Kripkenstein and Mathematics as the Language of Nature

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 130-140
Author(s):  
Nour Khairi ◽  

This paper addresses the skeptical paradox highlighted in Saul Kripke’s work Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The skeptical paradox stands in the way of many attempts to fix meaning in the rule-following of a language. This paper closely assesses the ‘straight solutions’ to this problem with regards to another type of language; mathematics. A conclusion is made that if we cannot sufficiently locate where the meaning lies in a mathematical operation; if we cannot describe how it is that we follow a rule in mathematics, we ought to tread lightly in characterising it as the language of nature.

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-141
Author(s):  
Nour Khairi

This paper addresses the skeptical paradox highlighted in Saul Kripke’s work Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The skeptical paradox stands in the way of many attempts to fix meaning in the rule-following of a language. This paper closely assesses the ‘straight solutions’ to this problem with regards to another type of language; mathematics. A conclusion is made that if we cannot sufficiently locate where the meaning lies in a mathematical operation; if we cannot describe how it is that we follow a rule in mathematics, we ought to tread lightly in characterising it as the language of nature.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 144-173
Author(s):  
Vinicius De Faria dos Santos

No presente artigo proponho-me a reconstruir, o mais claramente possível o “paradoxo cético” a partir do modo como apresentado por Saul Kripke em seu Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). Seu argumento sustenta que não há fatos ou razões que justifiquem nosso emprego de termos como dotados de significados. Para tanto, interponho as distinções que julgo pertinentes à adequada compreensão do tema, formulando os requisitos necessários à sua adequada resposta, a saber, o ontológico, o normativo e o da identificação extensional no tempo. Ao final, contrasto o ceticismo ora objeto de análise com sua versão epistemológica clássica. AbstractIn the present paper I propose to rebuild as clearly as possible the “skeptical paradox” from the way presented by Saul Kripke in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982). His argument maintains that there are no facts or reasons justifying our use of terms as having meaning. Therefore, I interpose the distinctions that I consider relevant to the proper understanding of the subject and I formulate the requirements necessary for its proper response, namely the ontological, the normative and the extensional identification in time. Finally, I contrast semantic skepticism with its classical epistemological version.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 155
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Duque de Blas ◽  
Isabel Gómez-Veiga ◽  
Juan A. García-Madruga

Solving arithmetic word problems is a complex task that requires individuals to activate their working memory resources, as well as the correct performance of the underlying executive processes involved in order to inhibit semantic biases or superficial responses caused by the problem’s statement. This paper describes a study carried out with 135 students of Secondary Obligatory Education, each of whom solved 5 verbal arithmetic problems: 2 consistent problems, whose mathematical operation (add/subtract) and the verbal statement of the problem coincide, and 3 inconsistent problems, whose required operation is the inverse of the one suggested by the verbal term(s). Measures of reading comprehension, visual–spatial reasoning and deductive reasoning were also obtained. The results show the relationship between arithmetic problems and cognitive measures, as well as the ability of these problems to predict academic performance. Regression analyses confirmed that arithmetic word problems were the only measure with significant power of association with academic achievement in both History/Geography (β = 0.25) and Mathematics (β = 0.23).


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (S367) ◽  
pp. 281-285
Author(s):  
Karen Hallberg

AbstractThis paper summarizes the talk given at this conference in which the cultural aspect of the low participation of women in science, mainly in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) areas, is emphazised. A few personal recollections will be presented and some some striking numbers to illustrate the current situation will be given. In addition, some thought provoking ideas on what is known as “neurosexism” are explicited and a tribute is made to three women that overcame the challenges posed to them in different times in history (including current times) and helped paved the way to the new generation. However, there is still a long way to go. The inclusion of women and of other relegated sectors of society in scientific and technological activities is an important pending issue which will be achieved when our society as a whole reaches the necessary cultural maturity.


Author(s):  
Mark Paterson

The accidental discovery in 1786 by Valentin Haüy that embossed script could be read by the fingers paved the way for the concrete development of a fully-fledged haptic reading system. The story of tactile writing systems is spurred in part by shame, a means to include the blind in literate culture. Haüy’s ‘An Essay on the Education of Blind Children’ of 1786 summarized his purpose: “to teach the blind reading, by the assistance of books, where the letters are rendered palpable by their elevation above the surface of the paper” (1894:9). Here the evolution of competing writing systems and their role in education and access to literature and mathematics is detailed, as Braille’s system spread to other countries including Britain and the US, and was famously endorsed by Helen Keller whose own remarkable story of reading and communicating through the skin is so compelling.


Author(s):  
Norman Lillegard

Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I attempt to defend Kripke's account against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn supposes that individuals are no worse off than communities with respect to the difficulties raised by Kripke, and argues that the "paradox" of PI 201 can be avoided by a proper understanding of extended dispositions, and by grasping the possibility of private practices. But Blackburn misconstrues what it is to go on in the "same" way in following a rule, and ignores the place of constitutive rules in practices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 4
Author(s):  
Patrick Tod Colegrove

By actively seeking out opportunities to bring art into traditionally STEM-focused activity, and vice-versa, we are deliberately increasing the diversity of the environment. Makerspace services and activities, to the extent they are open and visibly accessible to all, are a natural for the spontaneous development of trans-disciplinary collaboration. Within the spaces of the library, opportunities to connect individuals around shared avocational interest might range from music and spontaneous performance areas to spaces salted with LEGO bricks and jigsaw puzzles; the potential connections between our resources and the members of our communities are as diverse as their interests. Indeed, when a practitioner from one discipline can interact and engage with others from across the STEAM spectrum, the world becomes a richer place – and maybe, just maybe, we can fan the flames of curiosity along the way.


Mind ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 117 (466) ◽  
pp. 303-328
Author(s):  
Cyrus Panjvani

2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gila Sher

AbstractThe construction of a systematic philosophical foundation for logic is a notoriously difficult problem. In Part One I suggest that the problem is in large part methodological, having to do with the common philosophical conception of “providing a foundation”. I offer an alternative to the common methodology which combines a strong foundational requirement (veridical justification) with the use of non-traditional, holistic tools to achieve this result. In Part Two I delineate an outline of a foundation for logic, employing the new methodology. The outline is based on an investigation of why logic requires a veridical justification, i.e., a justification which involves the world and not just the mind, and what features or aspect of the world logic is grounded in. Logic, the investigation suggests, is grounded in the formal aspect of reality, and the outline proposes an account of this aspect, the way it both constrains and enables logic (gives rise to logical truths and consequences), logic's role in our overall system of knowledge, the relation between logic and mathematics, the normativity of logic, the characteristic traits of logic, and error and revision in logic.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 249-258
Author(s):  
Antonio Capuano ◽  

I offer a skeptical reading of Saul Kripke’s “A Puzzle about Belief.” I maintain that Kripke formulates a skeptical paradox about belief that is analogous to the skeptical paradox about meaning and rule-following that, according to Kripke, Wittgenstein formulates in his Philosophical Investigations.


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