Conditional Obligations

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-390
Author(s):  
Tina Rulli ◽  

Some obligations are conditional such that act A is morally optional, but if one chooses A, one is required to do act B rather than some other less valuable act C. Such conditional obligations arise frequently in research ethics, in the philosophical literature, and in real life. They are controversial: how does a morally optional act give rise to demanding requirements to do the best? Some think that the fact that a putative obligation has a conditional structure, so defined, is a strike against its being a genuine obligation. I argue that conditional obligations are to be expected in a moral theory that has moral options.

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Samuel ◽  
W. Ahmed ◽  
H. Kara ◽  
C. Jessop ◽  
S. Quinton ◽  
...  

This article reports on a U.K. workshop on social media research ethics held in May 2018. There were 10 expert speakers and an audience of researchers, research ethics committee members, and research institution representatives. Participants reviewed the current state of social media ethics, discussing well-rehearsed questions such as what needs consent in social media research, and how the public/private divide differs between virtual and real-life environments. The lack of answers to such questions was noted, along with the difficulties posed for ethical governance structures in general and the work of research ethics committees in particular. Discussions of these issues enabled the creation of two recommendations. The first is for research ethics committees and journal editors to add the category of ‘data subject research’ to the existing categories of ‘text research’ and ‘human subject research’. This would reflect the fact that social media research does not fall into either of the existing categories and so needs a category of its own. The second is that ethical issues should be considered at all stages of social media research, up to and including aftercare. This acknowledges that social media research throws up a large number of ethical issues throughout the process which, under current arrangements for ethical research governance, risks remaining unaddressed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-28
Author(s):  
David Wyatt Seal ◽  
Frederick R. Bloom ◽  
Anton M. Somlai

Lew Margolis’s commentary on our discussion of field dilemmas delineates the basic tenets of research ethics and presents the historical backdrop for Institutional Review Board governance of the conduct of scientific research. Margolis’s commentary also highlights two important points: (1) within broad boundaries, multiple strategies may exist for resolving ethical dilemmas, and (2) field judgments about the best strategy for resolving ethical dilemmas may sometimes appear less than optimal with hindsight. These emphases reinforce the critical need for continued dialogue about the practical application of research ethics in applied field settings. We further emphasize the importance of conducting this dialogue not only in community forums but in academic arenas. The professional expertise of field researchers often is derived from direct experience with or membership in the communities being studied. For academic discussion of research ethics to have real-life utility, it is essential that conceptual discussion be translated into discussion of these issues as they apply to real-life situations demanding real-life solutions. We invite others to continue this dialogue about the practical application of research ethics to dilemmas that have been encountered during the conduct of applied field research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lukas J Meier

When an individual is comatose while parts of her brain remain functional, the question arises as to whether any mental characteristics are still associated with this brain, that is, whether the person still exists. Settling this uncertainty requires that one becomes clear about two issues: the type of functional loss that is associated with the respective profile of brain damage and the persistence conditions of persons. Medical case studies can answer the former question, but they are not concerned with the latter. Conversely, in the philosophical literature, various accounts of personal identity are discussed, but usually detached from any empirical basis. Only uniting the two debates and interpreting the real-life configurations of brain damage through the lens of the philosophical concepts enables one to make an informed judgment regarding the persistence of comatose persons. Especially challenging are cases in which three mental characteristics that normally occur together—wakefulness, awareness and memory storage—come apart. These shall be the focus of this paper.


2021 ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Amelia Hicks

There are cases in which, intuitively, an agent’s action is both morally right in one sense and morally wrong in another sense. Such cases (along with other intuitions about blameless wrongdoing and action-guidance) support distinguishing between the objective moral ‘ought’ and the subjective moral ‘ought.’ This chapter argues against drawing this distinction on the grounds that the prescriptions delivered by an adequate objective moral theory must be sensitive to the mental states of agents. Specifically, an adequate theory of the objective moral ‘ought’ must respect a strong ought-implies-can principle—morally ought implies agentially can—in order to prescribe actions to real-life agents. An agent’s mental states determine what is agentially possible for that agent; thus, what an agent objectively morally ought to do is in part determined by the agent’s mental states. This chapter describes the structure of a compelling non-ideal moral theory that is both objective and mental state-sensitive. This non-ideal theory illuminates the shortcomings of extant objectivist and subjectivist moral theories and illustrates how we can dispense with the subjective moral ‘ought.’


Dialogue ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Wand

Some thirty years ago Klaus Reich claimed that Kant's abandonment of feeling as the source of our moral appraisals was due to his reading of Plato and the Stoics, and more interestingly that it led him to the fundamental concept of his mature moral theory, the autonomy of the will. Despite the obvious importance of the latter claim, it seems to have gone either unnoticed or unchallenged, at least in the English philosophical literature. This is particularly surprising since, apart from holding any view as to the legitimacy of singling out the source of Kant's mature moral theory, more obvious influences than those of Plato and the Stoics seem to have played such a role : the variant of Lutheran Christianity, Pietism, Rousseau, and the cultural context of the Enlightenment.


2021 ◽  
pp. 189-200
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz

Chapter 10 addresses the duties of researchers, particularly those in the medical field, again contending that the relational moral theory is revealing relative to Western competitors. It first proffers a new account of the obligation to obtain free and informed consent to participate in a study, as something to be upheld not so much as a way to promote health (utilitarianism) or to avoid degrading autonomy (Kantianism), but more as a way to respect people as capable of communal or friendly relationship. Rightness as friendliness is next shown to entail duties of confidentiality, albeit, plausibly, ones not as stringent as what is common in Western ethical thought. Lastly, the chapter argues that the communal ethic grounds a powerful account of ancillary care obligations—duties to compensate for harms that have befallen study participants that the study did not cause—by giving an account that challenges an influential autonomy-based theory of them.


Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-470
Author(s):  
Nora Hämäläinen

AbstractConsistency is usually seen as one of the hallmarks and a cardinal virtue of moral theory, as well as of any defensible real-life moral perspective. In everyday life a consistent set of moral beliefs is conductive to moral clarity, communicability, responsibility and responsiveness. But this is just one side of the story. In this paper I argue that inconsistency, properly understood, is a productive and constructive aspect of both moral philosophy and our moral lives. After an introductory glance at Ralf Waldo Emerson and Hannah Arendt, the argument proceeds in three main steps. First, I discuss the philosophical importance of paying heed to inconsistencies in our moral lives, which often are prematurely pruned from moral philosophy. Second, I discuss the positive moral roles of inconsistency in terms of responsiveness to different situations, values, needs and concerns that call upon our attention in everyday life. Third, I argue that moral inconsistencies contribute to the necessary adaptability of our moral understandings to changing conditions. Fourth, in the place of a conclusion, I revisit the issue of consistency, clarity and accountability.


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Walt ◽  
Micah Schwartzman

Abstract Does the ontology of corporations matter for corporate rights? Much of the philosophical literature on corporate rights focuses on whether corporations are real entities, aggregations of individuals, or fictions to which rights or other entitlements can be ascribed. We argue that this focus is misplaced. Whether corporations have rights, and the sort of rights they have, is a question of moral theory. It is not fundamentally a matter of ontology, as F.W. Maitland thought, or a matter of legal or moral semantics, as H.L.A. Hart once argued. The going moral theory, not conceptual requirements or explanatory criteria, determines the conditions a corporation must satisfy to have various rights and duties. We argue that this truth is independent of the deontic, consequentialist, or hybrid character of the moral theory. This paper defends three claims. First, the ontological status of a group as an intentional agent is neither necessary nor sufficient for its moral status or entitlements. A moral theory in principle could recognize groups that are not intentional agents, and a group’s existence as an intentional agent does not by itself require moral recognition. A moral commitment to corporate rights and duties is therefore not determined by the indispensability of groups in explaining group behavior. Second, the substantive claims of a moral theory (understood broadly) determine the conditions for assigning rights and duties to corporations. Third, this moral conception of corporate rights has both legal and moral implications for the treatment of corporations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-409
Author(s):  
Baizhen Gao ◽  
Rushant Sabnis ◽  
Tommaso Costantini ◽  
Robert Jinkerson ◽  
Qing Sun

Microbial communities drive diverse processes that impact nearly everything on this planet, from global biogeochemical cycles to human health. Harnessing the power of these microorganisms could provide solutions to many of the challenges that face society. However, naturally occurring microbial communities are not optimized for anthropogenic use. An emerging area of research is focusing on engineering synthetic microbial communities to carry out predefined functions. Microbial community engineers are applying design principles like top-down and bottom-up approaches to create synthetic microbial communities having a myriad of real-life applications in health care, disease prevention, and environmental remediation. Multiple genetic engineering tools and delivery approaches can be used to ‘knock-in' new gene functions into microbial communities. A systematic study of the microbial interactions, community assembling principles, and engineering tools are necessary for us to understand the microbial community and to better utilize them. Continued analysis and effort are required to further the current and potential applications of synthetic microbial communities.


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