Cold War Aesthetics in East Asia

2019 ◽  
pp. 52-76
Author(s):  
Petrus Liu
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
East Asia ◽  
Intellectual History ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Current Effort ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter argues that the conventional understanding that we live in a post-Cold War world order is part of an imperialist aesthetic logic for two important reasons. On the one hand, traditional history creates a teleological narrative that conflates the intellectual history of Marxism—which continues to thrive in China and other locations today—with the political structure of the USSR that collapsed in 1991. According to this narrative, Marxism is merely an "ideology" that is inimical to free thinking and free speech, and, since humanity has entered a distinctly new phase called the "end of history" or the "end of ideologies" in 1991, any current effort to rebuild Marxist or socialist programs must be anachronistic, utopian, or naive. On the other hand, the conventional definition of the Cold War as the period from the Truman Doctrine of 1941 to the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 naturalizes a Western-centered explanatory framework that completely overlooks the experience and agency of East Asia. The presumption that Cold War studies must begin (and end) with the United States and its Western rival(s) is therefore part of the imperialist aesthetics that organizes our temporal-spatial life worlds into the rise and fall of Western empires.

The differences between American and European approaches to security policy after the Cold War

2014 ◽  
pp. 70-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Garlicki
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Transatlantic Relationship ◽  
Security Relations ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Impact

The objective of this paper is to examine whether in the post-Cold War period the European approach to security policy is in fact different than the one of the United States of America, and why it is so. The author tries also to analyse what might be the impact of these differences on the transatlantic relationship and what consequences it might bring in the nearest future. After the description and definition of the term “security”, the author analyses the differences between the two approaches and refers to the arguments and viewpoints of different scholars. In conclusion an attempt to foresee the future of the EU – US security relations is undertaken.

scholarly journals Germany, the United States, and Future Core Conflict

1995 ◽  
pp. 445-482
Author(s):  
Brigitte Schulz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
New Era ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Common ◽  
Will Power ◽  
The Cold War

With the end of the Cold War, much attention has been paid to the nature of the emerging new world order. By what criteria will power and influence be measured in this new era? Who will be the winners and losers? What types of allegiances will develop? Or is Francis Fukuyama's argument correct that, with the collapse of communism, we have reached the "...endpoint of man's ideological evolution" and thus "the end of history". Unlike Marx, who saw socialism at the end of humanity's arduous journey, Fukuyama tells us that the search is off because we have already arrived at our evolutionary destination: liberal capitalism...Other analysts envision less optimistic scenarios...One of the most popular scenarios over the past few years has been to anticipate growing tensions between the three main core powers: the US, Germany, and Japan... The first task of this paper, then, is to look at Germany within the context of the radically altered post-Cold War period... We argue that Germany, based on a multitude of factors which will be outlined below, is not now, nor will it ever become in the foreseeable future, a global hegemon... Indeed, as will be asserted in the second part of this paper, Germany will enter into a close alliance with the United States to form a reinvigorated trans-Atlantic marriage in which the common bonds of "culture and civilization" will replace a virulent anti-communism as the common vow.

After the Cold War: Wilsonianism Resurgent?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Smith
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Selective Approach ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines the United States's Wilsonianism in the post-Cold War era, first under George H. W. Bush and then under Bill Clinton. It considers how Bush, who became president as the Soviet Union was disintegrating and its leaders were looking for a new framework of understanding with the West, used Wilsonianism to address the question of establishing a world order favorable to American national security. It also discusses various Bush initiatives that were designed to establish a new world order after the cold war, Clinton's selective approach to liberal democratic internationalism, the effects of liberal economic practices on American national security, and the link between nationalism and liberal democracy. Finally, it assesses some of the challenges involved in the United States' efforts to bring about stable constitutional governance in many parts of the world.

17. US foreign policy in Africa

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Patman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Us Foreign Policy ◽  
Political Transformation ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines US foreign policy in Africa. It first considers the United States’ historical engagement with Africa, particularly during the Cold War era that saw the intensification of US–Soviet Union superpower rivalry, before discussing the rise of a New World Order in the immediate post–Cold War period that held out the possibility of positive US involvement in Africa. It then explores the United States’ adoption of a more realist approach after Somalia, as well as its renewal of limited engagement between 1996 and 2001. It also analyzes US policy towards Africa after 9/11, with emphasis on President George W. Bush’s efforts to incorporate Africa into Washington’s global strategic network as part of the new war on terror, as compared to the approach of the Obama administration calling for political transformation in Africa.

scholarly journals The Future of World Order: Building a Community of Common Destiny

2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Yakunin
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
International Relations ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Global Order ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Common Destiny

This article briefly examines the political and ideological aspects of Western countries’ post-Cold War approach to the world order. The Western triumph in the Cold War is generally attributed to reasons that are largely erroneous. The ongoing crises in international relations reveal structural inconsistencies, which have been present in the United States’ foreign strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union and have contributed to the subsequent erosion of the global order. The article analyzes the new trends of globalization resulting from the unexpected victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It concludes that Russia and China have now largely recognized Washington’s failure to establish a unipolar world system and to legitimize it through various political and media mechanisms and techniques. It suggests that it is only through the solidary development that both China and Russia are currently championing with their recent grand integration initiatives that a more successful and sustainable multipolar world benefiting every nation on the planet can be built and maintained.

Tinkering with Failure (1991–2001)

Special Duty ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 134-161
Author(s):  
Richard J. Samuels
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Environment And Trade ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter provides a straightforward account of Japan's meek surrender to a decade of tentative, groping, half-measure post-Cold War intelligence reform. Like intelligence communities elsewhere, the Japanese intelligence community did not anticipate the end of the Cold War. The “East” and “West” were realigning and even finding common ground—and triumphalism reigned in the “free world.” Since the United States was now by default or by design the world's overwhelming military power, some Japanese policy makers felt less urgency to develop a new, comprehensive intelligence formula to cope with this new world order. The shift in the strategic environment and trade frictions with the United States gave greater purpose to the Japanese's determination to do more and better on their own, and several highly conspicuous intelligence failures would provide the necessary political impetus for change. Experimentation was possible and it was time for tinkering.

scholarly journals Changing Context, Persistent Frames: The United States and the Absence of Multilateral Institutions in Post-Cold War East Asia

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-100
Author(s):  
Clint Work
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
East Asia ◽  
The United States ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Multilateral Institutions ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Critical Historiography

After the Cold War, conditions appeared ripe for the formation of new multilateral institutions that would have more accurately reflected the altered distribution of power in East Asia. However, no new or robust institutions were established. Despite the value of certain historical and structural arguments, this study emphasizes the role of the United States in contributing to this outcome. Building upon critical historiography, this article sketches three frames of U.S. foreign policy held by U.S. elites (including: expansion, preponderance, and exceptionalism), traces their operation in the discourse and rationales behind U.S. policy during the post-Cold War interregnum, and argues that these frames worked against any attempt by the United States to establish new multilateral institutions.

17. US foreign policy in Africa

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert G. Patman
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
New World Order ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Cold War Era ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter examines the historical evolution of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. It first considers the history of U.S.–Africa relations, particularly during the Cold War era of U.S.–Soviet Union superpower rivalry. It then turns to the immediate post-Cold War era, in which a New World Order — a vision in which the United States and the United Nations could combine to establish freedom and respect for all nations — held out the possibility of positive U.S. involvement in Africa. It also discusses American policy towards Africa after 9/11, focusing on President George W. Bush’s efforts to incorporate Africa into Washington’s global strategic network as part of the new war on terror. The chapter concludes with an assessment of Barack Obama’s peace diplomacy as an approach to the civil war in Sudan.

Worse Than a Monolith

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Burden Sharing ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Regional Conflicts ◽  
Security Relations ◽  
Opposing Camp ◽  
The Cold War

In brute-force struggles for survival, such as the two world wars, disorganization and divisions within an enemy alliance are to one's own advantage. However, most international security politics involve coercive diplomacy and negotiations short of all-out war. This book demonstrates that when states are engaged in coercive diplomacy—combining threats and assurances to influence the behavior of real or potential adversaries—divisions, rivalries, and lack of coordination within the opposing camp often make it more difficult to prevent the onset of regional conflicts, to prevent existing conflicts from escalating, and to negotiate the end to those conflicts promptly. Focusing on relations between the Communist and anti-Communist alliances in Asia during the Cold War, the book explores how internal divisions and lack of cohesion in the two alliances complicated and undercut coercive diplomacy by sending confusing signals about strength, resolve, and intent. In the case of the Communist camp, internal mistrust and rivalries catalyzed the movement's aggressiveness in ways that we would not have expected from a more cohesive movement under Moscow's clear control. Reviewing newly available archival material, the book examines the instability in relations across the Asian Cold War divide, and sheds new light on the Korean and Vietnam wars. While recognizing clear differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War environments, the book investigates how efforts to adjust burden-sharing roles among the United States and its Asian security partners have complicated U.S. security relations with the People's Republic of China since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

John Leighton Stuart and U.S.-Chinese Communist Rapprochement in 1949: Was There Another “Lost Chance in China”?

1982 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 74-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-ming Shaw
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Mao Zedong ◽  
Working Relationship ◽  
Republic Of China ◽  
The Many ◽  
The One ◽  
June July ◽  
The Cold War

Reverend John Leighton Stuart (1876–1962) served as U.S. ambassador to China from July 1946 until August 1949. In the many discussions of his ambassadorship the one diplomatic mission that has aroused the most speculation and debate was his abortive trip to Beijing, contemplated in June–July 1949, to meet with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Some students of Sino-American relations have claimed that had this trip been made the misunderstanding and subsequent hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China in the post-1949 period could have been avoided; therefore, the unmaking of this trip constituted another “lost chance in China” in establishing a working relationship between the two countries. But others have thought that given the realities of the Cold War in 1949 and the internal political constraints existing in each country, no substantial result could have been gained from such a trip. Therefore, the thesis of a “lost chance in China” was more an unfounded speculation than a credible affirmation.

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