW) director for Israel and Palestine, Omar Shakir. The court based its decision on a 2017 amendment to Israel's 1952 Entry into Israel Law enabling the government to refuse entry to foreigners who allegedly advocate for the boycott of Israel. The same law was invoked to deny entry to U.S. congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar in the summer of 2019. The campaign against Shakir began almost immediately after he was hired by HRW in 2016, and the court's decision marked the culmination of a multi-year battle against the deportation order. In this interview, JPS Editorial Committee member, Rutgers University professor, and author Noura Erakat discusses the details of his case with Shakir in an exchange that also examines the implications of the case for human rights advocacy, in general, and for Palestinians, in particular. The interview was edited for length and clarity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

The persuasive force of the accepted account’s property logic has driven antitrust and intellectual property law jurisprudence for at least the past three decades. It has been through the theory of trademark ownership and the commercial strategy of branding that these laws led the courts to comprehend markets as fundamentally bifurcated—as operating according to discrete types of interbrand and intrabrand competition—a division that had an effect far beyond the confines of trademark law and resonates today in the way government agencies and courts evaluate the emerging challenges of the networked economy along the previously introduced distinction between intertype and intratype competition. While the government in its appeal to the Supreme Court in ...


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 371
Author(s):  
Bobby Briando ◽  
Sri Kuncoro Bawono ◽  
Tony Mirwanto

Eradication of corruption in Indonesia is still the main agenda of the government in building good governance. One method to expose corruption is to use a whistleblower role that can help find the criminal mode of corruption. Whistleblower mechanism is divided into three main dimensions: Human, Structure and Process. But in practice whistleblower reporters in corruption cases in Indonesia have not received maximum legal protection. In Indonesia the normative regulation governing pursuant to Law No.13 of 2006 concerning Witness and Victim Protection as well as Supreme Court Circular Letter (SEMA) No.4 Year 2011 on Treatment of Criminal Reporting and Witness of Actors Cooperation The results show that from three dimensions of whistleblower system still does not yet have binding legislation. Whistleblower reporters only accept lightening relief. Specific whistleblower legislation is urgent. In legislation, at least, it should be in accordance with Whistleblower's protection.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This article argues that the Senate’s refusal to consider the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court should be deemed unconstitutional. The Senate’s stonewalling disrespected the institutional needs of the judiciary, violated the constitutional norm of forbearance in the exercise of power, and assumed a Senate role in the appointments process that was never intended. Although no court would ever enjoin a recalcitrant President to make a nomination or an obstructionist Senate to meet with, deliberate over, or vote on a presidential nominee to the Supreme Court or anything else, the President’s and the Senators’ oaths to “support the Constitution” should be understood as entailing a good faith commitment to enabling the government to function.


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