Foreign and Security Policy after the End of the Cold War

2009 ◽  
pp. 255-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Deighton
Special Duty ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 79-133
Author(s):  
Richard J. Samuels

This chapter explores how the accommodation by Japanese leaders to U.S. power and to the public's widespread aversion to security affairs shaped and stunted the Japanese intelligence community during the Cold War and beyond. Japan's intelligence failures in the Asia-Pacific War contributed to the new strategic environment that, in turn, drove the subsequent transformation of each element of Japan's intelligence community. The subordination of Japanese foreign and security policy to U.S. priorities set strict limits on the shape, pace, and direction of intelligence reform. In the nearly half century from 1945 to 1991 during which Japan was a junior partner to its conqueror, Japan's degenerated intelligence community became an undersized, compromised, and organizationally handicapped operation. Analysts have called Japan's Cold War intelligence community “a stark transformation from the past” marked by sharp “discontinuity.”


2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (162) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Strutynski

This article focuses on the analysis of the new strategic concept of NATO (Lisbon 2010) and its effect on German foreign and security policy. During the Cold War, the (old) Federal Republic of Germany had done well to recognize its limited sovereignty while at the same time expanding its economic and political influence in NATO and the EC/EU. This approach has not fundamentally changed with the unification of Germany in 1990. Since then Germany has been developing its imperial ambitions cautiously, embedded in the aggressive NATO military pact and the militarization of the EU. The credo of the new Germany is the enforcement of both;, German economic and geo-strategic interests as a nation cannot be achieved alone, but only within the range of existing alliances.


Author(s):  
Huiyun Feng

Scholars have heatedly debated whether and how culture impacts and shapes a state’s foreign and security policy in particular as well as international relations (IR) in general. The cultural approach to the studies of foreign policy has experienced two major waves since the end of the Cold War. We saw a revival of cultural studies in national security and foreign policy with the rise of constructivism in international relations in the 1990s, while into the 2000s, the culture approach focused on terrorism and globalization. Despite its achievement, the cultural approach continues to face theoretical and methodological challenges in conceptualization, measurement, and generalizability. Therefore, the cultural approach to foreign policy needs to work on demarcating the boundary of “cultural variables,” focusing on mid-range theorizing and placing the cultural variables within a context.


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-64 ◽  

After the end of the Cold-War, the EU started advancing its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP), making them part of reform that eventually led to the Lisbon Treaty. The article argues that this endeavour was above all a project of polity-construction: it endowed European integration with new purpose, imagining the EU as a polity that legitimately asserted itself globally as a civilising power. The article investigates how such polity-construction was generated during multilateral negotiations on the EU constitution and what different meanings it took on once inserted in national media debates in Poland and France. The argument is made that EU community-building is more adequately captured when looked at as ‘recontextualising polity-construction’, triggered top-down in legitimations of EU institution-building, than as ‘identity’ emerging bottom-up from societal imagination.


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juhana Aunesluoma ◽  
Johanna Rainio-Niemi

This article examines Finland's Cold War neutrality, highlighting its political and ideational dimensions. In contrast to other scholars who have stressed the pragmatic realpolitik considerations behind Finnish policymaking, the article demonstrates that political and ideological considerations were at least as important in shaping Finnish Cold War neutrality. The ideological and political identity dimensions are connected to the strong national consensus that lay behind Finnish neutrality policy and its wide, sustained public support. Paying attention to these dimensions helps us also to understand continuities in Finnish foreign and security policy that have continued into the post–Cold War period. The continuities of Cold War–era neutrality formulations are illustrated by a discussion of Finnish foreign policymaking in the final phase of the Cold War and the early 1990s.


Author(s):  
Spyros Economides

This chapter examines Greek foreign policy since the metapolitefsi through three broad characteristics. First, it argues that since 1974, a central defining feature of Greek foreign and security policy has been the search for an external guarantor of interests and provider of security which has seen Greece gradually shift away from American tutelage to that of the European Union. Second, is the idea that Greece’s external environment has had a determining influence on its foreign policy and security policy: it is argued that much of Greek external relations can be explained and understood through Greece’s position regionally and internationally at any given point in time in the Cold War or post-Cold War geopolitical context. Third, this chapter argues that we need to look more closely at the domestic sources of decision-making to gain a better understanding of how and why Greek foreign policy is formulated. In sum, the chapter aims to overcome piecemeal approaches to examining Greek foreign policy since 1974 by providing a more holistic understanding of the drivers of Greek foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Yu. Skorokhod

Since the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the UN in 1971, its approach to UN peacekeeping operations underwent significant alterations at least three times: after 1981, 1989/1990 and after 2003. This article examines the peculiarities of China’s approach to UN peacekeeping operations in 1971–1980 as to the tool of interference in the internal affairs of small states exercised by superpowers. The article claims that although Beijing’s approach to participation in UN peacekeeping efforts changed when in 1981 China began to vote on the UN Security Council for extending the mandates of UN current operations and began to pay contributions to the budget for peacekeeping, the evolution of China’s stance towards UN peacekeeping activities in fact became apparent only following the end of the Cold War, when China was able to take part in launching and implementation of the new peacekeeping operations. Beijing’s vision of the settlement of conflicts in the Persian Gulf (1990–1991) and Somalia, which had a significant impact on China’s position on the new trends in the development of UN peacekeeping practices, was also explored in the article. The author provides a thorough analysis of the main features of Chinaʼs stance on the development of theory and practice of UN peacekeeping in 1981–2003 and points out that in contrast to the previous period of 1971–1980 the countryʼs opposition to it was limited but not overwhelming, since China had elaborated its attitude towards peacekeeping in terms of its own national interests but not ideological reasons, in particular because of the need to create favorable external conditions for implementation of domestic reforms. The article also pays much attention to the study of changes which Chinaʼs peacekeeping policy has undergone since 2003 and which were marked by a significant increase in Chinaʼs participation in UN peacekeeping. The author explains the reasons behind reconsideration by the Chinese leadership of the role which UN peacekeeping played in Beijingʼs strategy of foreign policy; the article also defined political and reputational benefits which China derived from participating in UN peacekeeping operations. The conclusion is that Beijingʼs position on UN peacekeeping evolved from vivid obstructionism to active participation because of significant changes in Chinaʼs foreign and security policy and the development of theory and practice of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period. The article proves that the core traits of Chinaʼs policy towards UN peacekeeping are flexibility and pragmatism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 2-10
Author(s):  
Lili Takács

Italy has been storing U.S. nuclear tactical weapons since the fifties. During the Cold War Rome considered hosting nuclear weapons a tool to strengthen the international ranking of the country, hoping that it provides opportunity to restore trust in Italy’s international image, which had been shaken by World War II. As a consequence of the effect of bipolar logic on Italian domestic politics, hosting nuclear weapons guaranteed that the Italian Communist Party remained in opposition. Although the original reasons of hosting U.S. nuclear weapons have disappeared at the end of the Cold War, Italy is not actively promoting nuclear disarmament.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-120
Author(s):  
Dariusz Popławski

After the end of the Cold War, neutrality was redefined by adapting its functioning to the unprecedented changes in the international environment. This redefi nition covered two key areas; the change in attitudes towards international confl icts and the rejection of the principles of economic neutrality. By joining the EU, Austria, as a perpetually neutral state, made a commitment to fully conform with its obligations arising from participating in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The necessary changes to legal regulations have led to a departure from the principles of traditional neutrality and the actual change of international status to an alliance-free/post-neutral state. The main area of main Austrian political forces’ dispute within foreign and security policy was the recognition of the possibility of abandonment of neutrality and NATO membership. It remains unresolved as to whether the rejection of neutrality constitutes solely a legal and constitutional issue. At the same time, Austrian society, with its fi rm pro-European attitude, still shows a strong commitment to neutrality.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alper Kaliber

This study argues that the post-Cold War changes in Turkish foreign and security policy (FSP) can best be understood as the regionalization of strategic and security outlook in Turkey. Here regionalization refers to two interrelated processes: first, the process whereby security interest definitions and threat perceptions in Turkey have gained an increasingly regional character, and second the process whereby Turkey has increasingly defined itself as an activist regional power. Yet, the current study takes issue with the widespread assumption that regionalist activism of Turkish FSP can only be appropriated to the recent Justice and Development Party governments. Rather, it argues that the regionalist activism observed in the 2000s should be conceived as the second regionalist turn in Turkish FSP. The first wave of regionalization began soon after the end of the Cold War and developed in parallel to the rise of the 'region' as a new unit of security in global politics. This study compares and contrasts these two regionalist eras with a view to exploring the post-Cold War regionalization of FSP in Turkey.


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