scholarly journals “Det er jo bare underholdning” – Om filosofi, populærkultur og underholdning

Author(s):  
Carsten Fogh Nielsen

The article argues for the legitimacy of regarding entertainment and popular culture as philosophically interesting and important topics. First it is shown that the conceptual distinction between “entertainment” and “art” is confused and that the normative implications often believed to follow from this distinction are problematic. Secondly it is argued that philosophy as a discipline is not confined to nor defined by an interest in particular topics (the Good, the Beautiful and the True for instance), but is better regarded as a reflective rational practice of questioning and examining whatever is of importance and interest to human beings. Bringing these two points together the article concludes by outlining some questions concerning entertainment and popular culture that philosophy might be uniquely suited to explore.

Dialogue ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Woodcock

ABSTRACTMy aim in this article is to argue that Philippa Foot fails to provide a convincing basis for moral evaluation in her book Natural Goodness. Foot's proposal fails because her conception of natural goodness and defect in human beings either sanctions prescriptive claims that are clearly objectionable or else it inadvertently begs the question of what constitutes a good human life by tacitly appealing to an independent ethical standpoint to sanitize the theory's normative implications. Foot's appeal to natural facts about human goodness is in this way singled out as an Achilles' heel that undermines her attempt to establish an independent framework for virtue ethics. This problem might seem to be one that is uniquely applicable to the bold naturalism of Foot's methodology; however, I claim that the problem is indicative of a more general problem for all contemporary articulations of virtue ethics.


2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Tutton

The prospect of human societies being made anew on other planets is a powerful recurring theme in popular culture and speculative technoscience. I explore what Science and Technology Studies (STS) offers to analyzing how the future is made and contested in present-day endeavors to establish humans as multiplanetary subjects. I focus on the case of Mars One—an initiative that aims to establish a human settlement on Mars in the 2020s—and discuss interviews undertaken with some of the individuals who have volunteered to be the first humans to live on Mars, drawing on STS work on futures and sociotechnical imaginaries and scholarly discussions of utopia. Seeing themselves as part of a project that would start to “establish what it means to live on another planet,” I discuss how interviewees talked about how sociotechnical relations could be remade in the future, both on Earth and on Mars, through the pursuit of this technoscientific project. I conclude that this project is an expression of a multiplanetary imaginary of human beings no longer subject to Earth—but, through sociotechnical inventiveness, able to live on other planets.


Author(s):  
Terry R. Clark

American civil religion incorporates a nostalgic version of biblical Israel’s covenant with their patron deity, Yahweh, imagining the United States as a new Israel. This new myth reflects early Puritan hope for a new foray into a new wilderness of promise, while also promoting a romantic notion of the providential founding of the United States, national innocence, and national purpose, upholding an ideal of pure democracy and divine favor for establishing it universally. This form of Christian nationalism has a tendency toward a new form of imperialism in the modern era that is heavily supported (at least subconsciously) by a vast array of popular culture products. Yet some pop culture media (including comic books) occasionally call into question the concept of human beings living in a covenant relationship with a divine creator, as well as the validity of America’s status as a divinely chosen and divinely guided nation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Deranty

Abstract This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective spirit’ sections of the Encyclopaedia are found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite.


2018 ◽  
pp. 146-163
Author(s):  
Martha C. Nussbaum

The category of age is the only category of discrimination that includes all human beings—if they live long enough. With other categories—racial, caste-based, ethno-religious, gender-based, sexual, and disability-based, the dominant group can view itself as immune from the traits it imputes to the group targeted for discrimination. Because age and its signs are associated with death, this condition is regarded with particular fear and with a disgust closely linked to fear. It is thus no surprise that one of the most tenacious types of prejudice in all societies is prejudice against people who are aging. They are stigmatized in popular culture and discourse, and very often law gives sanction to those forms of stigma. The bodies of aging people remind younger people of their own frailty and mortality, and popular discourse portrays those bodies as incompetent, unattractive, even revolting. Moreover, even ageing people themselves often come to feel disgust with their own bodies, as new research proposes. This stigma is itself a social problem, producing much unhappiness, and it leads to various forms of injustice, such as discrimination against aging people in employment and in informal social interactions, not to mention the huge social evil of compulsory retirement. Age may well be the new issue for our time, since discrimination on the basis of age deprives all societies of valuable human capital. After situating this case in the context of my theory of disgust and stigma, I focus on the special aspects of this case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan J. Ballor ◽  
Victor V. Claar

Purpose Creativity and innovation are interrelated, and indeed often conflated, concepts. A corollary to this distinction is two different perspectives or types of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs. The purpose of this paper is to explore the distinction between creativity and innovation on the basis of their relationship to history and implications for understandings of entrepreneurship. Design/methodology/approach This paper is a theoretical exploration of entrepreneurship understood in relation to a proper distinction between creativity and innovation. Creativity and innovation differ from the perspective of their relationship to what has already happened in history vs the radical novelty of a particular discovery or invention. Findings Creativity can be understood as what human beings do in connection with the fundamental givenness of things. Innovation, on the other hand, can be best understood as a phenomenon related to the historical progress of humankind. Innovation is what human beings discover on the basis of what has already been discovered. Entrepreneurs can be seen as those who discover something radically new and hidden in the latent possibilities of reality and creation. Or entrepreneurs can be seen as those who develop new, and even epochal, discoveries primarily on the basis of the insights and discoveries of those who have come before them in history. Originality/value This paper provides a helpful conceptual distinction between creativity and innovation, and finds compatibility in these different perspectives. A holistic and comprehensive understanding of entrepreneurship embraces both its creative and innovative aspects, its metaphysical grounding as well as its historicity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 400-417
Author(s):  
G. P. Marcar

In Matthew 6 and Luke 12, Christ instructs his listeners to consider the “birds of the air” and “lilies of the field.” For Martin Luther, this instruction essentially amounts to a reprimand: as human beings are naturally dominant over non-rational animals, Christ’s instruction to learn from these creatures is intended to elicit guilt and shame. Against this backdrop, I explore a fundamentally different interpretation in Søren Kierkegaard’s “Godly,” “Upbuilding,” and “Christian” discourses with normative implications for humanity’s reciprocity with other animals.


2015 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Franken

AbstractThe word ‘persuasion’ can be used in two different ways. It can either implicate a process of changing someone’s belief or action without any argumentative justification or, to the contrary, indicate that the changes are indeed a result of argumentative discourse. These two different uses are part of a conceptual development in the history of philosophy. Nowadays they are often placed in contrast to each other, whereby persuasion in philosophy as a non-argumentative act is taken as doubtful and even unsound. In the following paper I argue that the two types of processes should not be conceived of as incompatible, taking some notes from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as an argumentative source. I will show that persuading as a rational practice is based on the possibility of persuasion as a process of inculcation. These processes can help illuminate the notions of good grounds, reasons and persuasion. In contrast to the common perspective, I will show that they are actually the normal case regarding interaction between humans and thus fundamentally provide the possibility of an argumentative practice of giving and accepting reasons. I conclude that the primacy of argumentative persuasion in relation to inculcation needs to be reversed and the common understanding of human beings as genuine rational acting beings needs to be questioned.


2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-137
Author(s):  
Peter Vogt

AbstractThere are various perspectives from which the meaning of historicism can be understood. Historically, the interpretation of historicism has predominantly been interested in either questions concerning historical methodology, or the relationship between the natural and human sciences, or the normative consequences of historicism. My intention is not to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of these different research approaches, but rather to supplement them by confronting the meaning of historicism from the perspective of a different question. Did historicism in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries formulate a notion of historical chance or of historical contingency, a notion of what is neither necessary nor impossible in history but rather the result of accident and chance? To answer this question, I begin with Reinhart Koselleck’s interpretation of historicism presented in two rather short essays, “Der Zufall als Motivationsrest in der Geschichtsschreibung” and “Über die Verfügbarkeit von Geschichte”. In the next step of my analysis, I confront Koselleck’s interpretation of the historicist sensibility for contingency and chance with Odo Marquard’s conceptual distinction between two notions of contingency and chance. This line of argumentation gives rise to a definition of historicism as a theoretical sensibility for the “fatefully accidental” (Marquard). I further support this claim with an analysis of Savigny’s legal history, of Schleiermacher’s theology and of the “anti-Faustian” (Werner Busch) art of Caspar David Friedrich. Historicism ultimately teaches us that history is never the exact outcome of the intentions of historical actors. Though human beings undeniably act in history, they cannot make history or at least cannot make it as they please. It is in this regard that I find, in my concluding remarks, Hermann Lübbe’s description of historicism as a “sermon of human finitude” to be wholly accurate.


Author(s):  
Cayley Guimarães ◽  
Matheus Aquino ◽  
Sueli F. Fernandes

Language is a special activity, and it’s through/via/with language that we develop intelligence, knowledge, and culture. Language is what makes us human beings. Language and its meanings allow for interactions among members of the society to partake in the same culture. People are more than legal citizens: the sense of belonging creates identity, in a process mediated by language. Deaf people have little to no access to the oral language; thus, they have difficulties to share in the national literature, media, popular culture, traditions, myths, folklore, among others. In order to build this identity, the Deaf1 need to learn the written modality of the Oral language from the culture in which they are immersed. Unfortunately, very few research and resources are dedicated to such task. This research proposes a Learning Object that uses Sign Language (the natural language of the Deaf) to teach text cohesion.


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