scholarly journals Counting the cost

Author(s):  
Geoff Gregory

The Wellington after the Quake conference, organised by the Earthquake Commission in Wellington in March 1995, sought to answer some of the questions faced by all concerned with the recovery and restoration phases of a major earthquake in a nationally significant city. The papers, which were by a range of international authorities, and the discussions were published later that year, and some copies of the volume are still available from the Earthquake Commission. Then, in November 1996, the Earthquake Commission and the Insurance Council of New Zealand jointly sponsored a seminar on Natural Hazards: Finding, managing and sharing people and information, and a summary booklet was prepared as a record for those who attended and to inform those who were unable to attend. This seminar, Counting the Cost: The economic effects of a major earthquake, was again sponsored jointly by the Earthquake Commission and the Insurance Council of New Zealand, with the intention of looking more closely at the economic effects of a major earthquake. It attracted about 200 participants, most coming from the insurance and banking industries, fund and risk managers, and economists in a range of organisations, although there were also representatives from emergency management and civil defence organisations, local and regional councils, and earthquake engineers. This report on the information presented in the papers and discussions has been prepared to highlight the main conclusions and themes raised, for both the attendees and a wider audience who were unable to be present.

Author(s):  
R. H. F. Holloway

In New Zealand, Civil Defence exists because many natural hazards and man-made accidents can create disasters of dimensions that could not be dealt with by the normal emergency services. The destructive earthquake without warning is probably the most difficult and dangerous threat to public safety for Civil Defence to contend with. Most other causes of disaster either have some degree of warning or are relatively localised compared with the sudden and widespread effects of a major earthquake. Civil Defence planning is, in a sense, already based upon a vague and imprecise prediction of earthquakes known to be more likely to occur in some areas than in others and accepted as likely to happen at any time. The effect on Civil Defence of
 better earthquake prediction will depend
 on the probability, accuracy (in time, location and magnitude) of such prediction and how soon before the event it can be made.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 565-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo-Yao Lee ◽  

New Zealanders are exposed to multiple natural hazards. The country has experienced major disasters in the past, but recent decades have been relatively uneventful.1This paper reviews the New Zealand approach to civil defence emergency management (CDEM), as introduced by the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the CDEM Act). The approach promotes co-operative planning and sustainable management of hazard risks through the “4Rs” - reduction (of risks), readiness, response and recovery. It recognises the central government’s roles of national coordination, and emphasises the responsibilities of regional CDEM Groups, local government and communities for managing local hazard risks. The paper reviews various initiatives to illustrate that capacity building is a collective effort requiring active involvement across central and local government, nongovernmental agencies, communities and all individuals. New Zealand’s preparedness is examined from several perspectives, including: the level of public preparedness, lessons learned from real emergencies, a national exercise programme, and a monitoring and evaluation programme. The paper concludes that New Zealanders are making progress but difficulties remain in persuading all parties to work towards the vision of a “Resilient New Zealand.” 1. This paper was submitted before the magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck the Canterbury region of the South Island of New Zealand (where the second largest city Christchurch is located) on 4 September 2010. Fortunately, no deaths and only a few serious injuries were reported as a result of the earthquake. The impact on buildings, infrastructure and economy, and psychosocial effects are being assessed as the paper is being finalised. However, the event is set to become the most costly disaster so far in New Zealand history. It will also be the most significant real test for many years of New Zealand’s emergency management arrangements, but it is too soon for an assessment in this paper of their effectiveness.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reid Basher

New Zealand faces significant risks associated with natural hazards (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2011) and is one of the most vulnerable countries to such risks for its size (Insurance Council of New Zealand, 2014). The 2010–11 Canterbury earthquake sequence resulted in 185 deaths, a $40 billion rebuild cost, equal to about 15% of GDP, and now over five years of continuing disruption and trauma for thousands of people (Potter et al., 2015). A recent Wellington City Council report put the cost of a large earthquake in that city at $12 billion for building and infrastructure damage alone, plus an annual GDP loss of $10 billion.


Author(s):  
R.L. Mowll ◽  
D.R. Brunsdon ◽  
F. Wilde ◽  
P.D. Leslie

Understanding seismic hazard and the potential impacts of an earthquake on a population allows better planning of response and recovery. It also allows a better understanding of how to mitigate against the effects of earthquakes. The Wellington Lifelines Group (WeLG) and the various Wellington lifeline utility organisations over the past five years have synthesised information on the consequences of a major earthquake, drawing upon hazard information (including from the GNS Science-led ‘It’s Our Fault’ studies), learning from civil defence emergency management exercises and from overseas earthquakes, and specialist studies commissioned by individual utilities. During 2012, WeLG facilitated specific discussions in order to summarise the time taken to restore water, transport, power (electricity) and telecommunications services following a rupture of the Wellington Fault, and therefore the effects on the population. The outcome of this work was an indication of substantial post-earthquake restoration times, agreed across and within key utility sectors. The time-scales for restoration of lifelines in a major earthquake are in the tens of days for power and water, and some key roads would not be recovered for up to 120 days. Telecommunications systems, particularly cell phone sites, would be recovered earlier, but are critically dependent upon access and fuel supplies for the refuelling of emergency generators. Given the significance of these likely restoration times for the community, it was decided to publically release the information, with buy-in from all of the lifeline utility organisations involved. The resulting report was released, with appropriate messaging, via the Wellington CDEM Group to the media in mid-November 2012. This paper provides a summary of the likely restoration times, background to their derivation, and the initial reactions to the release of the information.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S1) ◽  
pp. s86-s86 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.R.G. Humphrey ◽  
J. Mitchell ◽  
S.K. Mcbride

On February 22, 2011 at 12:51 pm an earthquake measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale struck the city of Christchurch, population 376,700 in the South Island of New Zealand. This followed a 7.3 magnitude earthquake in September 2010, but the shallowness (5km) and proximity of the February earthquake to the central city, resulted in far more devastation, with Modified Mercalli scores reaching ten in some areas and upward ground acceleration exceeding 2.4G. The application of the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) routinely used by New Zealand Civil Defence agencies was swift, innovative and efficient, facilitating rapid deployment of local and international emergency teams and response resources. The effectiveness of this response was partially attributed to lessons learnt from the September earthquake which, with hindsight, was a practise for the more serious February event. The community response was equally remarkable, with standard approaches to measuring preparedness and resilience suggesting that community resilience in Canterbury was high. A number of initiatives by the New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management may have fostered some of this resilience,particularly community- based resilience-building projects initiated by the Regional Emergency Management Office on 2009 and 2010, supported by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. In addition, website education resources and media promotion (“Get Ready Get Thru”) and a travelling exhibition called “The Pandemic Roadshow” had been particularly well received and remembered by Canterbury residents. However, two key events provided an impetus for the Canterbury community to burnish its resilience. First, the Swine flu (AH1N1) pandemic in 2009 resulted in a greater awareness of public health in emergencies along with a doubling of neighbourhood support groups. Secondly, the September 2010 earthquake resulted in the establishment of the student army of volunteers and improvement of public information management. This presentation will describe the markers of community resilience following the Christchurch earthquake and discuss how such resilience can be fostered in communities where emergency preparedness is not recognised as a priority.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135910532110299
Author(s):  
Terise Broodryk ◽  
Kealagh Robinson

Although anxiety and worry can motivate engagement with COVID-19 preventative behaviours, people may cognitively reframe these unpleasant emotions, restoring wellbeing at the cost of public health behaviours. New Zealand young adults ( n = 278) experiencing nationwide COVID-19 lockdown reported their worry, anxiety, reappraisal and lockdown compliance. Despite high knowledge of lockdown policies, 92.5% of participants reported one or more policy breaches ( M  = 2.74, SD = 1.86). Counter to predictions, no relationships were found between anxiety or worry with reappraisal or lockdown breaches. Findings highlight the importance of targeting young adults in promoting lockdown compliance and offer further insight into the role of emotion during a pandemic.


Author(s):  
Monika Jain

India dropped out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which included the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan and Australia, after negotiating for almost seven years in November 2018 on the grounds of national interest and also that free trade agreements (FTAs) did not amount to free trade and led to more trade diversion than trade creation. The cost and benefit of a regional agreement depend on the amount of trade creation with respect to trade diversion (Panagriya, 2000). This study tries to examine India’s concerns and at the same time, highlights the cost of not joining RCEP. India’s trade deficit with 11 out of the 15 RCEP nations has been a major cause of concern. Unfavourable trade balance, concerns about the impact on dairy sector, economic slowdown, past experience with FTA’s, China factor, data localisation, rules of origin, the experience of ASEAN countries with Sino-FTA have been some of the reasons behind India’s decision to opt-out of this mega multilateral agreement. Also, bilateral trade agreements with some RCEP countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and South Korea were operational. A multilateral trade agreement with ASEAN countries was very much in place. So, trade between India and 12 of the RCEP member countries would not have changed much after India’s inclusion in RCEP. The impact of lower tariffs would have been evident for the remaining three countries: China, Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, there was fear of a massive surge in imports of manufactures from China, dairy imports from Australia and New Zealand. This study also examines the long term impact of this decision and if India has missed out on becoming a part of the global value chain and gaining greater market access in the Asia Pacific region. India’s policy of import substitution and protectionism did not capitulate desired results in the past. Hence, a critical evaluation of India’s decision and some validation on her concerns and fears have been done.


Author(s):  
Stefanie Vandevijvere ◽  
Nick Young ◽  
Sally Mackay ◽  
Boyd Swinburn ◽  
Mark Gahegan

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