First among friends: interest groups, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the right to privacy

2005 ◽  
Vol 42 (11) ◽  
pp. 42-6790-42-6790 ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 179-190
Author(s):  
Everson Alexandre de Assumpção

This scientific article was based on a case study, judged by the Argentine Supreme Court. In this process, the author filed a civil action in the civil court to compensate the damage against the authors, understanding that the right to privacy, privacy, honor and image rights were violated. The article sought to analyze the collision of principles, rules, rights and jurisprudence that led the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to rule in favor of Jorge Fontevecchia and Heitor D’amico. These were condemned by the Argentine State for understanding that there was a violation of the Right to Privacy. However, the international court decided to revoke the judgment passed and judged by the Supreme Court of the Argentine Nation, understanding that Fontevechia and D’amigo did not violate the Right to Freedom of Expression, making the action illegal and, therefore, forcing the Argentine State to withdraw the action and also to promote the due reparation of the damages caused to the. On February 14, 2017, the Argentine State rejected the decision of the Inter-American Court, transforming this case into one of the most famous “leading cases” of Argentine international public law. Finally, on October 18, 2017, the International Court issued another resolution to render the sentence in the Fontevecchia y D’Amico case ineffective. It was concluded, therefore, that even with the Argentine constitutional reform of 1994 and the granting of a constitutional hierarchy to international human rights standards, it was defined that the rules of international treaties “do not derogate from the provisions of the first part of the Argentine Constitution” under the terms of article 75, item 22, but attributed to the international treaties a character of complementarity, in addition to the prohibition, provided for in article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to invoke reasons of domestic law for non-compliance in order to comply with international obligations. For the preparation of this scientific article, the deductive method and qualitative and descriptive research were used. As bibliographic references were used published materials, scientific literature, Law and Jurisprudence that were relevant to the purposes discussed here.


2021 ◽  
pp. 58-61
Author(s):  
R. Mangayarkarasi

The term privacy is considered to be the crucial term in our society which has emerged recently and our society has witnessed this term for the past few years. In the recent times, there has been numerous debates on the concept of right to privacy i.e. whether our constitution guarantees the right to privacy and its reasonable restrictions, its non-recognition by some courts and this right has been recognized by the other courts. Alot of Indian jurists has thought whether Art.21 which guarantees right to life includes right to privacy also. But there is no clear cut legal or theoretical frame work to help us in this context. According to Clinton Rossiter privacy is a special king of independence, which can be understood as an attempt to secure autonomy in at least a few personal and spiritual concerns, if necessary in deance of all the pressures of modern society. It is an attempt that is to say to do more than maintain a posture of self-respecting independence toward other men; it seeks to erect an unbreakable wall of dignity and reserve against the entire world. This paper deals with the concept of privacy and the constitutional validity of Aadhaar and Supreme court interpretation on different case laws related to right to privacy in India.


Author(s):  
Sam B. Edwards III

This chapter explores privacy in American jurisprudence from its inception until the present day. This examination starts with the first challenge of defining privacy. The second section examines the body of research on the importance of privacy. The third section focuses on privacy in American jurisprudence from its inception to its current state. This examination will include analysis of specific cases where technology has advanced and privacy has retreated. The purpose of this examination is to elucidate how current privacy doctrine no longer represents either the original intent nor the wishes of the citizens. The final section examines different paths the U.S. can take at this important point in privacy jurisprudence.


Author(s):  
Sam B. Edwards III

This chapter explores privacy in American jurisprudence from its inception until the present day. This examination starts with the first challenge of defining privacy. The second section examines the body of research on the importance of privacy. The third section focuses on privacy in American jurisprudence from its inception to its current state. This examination will include analysis of specific cases where technology has advanced and privacy has retreated. The purpose of this examination is to elucidate how current privacy doctrine no longer represents either the original intent nor the wishes of the citizens. The final section examines different paths the U.S. can take at this important point in privacy jurisprudence.


2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd L. Weinreb

The question that I address in this paper is whether there is a right to privacy. It is not the question whether in the United States there is a legal right to privacy or, more particularly, a constitutional right to privacy. There are any number of ordinary legal rights and specific constitutional rights that might be so described, and the U.S. Supreme Court has referred also to a generic “right to privacy” that is implicit in the U.S. Constitution. Nor is the question that I address whether persons have a moral claim to privacy that others ought to respect. I assume that in many circumstances, respecting a person's claim to privacy is productive of the good and, if so, that the claim ought to be respected. Rather, my question is whether persons have a right to privacy not dependent on positive law, such that it ought ordinarily to be respected without regard to the consequences, good or bad, simply because it is right.


Author(s):  
Sam B. Edwards III

This chapter explores privacy in American jurisprudence from its inception until the present day. This examination starts with the first challenge of defining privacy. The second section examines the body of research on the importance of privacy. The third section focuses on privacy in American jurisprudence from its inception to its current state. This examination will include analysis of specific cases where technology has advanced and privacy has retreated. The purpose of this examination is to elucidate how current privacy doctrine no longer represents either the original intent nor the wishes of the citizens. The final section examines different paths the U.S. can take at this important point in privacy jurisprudence.


2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (7) ◽  
pp. 1293-1305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnfinn Bårdsen

This article attempts to give a brief overview as to the interplay between the Norwegian Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. I will do so partly on a general footing and partly connected to a couple of specific cases. In particular, I will comment on the 16 January 2014 judgment from the Strasbourg Court in the Case of Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway. This case involved an alleged violation of the right to privacy according to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), by publishing pictures from the wedding of a well-known couple-both performing artists-in a weekly magazine, without their consent.


TEME ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 997
Author(s):  
Tanja V. Kesić ◽  
Ivana Bjelovuk

The application of thermal imaging cameras in crime detection has raised the question of the legality of their use, as well as the procedural value of thus obtained information. With regard to these questions, the standpoint of the U.S. court practice has shown diametrically opposite views. The earliar U.S. courts rulings took the position that the application of thermal imaging cameras was not subject to the fulfillment of any particular conditions and that it was encompassed by police discretionary decisions. The position of later rulings was that the application of new technologies, including thermal imaging cameras, was subject to basic conditions required for searching, i.e. mandatory obtaining of the court order with the purpose of protecting the right to privacy. As the application of thermal imaging cameras in the Republic of Serbia is prescribed neither by laws nor by by-laws, it could be governed by general regulations on the use of technical means in implementing operational tactical measures and actions, as well as gathering of evidence. Therefore, thermal imaging cameras might be used in police actions, such as police observation, covert surveillance and recording. In the course of covert surveillance and recording, as part of theevidence gathering process, the use of thermal imaging cameras would be regulated by the same conditions by which the undertaken actions are regulated. Since the possibility of the application of thermal imaging cameras while performing police observation is not explicitly provided for, dilemmas with regard to their use still remain, as well as the issues concerning their procedural value.       


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