Objectifying and Nonobjectifying Acts

Husserl ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 193-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ullrich Melle
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Other ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The One

This chapter examines the distinction between objectifying and non-objectifying acts. The latter, in reacting to the objects presented in objectifying acts, reveal further, nonmaterial determinations of objects, most notably, the value of the objects or states of affairs presented, which values, in turn, motivate desires and choices. The chapter explores the distinction and relations among the three classes of experience (logical-cognitive or intellective, evaluative, and practical) in order to reveal how Husserl tried to navigate between two theories of reason, a pure intellectualism on the one hand and a pure emotivism on the other, and how these two views of reason affected Husserl’s accounts of the three domains of reason (logical-intellective, axiological, and practical), each with its own form of justification. Husserl envisioned these three domains of reason in a determinate relationship: axiological reason is grounded in and dependent upon logical-cognitive reason, and practical reason is grounded in and dependent upon axiological reason.

Plato on Practical Reason and Practical Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. M. M. Olfert
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
The One

In Chapter 1, I argue that in a number of dialogues, Plato proposes that when we reason about what to do, we are equally and inseparably concerned with two sets of aims or concerns: grasping the truth and gaining knowledge on the one hand, and acting and acting well on the other. That is, from the perspective of practical reasoning, the goals of grasping the truth and gaining knowledge is inseparable from, and equally fundamental as, the goals of acting rationally and well. I argue that this Platonic idea is a plausible and worth examining both on its own terms, and because it has a legacy in Aristotle’s notion of practical truth. As I argue in the remainder of the Book, Aristotle uses his innovative conception of practical truth to formalize and make explicit the dual normative structure of practical reasoning suggested by Plato.

Practical Necessity and Historical Necessity in Historical Materialism

2021 ◽  
pp. 192-222
Author(s):  
David James
Keyword(s):  
Historical Materialism ◽  
Capitalist Society ◽  
The Other ◽  
First Person ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Practical Necessity ◽  
The One ◽  
Historical Necessity

Practical necessity is shown to play a key role in Marx’s explanation of the historical necessity to which historical materialism is committed and to facilitate the adoption of a first-person standpoint that introduces minimal assumptions about what would lead the relevant agents to act in ways that bring about certain events and states of affairs. It is argued that Marx’s commitment to the idea of historical necessity, on the one hand, and his account of the possibility of a society in which freedom and necessity are reconciled, on the other, generate a problem in relation to the historical necessity of a phase of history that precedes a post-capitalist society in which freedom and necessity are reconciled. The idea of historical necessity would not apply to this phase of history, whereas to claim that it does so implies the existence of ‘surplus’ practical necessity.

scholarly journals Moral Character and the Iteration Problem

Utilitas ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Character ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Ethical Thinking ◽  
The One

Moral evaluation is concerned with the attribution (to its various objects – actions, character, attitudes, states of affairs, institutions) of values whose distinction into two broad groups has become familiar. On the one hand, there are the most general moral values of lightness, wrongness, goodness, badness, and what ought to be or to be done. On the other, there is a great diversity of more specific moral values which these objects can have: of being a theft, for instance, or a thief; of honesty, reliability or callousness. Within the recent body of work attempting to restore to the virtues a central place in ethical thinking, two claims stand out. One is that, of these two kinds of values, the specific ones are explanatorily prior to the general – that if an action is wrong, it is because it is wrong in one of those specific respects. A second claim, though, is now standardly made definitive of ‘Virtue ethics’: that amongst the specific values, the value of character is explanatorily prior to that of action – that if an action is callous, say, it is because it expresses callousness of character – and that in this sense, the moral value of action derives from that of character. This second claim has been widely attacked; in what follows, I present a reason for believing that, at least in the case of callousness, it is right.

scholarly journals Exploring Kogi epistemic marking in interactional elicitation tasks: A report from the field

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominique Knuchel
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Spontaneous Speech ◽  
The Other ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Verbal Prefixes ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
The One ◽  
Relative Scarcity

AbstractThis paper discusses methods to investigate epistemic marking in Kogi, a Chibchan language of Colombia. The type of epistemic marking prominent in Kogi grammar belongs to the recently proposed category of engagement, which is concerned with signaling shared vs. non-shared access to a discourse object between the speech-act participants. This is manifested on the one hand in an (ad)nominal demonstrative that is licensed by shared visual or cognitive access to a referent, and on the other hand, in a set of verbal prefixes that reflect (a)symmetries in access to states of affairs. Given the relatively abstract meaning of epistemic markers as well as their particular context sensitivity, the study of such forms comes with certain challenges such as, for example, their elusiveness to semantic elicitation or relative scarcity in naturally occurring speech. The present study aims to circumvent these pitfalls by employing methods that constitute a middle ground between controlled elicitation and spontaneous speech, namely stimuli-based, interactional elicitation tasks, in which participants are asked to collaboratively solve a problem or develop a narrative. In addition to the description of the materials and procedures, the tasks are discussed with regard to the occurrence of engagement forms in the obtained data.

scholarly journals Practical theology: A critically engaged practical reason approach of practice, theory, practice and theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Klaasen
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Theology ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practice Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Dependent Relationship ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
The One

Browning’s influential use of practical reason for his fundamental practical theology is analysed. His correlation of theory and practice in his three stages of theory, practice and theory is also critiqued because his approach reduces practical theology almost to professionalism and principles for ministry. His approach could also result in an antagonistic relationship between practice and theory as practice is reduced to theory or academics. This article seeks to present a critically engaged practical reasoning approach in which theory and practice have an in-ter-dependent relationship. Practical reason is an activity in which engagement happens at every stage. For this to happen, theory and practice interact as equal variables that have a bearing on each other not to reduce the one to the other, but to complement each other in a lateral hermeneutical process. This process has four stages, unlike Browning’s three-stage correlation. The stages are schematically presented as practice, theory, practice and theory.

Aristotelian Phronêsis, the Discourse of Human Rights, and Contemporary Global Practice

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-30
Author(s):  
Stephen Salkever
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Development ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Global Politics ◽  
Globalizing World ◽  
The One ◽  
Contemporary Context

This essay outlines some fundamental differences between the evaluative and explanatory language of Aristotelian practical reason based on his empirical psychological theory of human development, on the one hand, and the late 20th and 21st century discourse of human rights based on a NeoKantian transcendent principle of universal human dignity on the other. To what extent are these two types of political discourse compatible in today’s globalizing world? To the extent that they are not compatible, which should be preferred? My answer is that they are compatible and even complementary, but only if the Aristotelian framework is treated as more fundamental, and the rights-and-dignity perspective is understood as a potentially good political solution, for the time being, in the contemporary context of global politics.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
The Other ◽  
Affective States ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Arts ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
The One

This chapter identifies a general dilemma in descriptive and explanatory claims about the arts. On the one side is the pull of continuity, in which responses to the contents of fictions and other imagined creations are said to be modeled (morally, affectively, epistemically) on responses to ordinary real-world states of affairs. On the other is the pull of discontinuity, in which such engagements are posed as offering potentially sui generis sorts of experiences that resist assimilation or reduction to those encountered in the everyday. This chapter identifies the place of the book’s discontinuity thesis within that general tension, and discusses the thesis’s main rivals: (1) those who argue that our affective states are not the same kind across encounters with fictions and the real world; and (2) those who argue for continuity or invariance of affective states across those contexts.

Faith in/as the Unconditional: Kant, Husserl, and Derrida on Practical Reason

Derrida Today ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-191
Author(s):  
Dylan Shaul
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theoretical Knowledge ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
The One

This article tracks Derrida's readings of Kant and Husserl as they explore the relation between, on the one hand, faith and knowledge, and on the other, theory and practice (theoretical and practical reason). Kant had to limit the scope of theoretical knowledge in order to make room for a practical faith in the rational ideas of the unconditioned (God, freedom, and immortality), generated through the unconditionality of the moral law. Husserl deployed the figure of ‘the Idea in the Kantian sense’ at those crucial moments in the exposition of his transcendental phenomenology where the unconditioned comes into play, a problematic strategy that Derrida judges to have revealed the limits of the phenomenological project. While Husserl's call for an unconditional theoretical and practical renewal of faith in reason appears to offer him an out, Husserlian faith is ultimately dependent on an untenable circularity, to which the Kantian variety also succumbs. Only Derrida's unconditional gift of faith can save the honour of reason from its mortal crisis, but in a manner that is itself not wholly a matter of reason.

scholarly journals Exploring Kogi epistemic marking in interactional elicitation tasks: A report from the field

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 447-467
Author(s):  
Dominique Knuchel
Keyword(s):  
Speech Act ◽  
Spontaneous Speech ◽  
The Other ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Verbal Prefixes ◽  
Naturally Occurring ◽  
Cognitive Access ◽  
The One ◽  
Relative Scarcity

AbstractThis paper discusses methods to investigate epistemic marking in Kogi, a Chibchan language of Colombia. The type of epistemic marking prominent in Kogi grammar belongs to the recently proposed category of engagement, which is concerned with signaling shared vs. non-shared access to a discourse object between the speech-act participants. This is manifested on the one hand in an (ad)nominal demonstrative that is licensed by shared visual or cognitive access to a referent, and on the other hand, in a set of verbal prefixes that reflect (a)symmetries in access to states of affairs. Given the relatively abstract meaning of epistemic markers as well as their particular context sensitivity, the study of such forms comes with certain challenges such as, for example, their elusiveness to semantic elicitation or relative scarcity in naturally occurring speech. The present study aims to circumvent these pitfalls by employing methods that constitute a middle ground between controlled elicitation and spontaneous speech, namely stimuli-based, interactional elicitation tasks, in which participants are asked to collaboratively solve a problem or develop a narrative. In addition to the description of the materials and procedures, the tasks are discussed with regard to the occurrence of engagement forms in the obtained data.

Pleasure and Fit in Kant's Aesthetics

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth F. Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Concept ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One

In the third Critique Kant shifts the focus in his enquiry from the status of factual statements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the grounding of moral imperatives in the Critique of Practical Reason to investigating two methods of considering the world which go beyond the strictly verifiable. This is a move from evaluating the interplay of a ‘determinate’ set of facts and intellectual preconditions to forming what Kant calls ‘reflective’ judgements on these facts. There are two major questions which the Critique of Judgement tackles. On the one hand Kant ambitiously considers how we might properly interpret a set of facts as comprising a larger teleological system and, on the other hand, he is interested in the seemingly quite separate issue of the appreciation of objects as beautiful. It is this latter issue which shall concern us here. Consistent with the reflective stand in the third Critique, Kant argues from the very outset that beauty is not an empirical concept with which we might describe the world. Beauty is not objective in the sense that size, colour or weight might be. Objective properties of this kind belong to the world of scientific understanding. Instead, he holds that judgements of aesthetic merit should be based upon the subjective pleasure we take in experiencing works of art and natural objects.

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