Turning Back to Kuhn

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-19
Author(s):  
Ilya T. Kasavin ◽  
Vladimir N. Porus ◽  

The article examines the problem of interpreting normal and revolutionary science in the concept of Thomas Kuhn. It is shown that the “normal science” is the central concept of the Kuhn’s history of science, designed in accordance with the normative definition of science adopted by him. Such a story serves an internal purpose – to justify the special epistemical status of expert knowledge. But there is also an external goal – to establish professional science as an institution with special epistemological status and social function, which is situated in a center of intellectual power and property. Historians are those who are forced to constantly rewrite history – either following the methodology of “rational reconstruction” or responding to the challenges of their time. To be a “conservative” or a “revolutionary” in the history of science is a choice made not only for philosophical reasons, but also under the influence of the general socio-cultural situation of the epoch.

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 171
Author(s):  
Michael Sunday Sasa

The present paper is a representation of a systematic inquiry as well as an application of the main thrust in Thomas Kuhn’s discourse concerning the growth of human knowledge represented in philosophy of science. The paper begins by stating the points of tradition and normal science in Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of the growth of scientific knowledge. This is juxtaposed with the notions of discontinuity and revolution. A fundamental point in the paper is that Thomas Kuhn presents an analysis that bring to the fore a tradition of continuous discontinuity. This he expounded in the philosophy of paradigm shifts brought about by crisis and revolution, resulting in the overthrow of an existing hegemony and the birth of a new one. In all, Thomas Kuhn believes that science does not represent a paradigm of rationality because going through the history of science; we are not able to discover a particular paradigm or rationality that runs through the entirety of the history of science. If anything at all, science is made up of different paradigms of rationality, models of knowledge systems of method such that, the change from one scientific epoch to another cannot be a lineal rational or methodic one. Rather, it is a shift from one model to an opposing one; what he calls a gestalt switch which is a change in ‘form of life’, ‘language game’ or ‘conceptual scheme’. The paper however, presents the thesis that even if there is no outstanding form of rationality the history of science is seen to contain a certain continuous tradition. This has to do with the aim of any science. And so, be it the science of Ptolemy, Copernicus or Galileo, Einstein or Newton, there is the aim of human interest transcending all the epochs. To this extent, the paper argues a rationality of any scientific epoch or paradigm must derive from the quality of human interest it potent. Any science be it religion, mysticism or positivism that does not aim at human flourishing is not rational. The paper employs the method of text-analysis, conceptual clarification, constructive criticism and reconstructivism to bring forth its central argument.   


Author(s):  
Anna Kołos

The article addresses the issue of one of the more intense and captivating European scientific disputes, likewise common to Poland, in the era of the seventeenth-century transformation of knowledge formation, which centered around the possibility of the existence of vacuum, and which culminated in 1647. The fundamental aim of the article comes down to an attempt to determine a position in the scientific-cognitive debate, from which the pro and anti-Polish and European representatives of The Republic of Letters (Respublica literaria)  could voice their opinions. In the course of the analysis of the mid-seventeenth century scientific discourse, the reflections of Valeriano Magni, Torricelli, Jan Brożek, Wojciech Wijuk Kojałowicz, Blaise Pascal, Giovanni Elefantuzzi, Jacob Pierius, and Pierre Guiffart are subjected to close scrutiny. From the perspective of contextualism in the history of science, experiments demonstrating the existence of vacuum are perceived as anomalies that fall into the crisis of normal science, largely based on Aristotle’s physics. The conflict between the old and the new is not, however, presented as a battle of progression with epigonism, but merely as a contest between opposing individual views and the concept of science, which before the formation of the new paradigm was accompanied by ambiguous verification criteria.


Author(s):  
Leonardo Díaz

RESUMENA finales de los años 80s, Thomas Kuhn y Charles Taylor fueron invitados a un debate en La Salle University. Taylor defendió que las ciencias naturales no son ciencias hermenéuticas, pues se fundamentan en datos puros, carentes de significado. Kuhn rechazó la tesis de la existencia de datos puros, sosteniendo que las ciencias naturales operan con significados y poseen una base hermenéutica. En la postura de Kuhn pueden apreciarse ambivalencias como resultado de sus viejos compromisos teóricos con el proyecto explicativo formulado en La estructura de las revoluciones científicas y como mostraré, vinculado a la existencia de una tensión entre dos perspectivas filosóficas sobre la ciencia.PALABRAS CLAVEHERMENÉUTICA, CIENCIA NORMAL, CIENCIA REVOLUCIONARIA, TENSIÓN, CIENCIAS HUMANASABSTRACTBy the end of the 1980s, Thomas Kuhn and Charles Taylor participated in a debate at La Salle University. Taylor defended that natural sciences are not hermeneutical sciences, since they are based on the pure, meaningless data. Kuhn rejected the thesis of the existence of pure data, arguing that natural sciences work with meanings and have a hermeneutic foundation. Kuhn’s position presents ambivalences as a result of his former theoretical commitments with the explicative project formulated in The Structure of the Scientific Revolutions and as I will show, linked to the existence of a tension between two philosophical perspectives on science.KEYWORDSHERMENEUTICS, NORMAL SCIENCE, REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE, TENSION, HUMAN SCIENCES


Author(s):  
Isabel Ramos ◽  
João Álvaro Carvalho

Scientific or organizational knowledge creation has been addressed from different perspectives along the history of science and, in particular, of social sciences. The process is guided by the set of values, beliefs and norms shared by the members of the community to which the creator of this knowledge belongs, that is, it is guided by the adopted paradigm (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The adopted paradigm determines how the nature of the studied reality is understood, the criteria that will be used to assess the validity of the created knowledge, and the construction and selection of methods, techniques and tools to structure and support the creation of knowledge. This set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions that characterize the paradigm one implicitly or explicitly uses to make sense of the surrounding reality is the cultural root of the intellectual enterprises. Those assumptions constrain the accomplishment of activities such as construction of theories, definition of inquiry strategies, interpretation of perceived phenomena, and dissemination of knowledge (Schwandt, 2000).


Conatus ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Athanasios Rinotas

Albertus Magnus’ alchemy is a subject that has attracted the attention of the scholars since the early decades of the 20th century. Yet, the research that has been conducted this far is characterised by its non philosophical character. As a matter of fact, the previous studies approached Albertus’ alchemy either in terms of history of science or of intellectual history. In this paper, I focus on Albertus’ definition of alchemical transmutation that is found in his De mineralibus and I analyze it in terms of his theory of creation and of his theory of matter. Therefore, I show whether a re-creation of a metal is in accordance with Albertus’ philosophy and congruently I bring forth the Aristotle Graecus and the Aristotle Latinus that are found as background in his alchemical theory of transmutation. Ultimately this paper aims to show that the aforementioned theory is not an arbitrary statement from Albertus’ part, but the result of a serious philosophical endeavour


2008 ◽  
pp. 2296-2301
Author(s):  
Isabel Ramos ◽  
João Álvaro Carvalho

Scientific or organizational knowledge creation has been addressed from different perspectives along the history of science and, in particular, of social sciences. The process is guided by the set of values, beliefs and norms shared by the members of the community to which the creator of this knowledge belongs, that is, it is guided by the adopted paradigm (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The adopted paradigm determines how the nature of the studied reality is understood, the criteria that will be used to assess the validity of the created knowledge, and the construction and selection of methods, techniques and tools to structure and support the creation of knowledge. This set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions that characterize the paradigm one implicitly or explicitly uses to make sense of the surrounding reality is the cultural root of the intellectual enterprises. Those assumptions constrain the accomplishment of activities such as construction of theories, definition of inquiry strategies, interpretation of perceived phenomena, and dissemination of knowledge (Schwandt, 2000).


Author(s):  
Helen Tilley

There is no escaping the fact that the history of science took European places and people, broadly construed, as its original object of study. There is also no escaping that in African history, scholars interested in science, technology, and to a lesser extent environmental knowledge have concentrated the bulk of their investigative energies on developments since European (and North African) conquest. This focus on the period since the 1870s has tended to foreground dynamics relating to colonial rule and state-building, extractive economies and development, and decolonization and geopolitics. A handful of Africanists in the history of science have explicitly worked to cross the colonial divide, often taking single topics deeper back in time. The field as a whole, however, still needs to debate more systematically what the overarching narratives and benchmark phenomena should be for the precolonial periods. It also needs to grapple more explicitly with methodological tensions that arise from a focus on human agency and specific places (and the languages this requires) versus a focus on ideas, tools, and phenomena that transcend local or state containers (and the trade-offs this produces). As historians of science extend their reach into Africa’s pasts and bridge the colonial and post-colonial divides, it raises thorny questions about different approaches. Among others this includes how we produce histories of science, why they matter, and what we ought to bear in mind as we do. To this end, four goals are advanced here simultaneously: First, is the aim to open a dialogue with historians of science working outside Africa about ways Africanist scholarship speaks to and could be incorporated into the field as a whole (encouraging non-Africanists to consider the blind spots of “global” histories). Second, is the objective to draw attention to the pitfalls and benefits of different research methods and theoretical assumptions, especially as they relate to expert knowledge (an analysis that may be most useful for students entering the field). Third, is the ambition to explore a set of topics that connect deeper time periods to more recent developments (topics that invite critical scrutiny from specialists and generalists alike). Finally, is the desire to foreground the many different ways people across sub-Saharan Africa have initiated, responded to, and been incorporated into the production of knowledge. Africa has been a site of rich and varied epistemological and material experiments for millennia—some deleterious, some beneficial, and all imbued with different kinds of power. Acknowledging this long-standing history can serve to correct stereotypes that suggest otherwise. It can also contribute to debates within the history of science as the field continues to move away from its original focus on Europe and Europeans.


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