scholarly journals Is Vision for Action Unconscious?

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 (8) ◽  
pp. 413-433
Author(s):  
Wayne Wu ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Work ◽  
Dorsal Stream ◽  
Philosophical Analysis ◽  
Widespread Acceptance ◽  
Empirical Argument ◽  
Intentional Agency ◽  
Vision For Action

Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is wrongly assumed that introspective reports speak to absent phenomenology in the dorsal stream. In light of this, I consider a different conception of consciousness’s relation to agency in terms of access. While theoretical reasons suggest that the inaccessibility of the dorsal stream to conceptual report is evidence that it is unconscious, this position begs important questions about agency and consciousness. I propose a broader notion of access in respect of the guidance of intentional agency as the crucial link connecting agency to consciousness.

scholarly journals Making the World Behave: A New Embodied Account on Mobile Paradigm

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umay Sen ◽  
Gustaf Gredebäck
Keyword(s):  
Visual Information ◽  
Motor Behavior ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Dorsal Stream ◽  
Embodied Experience ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
Distributed Information ◽  
Young Infants ◽  
The World ◽  
Sensorimotor Contingencies

In this review article, we describe the mobile paradigm, a method used for more than 50 years to assess how infants learn and remember sensorimotor contingencies. The literature on the mobile paradigm demonstrates that infants below 6 months of age can remember the learning environment weeks after when reminded periodically and integrate temporally distributed information across modalities. The latter ability is only possible if events occur within a temporal window of a few days, and the width of this required window changes as a function of age. A major critique of these conclusions is that the majority of this literature has neglected the embodied experience, such that motor behavior was considered an equivalent developmental substitute for verbal behavior. Over recent years, simulation and empirical work have highlighted the sensorimotor aspect and opened up a discussion for possible learning mechanisms and variability in motor preferences of young infants. In line with this recent direction, we present a new embodied account on the mobile paradigm which argues that learning sensorimotor contingencies is a core feature of development forming the basis for active exploration of the world and body. In addition to better explaining recent findings, this new framework aims to replace the dis-embodied approach to the mobile paradigm with a new understanding that focuses on variance and representations grounded in sensorimotor experience. Finally, we discuss a potential role for the dorsal stream which might be responsible for guiding action according to visual information, while infants learn sensorimotor contingencies in the mobile paradigm.

Virtually the same? How impaired sensory information in virtual reality may disrupt visually-guided action.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Harris ◽  
Gavin Buckingham ◽  
Mark Wilson ◽  
Samuel James Vine
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Reality ◽  
Visual Processing ◽  
Haptic Feedback ◽  
Sensory Information ◽  
Dorsal Stream ◽  
Depth Information ◽  
Haptic Information ◽  
Promising Tool ◽  
Vision For Action ◽  
Optic Array

Virtual reality (VR) is a promising tool for expanding the possibilities of psychological experimentation and implementing immersive training applications. Despite a recent surge in interest, there remains an inadequate understanding of how VR impacts basic cognitive processes. Due to the artificial presentation of egocentric distance cues in virtual environments, a number of cues to depth in the optic array are impaired or placed in conflict with each other. Moreover, realistic haptic information is all but absent from current VR systems. The resulting conflicts could impact not only the execution of motor skills in VR but raises deeper concerns about basic visual processing, and the extent to which virtual objects elicit neural and behavioural responses representative of real objects. In this brief review we outline how the novel perceptual environment of VR may affect vision for action, by shifting users away from a dorsal mode of control. Fewer binocular cues to depth, conflicting depth information and limited haptic feedback may all impair the specialised, efficient, online control of action characteristic of the dorsal stream. A shift from dorsal to ventral control of action may create a fundamental disparity between virtual and real-world skills that has important consequences for how we understand perception and action in the virtual world.

scholarly journals Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Shepherd ◽  
Myrto Mylopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Unconscious Perception ◽  
Vision For Action ◽  
Representational State ◽  
The Individual

AbstractOne necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop an explication of what it is for a representational state to be available to central coordinating agency for guidance of behavior. Second, drawing on this explication, we place a more careful understanding of the attributability of a state to the individual in the context of a range of empirical work on vision-for-action, saccades, and skilled typing. The results place pressure on the skeptic about unconscious perception. Third, reflecting upon broader philosophical themes running through debates about unconscious perception, we highlight how our discussion places pressure on the view that perception is a manifest kind, rather than a natural kind. In doing so, we resist the tempting complaint that the debate about unconscious perception is merely verbal.

Trust in Management Information Systems (MIS)

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Meeßen ◽  
Meinald T. Thielsch ◽  
Guido Hertel
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Information Overload ◽  
Management Information Systems ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Management Information ◽  
Trust In Management ◽  
Actual Use ◽  
Trust In Technology ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Abstract. Digitalization, enhanced storage capacities, and the Internet of Things increase the volume of data in modern organizations. To process and make use of these data and to avoid information overload, management information systems (MIS) are introduced that collect, process, and analyze relevant data. However, a precondition for the application of MIS is that users trust them. Extending accounts of trust in automation and trust in technology, we introduce a new model of trust in MIS that addresses the conceptual ambiguities of existing conceptualizations of trust and integrates initial empirical work in this field. In doing so, we differentiate between perceived trustworthiness of an MIS, experienced trust in an MIS, intentions to use an MIS, and actual use of an MIS. Moreover, we consider users’ perceived risks and contextual factors (e. g., autonomy at work) as moderators. The introduced model offers guidelines for future research and initial suggestions to foster trust-based MIS use.

A Philosophical Analysis of Commonplace Morality

1983 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 422-423
Author(s):  
Robert B. Cialdini
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Analysis

The Philosophical Analysis of a Psychological Stance

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 57 (29) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles R. Figley
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Analysis

A REVIEW OF 10 YEARS' RESEARCH WITH RED CLOVERS UNDER GRAZING IN SOUTHLAND

1989 ◽  
pp. 181-187
Author(s):  
R.J.M. Hay ◽  
D.L. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Tall Fescue ◽  
Red Clover ◽  
Farming Systems ◽  
Seasonal Growth ◽  
Sheep Grazing ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Late Flowering ◽  
Heavy Weight ◽  
Widespread Acceptance ◽  
Summer Growth

In a series of trials at Grasslands Gore, over 10 years, the late-flowering tetraploid red clover 'Grassland Pawera' was more productive and persistent than other red clover cultivars. The strong summer growth of Pawera meets the need for heavy-weight lamb feed and high quality forage for conservation in intensive sheep farming systems in Southland. Lenient. infrequent defoliation is necessary to maximise DM production and persistence of Pawera. The most compatible of the grasses evaluated was 'Grasslands Roa' tall fescue. However, 'Grasslands Nui' ryegrass will still be the major grass sown with Pawera owing to its widespread acceptance. In ryegrass mixtures, sowing rates of 5-7 kg/ha of red clover were needed to optimise establishment and subsequent yield. Evidence of oestrogenic activity of Pewera to sheep prompted Grasslands Division to select within Pawera for a low formononetin cultivar. Keywords: red clover, Pawera. Hamua, Turoa. G21. G22, G27. oestrogenic activity, Nui ryegrass, Roa tall fescue, Maru phalaris. Southland, sheep grazing, frequency, intensity, quality. seasonal growth

Plotinus’ “Reverse” Platonism: A Deleuzian Response to the Problem of Emanation Imagery

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina Zavota
Keyword(s):  
Widespread Acceptance ◽  
The One

Gina Zavota’s “Plotinus’ ‘Reverse’ Platonism: A Deleuzian Response to the Problem of Emanation Imagery” attempts a radical rethinking of the Plotinian question of emanation through the lens of Deleuze’s account of ontological individuation and actualization. Zavota notes that, despite its widespread acceptance as a Plotinian concept, Plotinus himself acknowledges the inadequacy of the language of emanation. Rather, just as Deleuze’s virtual Idea does not impose order upon the plane of consistency but instead simply indicates divergent lines of generation, Plotinus’ One does not predetermine the organization of things from above. Instead, the variety of generated objects, from the Intellect down to the barest material particulars, self-organize through the inherently generative operation of contemplation or turning towards the One. Thus contemplation is an act of differentiation, and Plotinus’ philosophy can be read as a counter-Platonism or divergent-Platonism.

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