Doctrinal Aspects of the Functioning of the Iraqi Army’s Arms and Corps during the War

Author(s):  
Pesach Malovany ◽  
Amatzia Baram ◽  
Kevin M. Woods ◽  
Ronna Englesberg

This chapter analyzes the different Iraqi elements that participated in the war and the way they performed in the war in different aspects in general. This includes general doctrinal aspects in the activation of the Iraqi forces, especially to deal with the large Iranian offensive, as well as the Iraqi offensive operations in 1988. It describes the activation of the main elements of the Iraqi ground forces, air force and air defense, army aviation and the navy. It deals also with special topics like the use of the Popular Army, Intelligence and psychological warfare, the logistic system, surface-to-surface missile operation and the use of chemical weapons during the war.

Author(s):  
Jon R. Lindsay

This chapter investigates the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), the analogue to the Fighter Command Ops Room in the modern U.S. Air Force. The air force formally designates the CAOC as a weapon system, even as it is basically just a large office space with hundreds of computer workstations, conference rooms, and display screens. The CAOC is an informational weapon system that coordinates all of the other weapon systems that actually conduct air defense, strategic attack, close air support, air mobility and logistics, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). One might be tempted to describe the CAOC as “a center of calculation,” but modern digital technology tends to decenter information practice. Representations of all the relevant entities and events in a modern air campaign reside in digital data files rather than a central plotting table. The relevant information is fragmented across collection platforms, classified networks, and software systems that are managed by different services and agencies. Thus, in each of the four major U.S. air campaigns from 1991 to 2003, CAOC personnel struggled with information friction. They rarely used the mission planning systems that were produced by defense contractors as planned, and they improvised to address emerging warfighting requirements.


Vojno delo ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (7) ◽  
pp. 82-104
Author(s):  
Marcel Amstutz ◽  
Christoph Schmon
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Jon R. Lindsay

This chapter examines how a constrained problem and an institutionalized solution enabled the Royal Air Force (RAF) to successfully manage the air battle during the Battle of Britain. The RAF pioneered many concepts that the U.S. Air Force still uses today, including aircraft early warning, identification friend-or-foe, track management, aircraft vectoring, and operational research. The Battle of Britain is also one of the well-documented episodes in military history. Open archives, abundant data, and the electromechanical vintage of information technology make this case an accessible illustration of information practice in action. Britain won the battle because it put together a well-managed solution to the well-constrained problem of air defense. Germany, by contrast, met the inherently harder problem of offensive coercion with a more insular solution. The chapter first describes the historical development of the British air defense system, before looking at the “external problem” that Fighter Command faced during the battle and showing how the interaction produced “managed practice” that improved RAF performance.


Author(s):  
Michelle Bentley

This chapter analyses the chemical weapons taboo – the idea that chemical weapons are so abhorrent that they cannot be tolerated. In particular it engages with the work of Richard Price. It reinterprets the taboo from the perspective of Quentin Skinner and his concept of the ‘innovating ideologist.’ Instead of viewing the taboo as a social construction, this analysis argues that actors can exert significant agency over the taboo and the way in which it is employed in political discourse.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 25-44
Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Shumilov

The article is devoted to the life path of the Siberian pilot Georgy Filippovich Baidukov. An attempt to show not only his participation in the heroic flights of the 30s of the 20th century as part of the crew of the pilot Valery Chkalov, but the further service of the Air Force General during the Great Patriotic War and especially after the post-war service of military commander G.F. Baidukov at the USSR Ministry of Defense, responsible for the creation of the latest military equipment for the country's air defense forces was made. Due to the special secrecy of this type of troops, the participation of Georgy Filippovich in their creation was neither covered in his memoirs nor in official publications. Only in the beginning of the 21st century this page of the life of the great pilot, military commander was opened. The article shows the Siberian period of Georgy's life in the Kain district of the Tomsk province, now the Tatar district of the Novosibirsk region, studying at Omsk vocational school, working at Siberian Railway, serving in the Red Army, training in flight schools and then heroic work of a test pilot, performing record flights, participating in two wars: Finnish and Great Patriotic War. The whole life of the Siberian pilot was devoted to serving the homeland, strengthening its defenses. The biography of Georgy Baidukov can be as an example to young people in achieving their goals and in constant study of everything new, advanced in their main profession.


Author(s):  
Aleksey N. Malinka ◽  
Aleksey V. Anisimov ◽  
Aleksandr K. Kartashov

When it attacked the USSR, Nazi Germany possessed signifi cant chemical weapons. Chemical support thus became one of the main kinds of operational (combat) support. Short-term course has been created for chemical service commanders and personnel chemical specialists training. The Red Army’s general attention was paid to the chemical defence measures, to eliminate the enemy manpower, weapons and military equipment by use of the fl amethrower and incendiary means, smoke screens were used to mask. Chemical detection and the prevention of chemical weapons use involved chemical, meteorological monitoring; chemical reconnaissance was provided mostly by chemical troops. It took a lot to provide troops with necessary chemical defence means. The fl amethrowers` mission was to burn the enemy out of long-term fi re facilities and fortifi ed buildings, to block strongholds, and to destroy tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Smoke screens were used to mask rear objects, important industrial facilities in cities, railway junctions, bridges and crossings. Smoke screens masking signifi cantly reduced the effectiveness of German air force bombing.


Author(s):  
Brian D. Laslie

Only the most ardent of air power historians know the name of General Laurence S. Kuter, despite the fact he welded a B-17 group into a cohesive fighting force, was the deputy commander of allied tactical air forces in North Africa, and later served as commander of the Military Air Transport Service, Air University, Far East Air Forces—later Pacific Air Forces—and finally as a Commander-in-Chief of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). The biography of Larry Kuter is the biography of the United States Air Corps, Army Air Forces and U.S. Air Force


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenton Clymer

This essay examines the development and demise of one of the least studied elements of U.S. homeland defense efforts in the 1950s: the Ground Observer Corps (GOC). The article recounts the history of the GOC from its founding in the mid-1950s until its deactivation in 1959 and concludes that it never came close to achieving its goals for recruitment and effectiveness. Yet, despite the major shortcomings of the GOC, the U.S. Air Force continued to support it, primarily because it was seen as helpful for the public relations interests of the Air Force, continental air defense, and, more generally, U.S. Cold War policies. The lack of widespread public support for the GOC raises questions about the view that Americans were deeply fearful of an imminent Soviet nuclear strike in the 1950s.


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