Commending a freedman. Virtues and masculinities in the recommendation letters of Cicero and Pliny the Younger

This article explores Roman freedmen’s masculine positions expressed as virtues, qualities, and ideals in the recommendation letters of Cicero and Pliny the Younger. It discusses whether there were specific freedman virtues, qualities, and ideals and what consequences their existence or absence had for freedmen’s constructions of masculinity. A critical close reading of the texts is applied, combined with theories of masculinity, where hegemonic masculinity is a key concept. It is concluded that there were no virtues or qualities that were specific or exclusive to freedmen. A distinct set of virtues for freedmen did not exist in Late Republican and Early Imperial Rome, since much the same behaviour and qualities are seen as manly and desirable for freedmen as for freeborn male citizens of high birth. However, freedmen cannot comply with the hegemonic masculinity in full, since they cannot embody the Roman masculine ideal of the vir bonus and cannot be associated with the Roman cardinal virtue virtus, which was central in the construction of masculinity in the Roman world. This illustrates the complex Roman gender discourse and, on the whole, the social complexity of Roman society.

Institutional justice and the virtue of gratitude

This paper explores the relationship between justice, institutions, and the medieval virtue of gratitude. It does this by focusing on a thirteenth-century account of the virtue of gratitude in the work of Thomas Aquinas. It argues that institutions, both formal and informal, provide a helpful framework for considering the relationship between gratitude and a number of important benefactor and beneficiary relationships within the hierarchy of virtues that make up the cardinal virtue of justice. This paper first explores Thomas’ account of the virtues of justice and gratitude. It then looks at recent literature in theology and ethics of institutions showing how formal and informal institutions can help cultivate gratitude.

Prudence: essential virtue in the field of health

Prudence is very necessary in daily life and it is often necessary to cultivate it. His teaching has been emphasized since the Greek classics. We wonder if enough is taught at home, at school, during the study of medical sciences and we appeal to Haynes, Pellegrino and Maio in search of virtues, acts and clinical habits that link prudence with ethics and humanism. Prudence is all practical knowledge applicable and suitable for the direction of customs. In Greek it is called “fronesis” and in Latin it is called “prudentia”. Reference is made to the man who foresees, who knows in advance, who acts with cautious knowledge, the foresighted, reflective man.1–3 The Royal Spanish Academy defines it in three ways: Temperance, caution, moderation; Sanity, good judgement; and Cardinal Virtue that allows to distinguish good from bad.4

Environmental vices as ethical and anthropological roots of the environmental crisis

The root of environmental crisis is not only the failure to recognize the intrinsic value of the non-human world, but it can also be perceived as a failure in moral excellence and in the cultivation of virtue. The word “virtue” is an old-fashioned one, representing tradition and today we mostly associate it with academic discussion. However, the term is not only connected with traditional ethical reflection; nowadays, we can witness a revival of virtue discourse in environmental ethics, namely in environmental virtue ethics. The paper analyses the problem of cardinal virtue and vice, and tries to answer which vices are the most responsible for the environmental crisis. Thus the five crucial environmental vices are defined as egoism, greed, arrogance, ignorance and apathy.

Inconsistency in Ethics

Consistency is usually seen as one of the hallmarks and a cardinal virtue of moral theory, as well as of any defensible real-life moral perspective. In everyday life a consistent set of moral beliefs is conductive to moral clarity, communicability, responsibility and responsiveness. But this is just one side of the story. In this paper I argue that inconsistency, properly understood, is a productive and constructive aspect of both moral philosophy and our moral lives. After an introductory glance at Ralf Waldo Emerson and Hannah Arendt, the argument proceeds in three main steps. First, I discuss the philosophical importance of paying heed to inconsistencies in our moral lives, which often are prematurely pruned from moral philosophy. Second, I discuss the positive moral roles of inconsistency in terms of responsiveness to different situations, values, needs and concerns that call upon our attention in everyday life. Third, I argue that moral inconsistencies contribute to the necessary adaptability of our moral understandings to changing conditions. Fourth, in the place of a conclusion, I revisit the issue of consistency, clarity and accountability.

Tracking Prudence: What an Iconographic Trail Reveals about Western Culture and its Pathology

In the Middle Ages the cardinal virtue Prudence is revered and her depiction widespread. In the modern era, however, few Westerners esteem Prudence or can recognize her iconography. This article traces the evolution of the archetypal image of Prudence beginning in the fifth century through art and literature. By the modern era the formerly multifaceted Prudence becomes narrowly characterized as cautious or prudish, evidenced in popular culture (e.g., film). Her value might appear negligible. However, archetypal Prudence reemerges in Jung’s paradigm. The lens of depth psychology further reveals the current presence of archetypal Prudence within western culture, especially its prevalent pathological presentation, which may have implications for western culture’s sustainability. Prudence, as a virtue rooted in human neurobiology and the archetypal psyche, seems crucial to navigating the current manifestations of cultural and ecological chaos, perhaps demonstrating one of humanity’s current psychological tasks: to bridge human consciousness with Nature.

Stoic Magnanimity

The Stoic treatment of magnanimity was formulated independently from Aristotle’s, though there are points of resemblance, considered at the end of this chapter. In early Stoic thought, magnanimity is presented as a subdivision of the cardinal virtue of courage, and is marked by an ability to rise above external circumstances, especially adversity. Stoic thinking on magnanimity is analysed here in terms of their theory of value, psychology, and worldview. The main later Stoic treatment of magnanimity comes in Cicero’s On Duties, a highly influential work in medieval and early modern Europe. Magnanimity here appears as one of the four cardinal virtues, defined both in terms of the ability to rise above misfortune and the readiness to undertake great actions on behalf of others; the relationship between magnanimity and honour also emerges as a new theme in Cicero’s treatment.

Towards Computer Simulations of Virtue Ethics

This article presents two approaches for computer simulations of virtue ethics in the context of agent-based modeling, a simple way and a complex way. The simple way represents virtues as numeric variables that are invoked in specific events or situations. This way can easily be implemented and included in social simulations. On the other hand, the complex way requires a PECS framework: physical, cognitive, emotional, and social components need to be implemented in agents. Virtue is the result of the interaction of these internal components rather than a single variable. I argue that the complex way using the PECS framework is more suitable for simulating virtue ethics theory because it can capture the internal struggle and conflict sometimes involved in the practice of virtue. To show how the complex way could function, I present a sample computer simulation for the cardinal virtue of temperance, the virtue that moderates physical desires such as food, drink, and sex. This computer simulation is programmed in Python and builds upon the well-known Sugarscape simulation.1

Truth Matters: Living in Dangerous Times - Aquinas on the Virtue of Truth-Telling

Current political and social climate seems to have as a presupposition the view that truth-telling has a merely instrumental value. This paper will explore Thomas Aquinas’ writing on truth and truth-telling, arguing that truth-telling is an intrinsic good, a human virtue and a component of human flourishing. In Aquinas’ view the virtue of truth-telling is a satellite virtue within the cardinal virtue of justice, and as such imperative for the flourishing of human society.