The Paradox of Kurt Gödel: A Response

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Daniel W. Hollis ◽  

Miloš Dokulil’s dissection of Kurt Godel’s religious worldview generates questions among his conclusions. In part, the reader’s understanding is challenged by the turgid translation from the Czech language. Yet, the meaning still can be extricated. Because Gödel’s ontological argument for God’s existence was not published in his lifetime, there is doubt that he was satisfied by its method. Truly, since virtually all of Gödel’s writings on philosophy were unpublished, his rational Platonism leaves considerable room for speculation concerning his metaphysical system. Hence, Dokulil seeks alternative explanations for what seems to have been Gödel’s real faith in God. Framed by semantic-philosophical musings, Dokulil concludes that it was the influence of Gödel’s childhood exposure to the Bible mainly through his mother. Indeed, it seems at times that Dokulil is examining his own belief in God as well as Godel’s. In the event, there are several aspects of Göddel’s life and work which elucidate his religious belief through his pursuit of mathematical reasoning in a more intellectually engaging way than simply the maternal influence that is often most profound and Godly. These include his philosophy of Platonism, great contributions to metamathematics, and the relation of intellect and will.

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 167-191
Author(s):  
Eleonore Stump

Recent work on the subject of faith has tended to focus on the epistemology of religious belief, considering such issues as whether beliefs held in faith are rational and how they may be justified. Richard Swinburne, for example, has developed an intricate explanation of the relationship between the propositions of faith and the evidence for them. Alvin Plantinga, on the other hand, has maintained that belief in God may be properly basic, that is, that a belief that God exists can be part of the foundation of a rational noetic structure. This sort of work has been useful in drawing attention to significant issues in the epistemology of religion, but these approaches to faith seem to me also to deepen some long-standing perplexities about traditional Christian views of faith.


1981 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Whittaker

One of the most peculiar features of the belief in God is the accompanying claim that God is an indescribable mystery, an object of faith but never an object of knowledge. In certain contexts – in worship, for example – this claim undoubtedly serves a useful purpose; and so I do not want to dismiss the idea altogether. But when pious remarks about the ineffable nature of God are taken out of context and turned into philosophy, the result is usually an epistemological muddle. The trouble, of course, is that those who insist on God's mysteriousness still manage to say all sorts of things about him; he is an incorporeal spirit, he created the world, he loves his creatures, and so on. To assert these things is to presume some understanding of God, but no understanding is possible if God is completely incomprehensible. So if that is how it is, if the object of religious belief is utterly incomprehensible, then it makes no sense to say – or believe – anything about God.


2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-108
Author(s):  
Ze'ev Levy

AbstractThe story of the Aquedah represents one of the most moving stories of the Bible. Most modern discussions on it take their point of departure from Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling. I shall do so too in this essay, which focuses on the relations between ethics and religious belief and tries to show that Kierkegaard misinterpreted the story. The inquiry analyzes philosophical responses to the Aquedah from Philo and Jewish and non-Jewish philosophers until the present. It underscores its paradoxical implications, including a structuralist analysis and comparison of the Aquedah with the biblical story of Yephta's daughter. The final conclusion asserts that what Kierkegaard extolled, Judaism condemns as sacrilege.


2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-250
Author(s):  
David Weakliem

AbstractTocqueville said that Americans combined a general belief in God with a lack of interest in denominational differences. Although this outlook may be particularly prevalent in the United States, it is also visible in other Western societies, although combined with lower levels of religious belief. This paper investigates the possibility of a relationship between a belief that there is truth in many religions and modernization, using data from the Gallup International Millenium Survey. The belief that there is truth in many religions is more prevalent in more affluent nations. Moreover, this belief does not seem to be merely an intermediate stage in a move away from religion. The relationship is about equally strong among people of all religious backgrounds. The tendency for modernization to lead to “religious concord” may help to explain the relationship between modernization and democracy noticed by Lipset.


1998 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON

This paper is an exploration and interpretation of Kierkegaard's account of Christian belief. I argue that Kierkegaard believed that the Christian metaphysical tradition was exhausted and hence that there could be no defence of belief in God in purely rational terms. I defend this interpretation against objections, going on to argue that Kierkegaard thought it possible to defend a post-metaphysical conception of religious belief. I argue that Kierkegaard thought that such a defence was available if we understand correctly what it is to speak with ethico-religious authority. I argue that, when interpreted in the way I outline, Kierkegaard's notion of ethico-religious authority shows his conception of religious belief to have great plausibility. However, Kierkegaard goes on to argue that an individual's true relationship with God is constituted through the cultivation of guilt and the sense of himself as a sinner, and I give reasons for rejecting this claim, arguing that such cultivation is a form of asceticism.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Samuel Twitchin

<p>Research within the psychology of religion has illustrated the importance of both religious belief and religious belonging for facilitating cooperative behaviour. Specifically, the supernatural punishment hypothesis (Johnson, 2016; Johnson & Krüger, 2004) and identity fusion (Swann et al., 2009; Whitehouse, 2018) discuss belief and belonging, respectively. This thesis examines the connection of these two areas, with a focus on the understudied religious concept of karma. In Study 1, 193 participants took part in an online questionnaire, with a five-condition between subjects design, that investigated the content of religious belief by using karma and god related religious priming stimuli (images and vignettes) to influence individual’s belief. None of the four experimental conditions were found to change responses on belief in supernatural agents or karma. Belief in god/karma was associated with endorsement of both a punitive and benevolent god/karma. However, when both endorsements were included in the model, only benevolent endorsement was significant. In Study 2, 402 participants took part in a three-condition mixed-methods design with six repeated trials of a voluntary contribution task, which investigated how karma and god related religious priming stimuli (vignettes) influenced cooperative behaviour. Mixed methods analysis revealed that those in the karma condition had higher cooperative tendencies than those in the neutral condition, but did not differ from the god condition. Belief in supernatural agents did not affect how individuals were affected by the god condition. However, those with higher belief in supernatural agents and higher identity fusion were the least cooperative within the karma condition. Contrary to what was predicted, increased belief in karma predicted un-cooperative behaviour in the karma condition. These and other important findings are discussed with focus on the New Zealand context and how the findings from this thesis contributes to the supernatural punishment and identity fusion literature, by highlighting implications, limitations, and areas of focus for future research.</p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 407
Author(s):  
E. Anne York ◽  
Marilyn Dutton

<span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span><p style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; text-align: justify; mso-pagination: none;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">One of the more interesting findings in the research on household wealth is the relationship between religion and wealth accumulation. In contrast to previous studies that use denominational affiliation, we use a more precise measure of religious belief constructed from responses to survey questions regarding interpretation of the Bible.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Regression results indicate that households with more literalist Biblical beliefs have lower net worth overall.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Additional analysis using quantile regression reveals that this relationship holds only for the upper half of the wealth distribution.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>There is no relationship at lower levels of wealth.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Finally, while more literalist households are less likely to have an investment account or to have ever received an inheritance, they are more likely to own a home and to have a positive net worth.</span></span></p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: small;"> </span>


Author(s):  
Frederick C. Beiser

This chapter treats Strauß’s Streitschriften, his chief polemical writing against the first critics of Das Leben Jesu. These critics came from many quarters, from young Hegelians to orthodox pietists and Lutherans. The Streitschriften are very revealing about Strauß’s ambivalence on certain issues, viz., whether the dogma of Christ’s resurrection was necessary for Christianity; they also show that Strauß held out the possibility of an allegorical interpretation of the Bible. The Streitschriften are most interesting about the reasons for Strauß’s allegiance to criticism and the authority of reason. Here we see why Strauß believed that critique was essential for religious belief.


Author(s):  
Michael O'Neill

Chapter 3 traces the movements of Shelley’s ideas and attitudes toward religion throughout his life and writings. It views Shelley as a far more nuanced religious thinker than is often implied by critics. It identifies the ambivalence with which Shelley, a self-styled atheist, approaches religious belief—especially Christian modes of belief—and the ways in which Shelley wrestles with and subverts the boundaries between the secular and the religious. The chapter examines how Shelley’s imagination adapts the language of religious belief in order to articulate poetic vision and experience. It traces many of Shelley’s allusions to the Bible and identifies the ways in which Shelley ‘incessantly reorchestrate[s]’ Biblical language in his works. It identifies the treatment of religion in other Romantic poets, such as Wordsworth and Blake, and shows how Shelley’s poetry departs from their approaches to religion. The chapter also probes a recurring idea in Shelley’s poetry and writings that there is some power or spirit that affects human souls, that originates within or, just possibly, beyond humanity, and has characteristics that influence and are influenced by poets. For Shelley, poetry is religion and poets are prophets and seekers of truth. The chapter also discusses Shelley’s religious prose and the ways in which his writings about God, belief, and religion ‘[reveal] a double rhythm’ in which Shelley ranges from scientific examination to ‘eruptions of latent feeling’. The chapter concludes with a study of Shelley’s final poem, the unfinished Triumph of Life, showing that throughout the poem there ghosts a ‘Christian belief-system that is never wholly abandoned or forgotten’.


1980 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 148-224 ◽  

Kurt Gödel did not invent mathematical logic; his famous work in the thirties settled questions which had been clearly formulated in the preceding quarter of this century. Despite sensational presentations by crackpots, philosophers and journalists (or even in poems, for example, by H. M. Enzensberger, set to music by H. W. Henze), Gödel’s results have not revolutionized the silent majority’s conception of mathematics, let alone its practice; much less so than the internal development of the subject since then. Certainly, those results refuted most elegantly each of the grand foundational ‘theories’ current at the time, of which Hilbert’s, on the place of formal rules in mathematical reasoning, and those associated with Frege and Russell, on its reduction to universal systems like set theory, were most popular. (Gödel’s own and related results also deflate the particular ‘anti-formalist’ foundations of the time, Poincaré’s and Brouwer’s constructivist and Zermelo’s infinitistic schemes being extreme examples; they are taken up in the last sections of parts II-IV.) For obvious reasons, in his original publications Gödel made a point of formulating his work in terms acceptable to the theories mentioned, and to stress its bearing on them. But it is fair to say that they were suspect anyway, and—less trivially—that they can be refuted more convincingly by simple constatations rather than by (his) mathematical theorems as explained in more detail in part II. Further, as so often with very grand schemes, the refutations put nothing comparable in the place of the discredited foundational views which are, quite properly, simply ignored in current practice.


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