The Role of Tacit Knowledge in Religion

1998 ◽  
pp. 209-218
Author(s):  
Walter Van Herck
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Basic Form ◽  
Religious Person

Clarity concerning what kind of knowledge a religious person possesses is of the utmost importance. For one thing, J. Whittaker remarks that believers must have some knowledge that enables them to make the distinction between literal and non-literal descriptions of God. (1) In the believer's perception 'God is a rock', but not really a rock. God however really is love. Whittaker suggests that making this distinction requires knowledge that cannot be metaphysical or experiential, but a more basic form which he terms 'practical' knowledge. Without going into his discussion of the metaphysical and experiential view, I would like to elaborate on this notion of knowledge in three steps. Firstly, I want to consider a short passage in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (A 132-3 / B 171-2) on judgment. This passage points out that we necessarily know more than we can say or state. Secondly, Michael Polanyi's account of tacit knowledge will be introduced to see what 'religious tacit knowledge' could mean to be. Thirdly, analysis of a text from Meister Eckhart's Reden der Unterweisung will aim to show the relevance of this notion of practical (or tacit) knowledge in religious contexts.

Kant’s Material Condition of Real Possibility

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Leech
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Real Possibility ◽  
Rational Theology ◽  
Material Condition

In the Postulates of Empirical Thinking, a section of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents an account of the content and role of our concept of real possibility in terms of formal conditions of experience. However, much later in the Critique he introduces the idea of a material condition of possibility. What is this material condition of possibility, and how does it fit with the conception of possibility in terms of formal conditions? This essay argues that the key to answering these questions—as well as to understanding Kant’s criticism of rational theology, in which the discussion of the material condition of possibility appears—is Kant’s account of how we can individuate objects.

Epilogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Henning
Keyword(s):  
Historical Context ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction

This brief chapter summarizes central findings regarding the role of parenthetical sentences in practical discourse. But it also provides historical context. It suggests that a precursor of parentheticalism may be found in Kant, especially in Kant’s views about the “I think,” especially as they are expressed in the B-Version of the “Transcendental Deduction” and the B-Version of the chapter on Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason.

scholarly journals KANTAS IR DELEUZE’AS: KOKIA YRA GILIAUSIA VAIZDUOTĖS PASLAPTIS?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jūratė Baranova
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Do So ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto nužymėtos ir Deleuze’o eksperimentiniame mąstyme rekonstruotos vaizduotės kaip vieno iš trijų proto gebėjimų raiškos lauko alternatyvos. Siekiama atsakyti į paties Deleuze’o išsikeltą kantišką klausimą: kokia yra giliausia paslaptis? Aptinkamos kelios atsakymo alternatyvos. Šiame tyrime paaiškėjo, kad Deleuze’o atsakymai į paties išsikeltą klausimą „kokia yra giliausia vaizduotės paslaptis?“ patiria metamorfozes, kurios apsuka ratą. Nuo pradinės pozicijos, kai vaizduotė veikia tik paklusdama intelektui ar protui, ji juda link laisvo trijų nepriklausomų sugebėjimų – intelekto, proto, vaizduotės atitikimo, paskui – link jų nedarnios dermės, jų kovos, kuri skatina kiekvienos naują atsiskleidimą, galiausiai – prie vaizduotės anihiliacijos, kuri leidžia užgimti naujai minčiai, taigi, ratas apsisuka ir grįžtama prie jų dermės naujame lygmenyje, moderuojant filosofiniam skoniui. Tačiau visas šias metaformorfozes jungia viena bendra Kanto suformuluota prielaida: vaizduotė niekada neišvengia triadinės priklausomybės, ji neveikia viena; ji galima tik santykyje su intelektu ir protu, t. y. kitais trimis jai paraleliais ir simultaniškais sugebėjimais.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Kantas, Deleuze’as, vaizduotėKant and Deleuze: What is the Deepest Secret of Imagination? Jūratė Baranova Abstract The paper discusses the problem of possible philosophical understanding of imagination from the Kantian-Deleuzean point of view. At the begining of his philosophical carreer, one can say, “early Deleuze” in 1963 published the book „Kant’s Critical Philosophy“ (La philosophie critique de Kant). The same year he wrote an essay “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”. In both texts returning to Kant’s book Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze notices, that it is widely acknowledged that schematizing is an original and irreducible act of imagination: only imagination can and knows how to schematize. Nevertheless, the imagination does not schematize of its own accord, simply because it is free to do so. It schematizes only for a speculative purpose, in accordance with the determinate concepts of the understanding; when the understanding itself plays the role of legislator. This is why it would be misguided to search the mistery of schematizing for the last word on the imagination in its essence or in its free spontaneity. “Schematizing is indeed a secret, but not the deepest secret of imagination,” – writes Deleuze. Some questions arise at this point. The first one – who speaks here: Kant or Deleuze? The second one – what is this deepest secret of imagination, as an intrigue of this kantian-deleuzean voice? How many possible answers to this question one can discern passing from “early Deleuze” to “late Deleuze”? In this article the author discoved some possible metamorphosis or twists of imagination in the experimental reading of Deleuze. It starts from the submissive position being directed by Understanding or Reason, to the free accord of three independent faculties, towards their discord, even fight, even death of the imagination for the sake of the thought and at least – the whirl closes and comes to the same point but from a different point of view: imagination, together with understanding and reason participate as an integral part of philosophical taste in later Deleuze. But one point united all these different adventures of imagination. Imagination always acts only in relation to the understanding and reason, it never plays free. It could never be able to play alone. Keywords: Kant, Deleuze, imagination.

Necessity, Existence and Transcendental Idealism

2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 55-77
Author(s):  
Robert Greenberg
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Other Hand

The role of transcendental idealism in Kant's theory of knowledge has been both deliberately underrated1 and inadvertently exaggerated. If conceivably not necessary, its role in Kant's explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason is at least pivotal to the success of the explanation. On the other hand, though transcendental idealism depends on Kant's epistemological criterion of an existing object, or, simply, his criterion of existence, the criterion for its part is actually independent of the idealism. In fact, it may be because this independence has hardly been recognized that commentators have been unaware of the role the criterion may actually be playing in the continuing controversy over the correct interpretation of the idealism. Altogether, this article addresses both shortcomings – the underestimation and the exaggeration of the role of the idealism in Kant's epistemology. While it places the idealism at the centre of the epistemology, it also separates the criterion of existence from the idealism. In highlighting this contrast, the article explains how the criterion may actually be contributing to the persistence of the ongoing dispute over the correct interpretation of the idealism.

The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Sutherland
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Cognition ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Real

In theCritique of Pure Reason,Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all.

Appendix: The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

Giving a Damn ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Haugeland
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Pittsburgh School

In this 16 page outline, Haugeland (with James Conant and John McDowell) offers a summary outline and interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the Categories from his (Kant’s) Critique of Pure Reason (B Edition). In addition to a careful exposition of a difficult text, this outline also provides helpful context for understanding the role of Kant in the contemporary philosophers of the Pittsburgh School.

Realität als vermeintliche Grenze der Erkenntnis: Hegels Metaphysik im Anschluss an und in Abgrenzung zu Kant

2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 392-417
Author(s):  
Ermylos Plevrakis
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Science Of Logic ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
True Knowledge ◽  
Scientific System ◽  
Aristotelian Metaphysics

While Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason aims to 'humiliate' reason by declining any possibility of knowledge of things 'in themselves', he does conceive such critique as 'the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics'. In this paper I examine in what sense Hegel's Science of Logic goes beyond that Kantian view without neither relapsing back into dogmatic metaphysics nor turning into a mere pragmatism. I argue that reality in itself is ontologically deficient so that it is already reality itself (and not just the categories of understanding) that makes true knowledge of real things impossible. Nonetheless I contend that there is something in Hegel's Science of Logic that is truly absolute and turns Logic into 'a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics', namely what Hegel calls the Concept or the Absolute Idea. Furthermore I point out the concrete importance of these metaphysical claims for human theoretical and practical knowledge. This finally provides a new reading of Hegel's Logic as a de-ontologised Aristotelian metaphysics that not just claims to regulate empirical knowledge in a Kantian manner, but to also conceptually constitute reality 'in itself'.

Regulative principles and ‘the Wise Author of Nature’

2010 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE PASTERNACK
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Design Argument ◽  
Highest Good ◽  
Theological Argument ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThere is much more said in the Critique of Pure Reason about the relationship between God and purposiveness than what is found in Kant's analysis of the physico-theological (design) argument. The ‘Wise Author of Nature’ is central to his analysis of regulative principles in the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ and also appears in the ‘Canon’, first with regards to the Highest Good and then again in relation to our theoretical use of purposiveness. This paper will begin with a brief discussion of the physico-theological argument before moving on to the Appendix and the Canon. Finally, it will consider some changes to the role of the Wise Author in the Critique of Judgement.

The Legacy of Salomon Maimon

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Argumentative Structure ◽  
The Relationship

Salomon Maimon decisively influenced the development of post-Kantian German Idealism, but there is little consensus on how to interpret most aspects of his thought, including the nature and philosophical significance of his skepticism and the reasons why he challenged Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this chapter, Nisenbaum argues that the two ideas that define Fichte’s doctrine of science, or Wissenschaftslehre—the necessity of a common derivation of all a priori knowledge from one principle, and the idea that philosophy should be based on freedom—can be traced back to Maimon’s Essay on Transcendental Philosophy. It is also argued that, by emphasizing the regulative role of the ideas of pure reason in Kant’s account of empirical cognition, Maimon enables a rereading of the argumentative structure of the first Critique that reveals the relationship between sensibility, understanding, and reason. This rereading of the first Critique shows that Kant has the resources to address Maimon’s key challenges, but it also puts pressure on Kant’s discursive account of human cognition.

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