Merton-Popper’s paradox and the substantive rationality of science

2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liana A. Tukhvatulina ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 205-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Feldman

Among legal scholars, Anthony T. Kronman and David M. Trubek have provided the leading interpretations of Weber's theory of law. Kronman and Trubek agree on two important points: Weber's theory is fundamentally contradictory, and Weber's theory relates primarily to private law subjects such as contracts. This article contests both of these points. Building on a foundation of Weber's neo-Kantian metaphysics and his sociological categories of economic action, this article shows that Weber's theory of law is not fundamentally inconsistent; rather it explores the inconsistencies that are inherent within Western society itself, including its legal systems. Furthermore, Weber's insights can be applied to modern constitutional jurisprudence. Weberian theory reveals that modern constitutional law is riddled with irreconcilable tensions between process and substance—between formal and substantive rationality. In the context of racial discrimination cases involving equal protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's acceptance of John Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement demonstrates the Court's resolute pursuit of formal rationality, which insures that the substantive values and needs of minorities will remain unsatisfied.


Revista Foco ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Tadeu Cerri ◽  
Carolina Machado Saraiva de Albuquerque Maranhão ◽  
Jussara Jéssica Pereira

Este trabalho de cunho qualitativo se propôs compreender como se entrelaçam as racionalidades substantiva e instrumental no cotidiano dos gestores de primeira linha de uma multinacional e alguns funcionários de alto escalão de um órgão público na região do quadrilátero ferrífero em Minas Gerais. A coleta de dados ocorreu por meio da entrevista semiestruturada, que foram gravadas, transcritas e posteriormente analisadas via Análise de Conteúdo de Bardin (2006). A base teórica que fomentou as análises foram os trabalhos de Guerreiro Ramos (1981) e Maurício Serva (1996). Diante disso foi possível identificar 11 rubricas previstas por Serva (1996), entendidas nas análises como unidades de sentido; estas foram classificadas por proporção conforme sua aparição nos relatos; são elas: valores e objetivos, satisfação individual, reflexão, controle, tomada de decisão, divisão do trabalho, hierarquia e normas, conflito, ação social, relações interpessoais e dimensão simbólica. A presença da racionalidade instrumental ainda é latente no cotidiano analisado, sendo necessária alguma evolução para que esse modelo reificado do ser humano se altere. Todavia, tal pesquisa se mostra relevante, pois permitiu verificar uma manifestação considerável da racionalidade substantiva em um ambiente supostamente instrumental. This qualitative study was proposed to understand how the substantive and instrumental rationalities are interwoven in the daily life of first-line managers of a multinational and some high-ranking officials from a public agency in the iron quadrilateral region of Minas Gerais. The data were collected through semi-structured interviews, which were recorded, transcribed and analyzed through Bardin Content Analysis (2006). A theoretical basis that fostered as analyzes were the works of Guerreiro Ramos (1981) and Maurício Serva (1996). Thus, it was possible to identify 11 items predicted by Serva (1996), understood in the analyzes as units of meaning; These were classified by proportion according to their appearance in the reports; are they: values and objectives, individual satisfaction, reflection, control, decision making, division of labor, hierarchy and norms, conflict, social action, interpersonal relations and symbolic dimension. The presence of instrumental rationality is still latent in the daily analyzed, and some evolution is necessary for this reified model of the human being to change. However, such research is relevant because it has allowed us to verify a considerable manifestation of substantive rationality in a supposedly instrumental environment.


Author(s):  
Letícia Lenzi

ResumoAo longo do século XX a concepção tradicional de racionalidade da ciência sofreu duras críticas, principalmente após os trabalhos de Thomas Kuhn a respeito dos critérios de evolução das teorias científicas ao longo da história. Assim, filósofos da ciência assumiram a tarefa de redefinir o que se entende por racionalidade da ciência, garantindo novos critérios para salvaguardar a consistência do juízo científico na articulação das ideias e teorias. Neste artigo, evidenciam-se essas questões para se discutir ações que possam promover uma educação científica crítica e reflexiva, contemplando a relação entre Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade e uma compreensão mais adequada da natureza da ciência. Palavras-chave: Racionalidade da ciência; Natureza da ciência; Educação científica. AbstractThroughout the twentieth century, the traditional conception of rationality of Science suffered harsh criticism, especially after Thomas Kuhn's work concerning the development criteria of scientific theories throughout history. Thus, philosophers of Science have assumed the task of redefining what is meant by rationality of Science, guaranteeing new criteria to safeguard the consistency of scientific judgment in the articulation of ideas and theories. In this article, these issues are highlighted to discuss actions that can promote critical and reflective scientific education, considering the relationship between Science, Technology and Society and a better understanding of the nature of Science.Keywords: Rationality of Science; Nature of Science; Science education.


2021 ◽  
pp. 33-53
Author(s):  
Alex Worsnip

This chapter gives a rough account of substantive rationality, the kind of rationality that contrasts with the book’s main topic, structural rationality. On this account, which mirrors some recently popular accounts in the literature, substantive rationality consists in responding to evidence-relative, right-kind reasons. It also argues against further restrictions on the kinds of reasons relevant to structural rationality—such as a “practical condition” and a condition excluding moral reasons—and introduces the distinction between ex ante and ex post substantive rationality. Finally, it explores accounts of structural rationality that closely mirror the offered account of substantive rationality by understanding the former as responsiveness to “subjective” or belief-relative reasons and argues that these accounts fail.


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