The Pursuit of an Authentic Philosophy

Author(s):  
David Egan

Superficially, Wittgenstein and Heidegger seem worlds apart: they worked in different philosophical traditions, were mostly ignorant of one another’s work, and Wittgenstein’s terse aphorisms in plain language could not be farther stylistically from Heidegger’s difficult prose. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Heidegger’s Being and Time share a number of striking parallels. In particular, this book argues that both authors manifest a similar concern with authenticity. The argument develops in three stages. Part One explores the emphasis both philosophers place on the everyday, and how this emphasis brings with it a methodological focus on recovering what we already know rather than advancing novel theses. Part Two argues that the dynamic of authenticity and inauthenticity in Being and Time finds homologies in Philosophical Investigations. In particular, the book articulates and defends a conception of authenticity in Wittgenstein that emphasizes the responsiveness and reciprocity of play. Part Three considers how both philosophers’ conceptions of authenticity apply reflexively to their own work: both are concerned not only with the question of what it means to exist authentically but also with the question of what it means to do philosophy authentically. For both authors, the problematic of authenticity is intimately linked to the question of philosophical method.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 102-135
Author(s):  
John J. Preston ◽  

I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.


Author(s):  
Nikolas Kompridis

The first book of Stanley Cavell’s that I read is the only book that I ardently wished I had written, The Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage. Why this book, and not some high impact, world-historical book like Heidegger’s Being and Time or Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations? Well, there are a number of reasons, some of them personal and some of them, well, Cavellian. Most immediately, the book explained to me why I so much enjoyed watching again and again over the course of more than three decades the films which are the objects of Cavell’s interpretations — why, in short, watching these films made me so happy, why they filled me with goofy delight, always ringing a smile to my face, a smile not unlike that smile of Cary Grant’s (from Holiday) reproduced in the pages of The Pursuits of Happiness.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juliet Floyd

In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein conveyed the idea that ethics cannot be located in an object or self-standing subject matter of propositional discourse, true or false. At the same time, he took his work to have an eminently ethical purpose, and his attitude was not that of the emotivist. The trajectory of this conception of the normativity of philosophy as it developed in his subsequent thought is traced. It is explained that and how the notion of a ‘form of life’ ( Lebensform) emerged only in his later thought, in 1937, earmarking a significant step forward in his philosophical method. We argue that the concept of Lebensform represents a way of domesticating logic itself, the very idea of a claim or reason, supplementing the idea of a ‘language game’, which it deepens. Lebensform is contrasted with the phenomenologists’ Lebenswelt through a reading of the notions of ‘I’, ‘world’ and ‘self’ as they were treated in the Tractatus, The Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations. Finally, the notion of Lebensform is shown to have replaced the notion of culture ( Kultur) in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein’s spring 1937 ‘domestication’ of the nature of logic is shown to have been fully consonant with the idea that he was influenced by his reading Alan Turing’s 1936/1937 paper, ‘On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem’.


Philosophy ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 67 (262) ◽  
pp. 467-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. W. Rowe

Besides its intrinsic interest, the definition of ‘game’ is important for three reasons. Firstly, in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations ‘game’ is the paradigm family resemblance concept. If he is wrong in thinking that ‘game’ cannot be defined, then the persuasive force of his argument against definition generally will be considerably weakened. This, in its turn, will have important consequences for our understanding of concepts and philosophical method. Secondly, Wittgenstein's later writings are full of analogies drawn from games—chess alone is mentioned scores of times—and a proper understanding of ‘game’ can lead us to exercise more caution when considering the parallels between games and non-games. Thirdly, games and play are intriguingly and closely related to art and ritual, and an analysis of games can throw considerable light on both of the latter.


2005 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-313 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Michael Roberts ◽  
Teela Sanders

In this paper we argue that what is missing from many ethnographic accounts is a recognition that dilemmas inevitably emerge for the researcher before they make contact with the research setting, during the process of ethnographic research, and subsequently in the lengthy time taken to unravel the theoretical importance of the research after the fieldwork has ended. Using a comparison of two ethnographies as case studies, and by recourse to a realist methodology, such dilemmas are, we argue, overdetermined by many non-observable social structures that influence the everyday research process. We argue that specific mechanisms determine both the process and the outcome of the ethnographic journey in the before, during and after stages of research. For example we demonstrate how biography and the wider process of institutional knowledge production are two key resources that influence research practice. We use the term pragmatic realism as a means to reflect upon some of the connections between the dilemmas of research and real structures in these three stages.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-107
Author(s):  
Luciana de Souza Gracioso ◽  
Lourival Pereira Pinto

O plano ampliado e reconfigurado dos fluxos de informação na contemporaneidade sugerem novas condições para que a ação da leitura e da interpretação possa ser estabelecida. Com o objetivo de refletir sobre as implicações que fazem parte destas ações desenvolvemos um exame dialético parcial sobre três obras - Ser e Tempo, de M. Heidegger, Investigações Lógicas, Sexta Investigação: Elementos de uma Elucidação Fenomenológica do Conhecimento, de E. Husserl, e Investigações Filosóficas, de L. Wittgenstein - que, embora não tenham tido o objetivo direto de analisar a leitura e a interpretação, parecem oferecer elementos para refletirmos sobre estes fenômenos na contemporaneidade. Ao final, nos posicionamos a favor da interpretação enquanto uma ação social a priori e discorremos, sinteticamente, sobre a configuração dos atuais sistemas de informação, considerando tal condição. ABOUT THE LIMITS AND SCOPE OF INTERPRETATION: REFLECTIONS FROM HEIDEGGER, HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN AbstractThe expanded and reconfigured plan of information's flow in contemporary can suggest new conditions for the action of interpretation be established. In order to reflect on the implications of this action be part of interpreting process, we have developed a partial dialectical examination of three works - Being and time, of M. Heidegger, Logical Investigations, Sixth Research: Elements of a Phenomenological Elucidation of Knowledge, of E. Husserl, and Philosophical Investigations, of L. Wittgenstein - which, although these works had not the direct interest to address the phenomenon of interpretation, seem to offer the necessary elements to reflect on this phenomenon in the nowadays. In the end, we position ourselves in favor of interpretation while social phenomenon placed a priori, and commented above, briefly, about the configuration of current information systems, considering that condition.


Semiotica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Torres-Martínez

Abstract This paper forges links between early analytic philosophy and the posits of semiotics. I show that there are some striking and potentially quite important, but perhaps unrecognized, connections between three key concepts in Wittgenstein’s middle and later philosophy, namely, complex (Philosophical Grammar), rule-following (Philosophical Investigations), and language games (Philosophical Investigations). This reveals the existence of a conceptual continuity between Wittgenstein’s “early” and “later” philosophy that can be applied to the analysis of the iterability of representation in computer-generated images. Methodologically, this paper clarifies to at least some degree, the nature, progress and promise of an approach to doing philosophy and semiotics from a modally modest perspective that sees in the intellectual products of humanities, and not in unreflective empiricism, the future of scientific development. This hybrid, non-reductionist approach shows, among other things, that semiotic processes are encoded by specific types of complexes in computer-generated images that display iterability in time and space.


Author(s):  
David Egan

This chapter develops two claims that are central to the argument of the book. First, it articulates a conception of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that echoes the conception we find in Division II of Being and Time. This account builds on the treatment of rule following from the previous chapter and contrasts an ‘authentic’ reading of Wittgenstein with Kripke’s sceptical reading. And second, it argues that, for both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, authenticity is not a liberation from the everyday but rather a clear-sighted embrace of the everyday. Our average everyday existence is inauthentic to the extent that we regard that existence as fixed independent of us. An authentic everydayness, by contrast, acknowledges the uncanniness of our everyday practices, which have no external support or justification beyond our own investment in them.


Author(s):  
William H. Galperin

Although the “everyday” has long been synonymous with malaise, anomie, and routine, the conditions surrounding its emergence in the romantic period, where it names a possible world that has been missed or overlooked, are recapitulated and extended in twentieth century thought. In the conceptual moves undertaken by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time and by Henri Lefebvre in his three-volume Critique of Everyday Life, the everyday is dependent, practically as well as dialectically, on an entrenched orientation typically associated with idealism, or with romanticism in its “standard” formation, that “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger) both predates and supersedes. A similar conception of the everyday obtains in the writings of political theorist Jane Bennett, whose sense of an enchanted materialism echoes both Lefebvre and philosopher Stanley Cavell in stressing the “extraordinary that lives amid the familiar and the everyday” and the larger assemblage to which we all belong.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-71
Author(s):  
José Pedro Correia

In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, one can find a number of remarks that could be seen as antithetical to classic philosophical analysis. There are passages seemingly rejecting the ideas of concept decomposition, regression to first principles, and semantic substitution. The criticism, I argue, is aimed not at analysis in particular, but rather at some idealizations that pervade a certain picture of philosophy. This picture can be contrasted with Wittgenstein’s pragmatist view of explanations of meaning which, I believe, can inform a different attitude towards philosophical method that aligns well with a vision of philosophy as conversation. If we think of philosophy as engaging in the development and exchange of explanations of meaning, we can see how various methods can coexist insofar as they are useful, and as long as the urge to sublimate them beyond our practices can be avoided.


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