Corporate Governance, Shareholder Proposals, and Social Performance

Author(s):  
William J. Donoher ◽  
Daniel W. Greening ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 641-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chi-Jui Huang

AbstractPrevious research has analyzed and debated corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) independently. This paper aims to empirically explore the interrelationship between CG, CSR, financial performance (FP) and Corporate Social Performance (CSP) using a sample of 297 electronics companies operating in Taiwan, a newly industrialized Asian economy. The results show that a CG model which includes independent outside directors and which has specific ownership characteristics has a significantly positive impact on both FP and CSP, whereas FP itself does not influence CSP. The presence of independent outside directors in the firm has the greatest impact on the social performance of the firm's worker, customer, supplier, community and society dimensions. Government shareholders enhance a firm's social performance extraordinarily because government shareholders will be more likely to request that companies fulfill their social responsibilities. Only government shareholders positively and significantly relate to a firm's environmental performance. Furthermore, foreign institutional stockholders help to increase worker and supplier performance by paying more attention to employee policies and supply chain relationships. Finally, independent outside directors, foreign institutional stockholders and domestic financial institutional stockholders are shown to improve financial performance.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (6) ◽  
pp. 1412-1431
Author(s):  
Nejia Nekaa ◽  
Sami Boudabbous

Purpose The purpose of this study is to show the specificities of the corporate governance of Tunisian financial institutions and the impact of the internal mechanisms of corporate governance of these institutions on their social performance. It is therefore interesting to establish the existing relationship between these mechanisms of corporate governance and the performance of a financial firm. Design/methodology/approach This study aims to study the financial sector, generally characterized by its opacity, its regulation, its evolution and its obscurity. Therefore, a study based on the questionnaire method was recommended. The questionnaire is intended for managers. Therefore, the authors interviewed 138 managers of Tunisian financial institutions dispersed between agencies and headquarters in different regions (Gabes, Tozeur, Gafsa, Sfax, Sousse and Tunisia). Findings As a result, an impact on performance was observed according to the empirical study. Therefore, the authors can conclude an essential role of internal mechanisms for improving the social performance of a financial institution. The empirical findings in this paper lead to important conclusions. Indeed, the variables measuring the governance mechanisms have divergent effects on the social performance of the financial institutions subject to the sample. For the variables board of directors, confidence, culture, auditing, they have a positive effect. While, the incentive remuneration effect negatively the social performance. Originality/value This study will be based essentially on the financial sector in Tunisia: the credit institutions (22 banks), the establishments of leasing (eight companies of leasing), two factoring companies and two banks of cases which are listed on the Stock Exchange of Tunis (BVMT).


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Pyung Kun Chu

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a topic which has recently been attracting an increasing amount of attention with respect to corporate operations, and shareholder proposals on CSR are also one of the main types of proposals at firms’ annual shareholder meetings. However, even though the frequency of CSR proposals at annual meetings is comparable to other types of shareholder proposals, the approval rate of CSR proposals is significantly lower than that of other types of proposals, meaning that most CSR proposals are not recommended by the annual meeting to the board of directors for further approval. Motivated by this stylized fact, this study investigates the value of the submission of CSR shareholder proposals. Using a regression discontinuity design with shareholder proposal data of US public companies between 2006 and 2019, this study examines the importance of shareholders’ interest in CSR for firm valuation. Interestingly, while the CSR proposals themselves are typically not approved, the submission of CSR proposals by shareholders at annual meetings matters for the value impact of other types of shareholder proposals. More specifically, the causal effect of approving a corporate governance proposal on shareholder value is significantly positive only if the corporate governance proposal is voted together with a CSR proposal at the same meeting, i.e., the presence of CSR proposals is important for firm value through its interrelations with corporate governance proposals. This shows that the submission of CSR shareholder proposals has significant value implications, even if the CSR proposals themselves are not approved at annual meetings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 99
Author(s):  
Jun Hyeok Choi ◽  
Saerona Kim ◽  
Ayoung Lee

The purpose of this study was to examine the association between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenure and corporate social performance with the moderating effect of governance. We investigated whether new CEOs and CEOs in their last year of service were more focused on short-termism than CEOs of other periods. Specifically, we tested whether these CEOs reduced social performance that demands immediate expenditure and expect payoffs in the long run. We also tested whether good governance can mitigate such behaviors, because not all CEOs of the same tenure will act the same, depending on the monitoring environments surrounding them. We employed ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the moderator models using data from the Korean listed companies from 2012 to 2016. Test results showed that only the CEOs of their last year reduced social performance. However, when we considered corporate governance, we found that both groups of CEOs reduced social performance, and that good governance mitigated the adverse effects of the two periods on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Specifically, we tested board independence, board frequency, CEO duality, and board diversity, and found that, for all but board independence, the negative effects of the two periods on social performance were decreased.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 178-197
Author(s):  
Ting Li ◽  
Xinlei Zhao ◽  
Aiwu Zhao

Purpose Motivated by managers’ intentions to pursue private interests by engaging in earnings management, this paper aims to investigate whether voting with hands (shareholders cast votes on shareholder proposals) by shareholders acts as an external disciplining mechanism over earnings management relative to corporate governance. Also, as corporate governance can scrutinize managers’ behavior, this study also examines whether there is a substitutive relation between shareholder proposals and corporate governance mechanism. Design/methodology/approach First, this paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discrepancy accruals on the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals to test the incremental effect of shareholder proposals on earnings management. Second, firms receiving shareholder proposals are matched with those not receiving proposals by propensity scores, and the levels of earnings management and corporate governance between these two groups are compared by univariate analysis and OLS regressions. In addition, six portfolios are created based on whether firms receive shareholder proposals, as well as on the levels of corporate governance, to assess whether external control from shareholder proposals can substitute internal control for corporate governance in disciplining earnings management. Regressions of earnings management on corporate governance (shareholder proposals) are conducted in the sub-samples formed on shareholder proposals (corporate governance) to further explore the above substitution effects. Findings Based on a sample of 2,041 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that the “For” votes received from the shareholder proposals have a significant negative relationship with the practice of earnings management, even when corporate governance is controlled. The negative relationship between shareholder proposal and magnitude of earnings management is also found to be stronger when firms have weak corporate governance. The overall evidence suggests that the external control from “voting-with-hand” shareholders has a significant impact on earnings management. In addition, shareholder proposals can substitute the monitoring mechanism for corporate governance in constraining managers’ myopic behavior. Originality/value This paper contributes to the extant literature by using the percentage of “For” votes for shareholder proposals as a proxy for shareholder pressure and concerns. This study contributes to the earnings management literature by showing the disciplinary effect of outside shareholders on managers’ reporting behavior. Also, it contributes to the corporate governance research by presenting that shareholder proposals can substitute for the internal control of corporate governance in decreasing earnings management. This paper should be of interest to investors and standard setters.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Zain Nahdi Baldina ◽  
Achsania Hendratmi

This study aims to compare and see the differences between foreign Islamic bank and non-foreign Islamic bank using method RGEC (Risk Profile, Good Corporate Governance, Earnings, and Capital). This study examines the comparison in business and social performance of four foreign Islamic banks and six non-foreign Islamic banks. The collection of data in this study was done by collecting all the annual reports of banks that has been created as a sample over the period 2011-2015.The test result of the Independent Samples T-test and Mann Whitney Test showed there was no differences in the business performance of foreign Islamic banks exchange with Non-foreign Islamic Bank exchange as seen from the aspect of Risk profile (FDR), GCG, and Earnings (ROA). While there were differences of business and social performance as seen from Earnings (ROE), capital (CAR), and Sharia Conformity Indicator (PSR and ZR) aspects


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