Godly Diversions and Gifted Teachers: Learning Joyful Stewardship from the Birds and the Lilies with Søren Kierkegaard

2021 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 400-417
Author(s):  
G. P. Marcar

In Matthew 6 and Luke 12, Christ instructs his listeners to consider the “birds of the air” and “lilies of the field.” For Martin Luther, this instruction essentially amounts to a reprimand: as human beings are naturally dominant over non-rational animals, Christ’s instruction to learn from these creatures is intended to elicit guilt and shame. Against this backdrop, I explore a fundamentally different interpretation in Søren Kierkegaard’s “Godly,” “Upbuilding,” and “Christian” discourses with normative implications for humanity’s reciprocity with other animals.

Author(s):  
Carsten Fogh Nielsen

The article argues for the legitimacy of regarding entertainment and popular culture as philosophically interesting and important topics. First it is shown that the conceptual distinction between “entertainment” and “art” is confused and that the normative implications often believed to follow from this distinction are problematic. Secondly it is argued that philosophy as a discipline is not confined to nor defined by an interest in particular topics (the Good, the Beautiful and the True for instance), but is better regarded as a reflective rational practice of questioning and examining whatever is of importance and interest to human beings. Bringing these two points together the article concludes by outlining some questions concerning entertainment and popular culture that philosophy might be uniquely suited to explore.


Dialogue ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Woodcock

ABSTRACTMy aim in this article is to argue that Philippa Foot fails to provide a convincing basis for moral evaluation in her book Natural Goodness. Foot's proposal fails because her conception of natural goodness and defect in human beings either sanctions prescriptive claims that are clearly objectionable or else it inadvertently begs the question of what constitutes a good human life by tacitly appealing to an independent ethical standpoint to sanitize the theory's normative implications. Foot's appeal to natural facts about human goodness is in this way singled out as an Achilles' heel that undermines her attempt to establish an independent framework for virtue ethics. This problem might seem to be one that is uniquely applicable to the bold naturalism of Foot's methodology; however, I claim that the problem is indicative of a more general problem for all contemporary articulations of virtue ethics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jean-Philippe Deranty

Abstract This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective spirit’ sections of the Encyclopaedia are found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite.


1970 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-114
Author(s):  
Deborah Casewell

This article is concerned with how a particular concept of ontology switched from theistic to atheistic to theistic again due to the influences and disciples of Martin Heidegger. It is agreed that Heidegger took aspects of Christian thought, namely from Augustine of Hippo, Martin Luther, and Søren Kierkegaard, stripping them of their relation to God and instead orientating them to nothingness. Despite Heidegger’s methodological atheism, his ontology was taken up by a number of theologians such as Ernst Fuchs and Rudolf Bultmann, who in their turn influenced Eberhard Jüngel, who in turn mentioned the direct influence that Heidegger has on his thought. Whilst Jüngel acknowledges his debts to Heidegger in the area of ontology, Jüngel also seeks to incorporate the history of God into ontology, where the history of God as Trinity is defined by the passivity of Christ on the cross, and how that event redefines evil’s work in nothingness. This article initially explores how Heidegger formulated his account of ontology, then explores how Jüngel re-Christianized Heidegger’s ontology; evaluating what can be drawn from these shifts about the relationship between ontology and history.


2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Brimadevi Van Niekerk

When Martin Luther tore the church asunder after he attacked ecclesiastical corruption, he unwittingly prompted alternative Reformations in other localities that would metastasize throughout the world. This new freedom begun by Luther – the separation of powers, toleration and freedom of conscience centred on the individual – spread also to our remote corner of the world, South Africa. Half a millennium later, Beyers Naudé, an Afrikaner of Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk parsonage, and a theologian, threatened Afrikaner civil religion through his stand against apartheid. While there are many differences between these men, there was one characteristic which they both shared in the use of their consciences, which was closely connected to their respective Christian faiths. The aim of this article therefore is to show firstly how Luther and Naudé followed the dictates of their consciences which caused them to act against the apparent flow of history in response to the moral values in the societies they found themselves in. Secondly, it will show that with their enlarged sense of responsibility came consequences for both the immediate people surrounding them as well as the community at large. Without over-simplifying the connection between these two individuals in history, the article concludes that both Luther and Naudé are human beings with highly developed consciences, and while both were morally obliged to follow a judgement of conscience formed in good faith and both attained their highest ideals, following one’s conscience is ambiguous because it may scandalise the consciences of those whose consciences are differently formed.


2021 ◽  
pp. 131-136
Author(s):  
Jan Loffeld

AbstractMartin Luther had no doubt about it: diseases were a punishment from God. In espousing this view, Luther, who was one of the first people to translate the Bible from Greek into another language, stood on firm biblical grounds. For the Semitic people of the biblical world, this causal connection had been self-evident as well. Diseases, plagues, catastrophes were the consequences of the sin that people commit. Ultimately, the intuition that evil is the result of sin is the basis for the adage that adversity causes people to pray: sooner or later, human beings will be confronted with the contingency of their own lives, which, in the Christian perspective, is rooted in the fact that creation has fallen into sin. This is why the idea that adversity causes people to pray is often trotted out in times of crisis even though it has long been empirically disproven.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
WILLIAM EDGAR

The Article Begins With A Historical Survey Of Challengers Of Hypocrisy And Inauthentic Christianity Throughout Church History: Søren Kierkegaard, Bernard De Clairvaux, Girolamo Savonarola, Martin Luther, Jonathan Edwards, And Francis Schaeffer. It Continues With Two Questions About The Biblical Warrant And Feasibility Of Such Warnings. Finally, It Concludes With A Consideration Of Two Dangers Facing The Church Today: Conservatism And Escapism In The Church. In The End, We Can Only Face Up These Challenges In The Task Of Apologetics Through The Power Of The Gospel. KEYWORDS: Søren Kierkegaard, Bernard De Clairvaux, Girolamo Savonarola, Martin Luther, Jonathan Edwards, Francis Schaeffer, Hypocrisy, Mission Of The Church, Conservatism


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 41
Author(s):  
João Marcelo Crubellate

Sommario: Il mio obiettivo in questo testo è discutere la nozione di lavoro produttivo nell’ambito della opera di Kierkegaard, con speciale atenzione alla teoria degli stadi esistenziali. Partendo dal concetto di uomo come un essere relazionale cioè che si rapporta a sé stesso ed alle altre persone, cerco di esaminare come il teologo danese descrive il lavoro in ogni stadio (l’estetico, l’etico e poi il religioso). Mentre si può dire che nell’etico il lavoro (come approfondimento dell’interiorità e come lavoro produttivo) sia il dovere di ogni uomo, dovere che lo porta all’universale, e nell’estetico che il lavoro sia una noiosa attività almeno quando non si riesce ad svilupparsi qualche talento speciale, nel religioso tutto cambia. Nello stadio religioso l’altro è il prossimo cioè un somigliante e quindi l’esistenza umana prende come scopo un attuarsi del sé verso ad una possibilità che si trova oltre sé stesso, una possibilità che Kierkegaard designa come coscienza eterna. Dunque il lavoro diventa sfera anche per la manifestazione dello umano come coscienza e libertà e non soltanto uno sforzo per soddisfare le necessità materiale dell’uomo come individuo di una spezie animale.Abstract: My purpose here was to discuss the notion of productive work in the philosophy of Kierkegaard. I put special attention upon the so-called theory of the life’stages. Firstly I take the concept of man as a relational being, that is a being that related himself to himself and to the other people. Then I examine Kierkegaardian discussion of the concept of work in each stage: the esthetic, the ethical and the religious. It is possible to affirm that while in the ethical the work (both as the inner working of the personality and as productive work) is an universal duty, and for the esthetic it is a boring activity or at the best, is one occasion for exercising a special talent, in the religious everything changes. In the religious the Other person with whom the Self relates himself must be taken as the biblical-neighbour and so the human life takes a diferente purpose: become conscious of his own eternal calling. In the same sense working becomes a way of developing the most important atributes of human beings – his self-conscience and his liberty – more than a way of caring about the material necessities of life as an individual of an animal specie. Key words: Life’stages; Work; Subjectivity  


Author(s):  
Curtis L. Thompson

In relation to Martin Luther, the topic of “history and its meaning” is necessarily imprecise. It can refer to his personal understanding of history and its meaning. It can refer to the history and meaning that Luther himself made as a result of especially his theological work. And it can refer to the history and meaning that came after Luther and was influenced by him. Therefore, some nuance and refinement are called for in dealing with this complex topic. Luther in his own way was immersed in the topic of history and its meaning. He did not devote much of his writing and speaking explicitly to a kind of “philosophy of history.” However, he wrote and spoke much about the dynamic affairs of God, human beings, and the world, and he could not have done so without conducting his discussion of such events within a comprehensive theological framework that provided an ultimate horizon of meaning. Some explicit claims that Luther made on history and its meaning can be identified, e.g., that it provides lively examples by which the common person could more readily grasp truths that were less effectively communicated by discursive language. From these claims can be articulated a general overview of Luther’s stance on why history and its meaning were to be taken seriously. Besides the knowledge that can be gained about this topic by marshalling Luther’s explicit claims, additional insight can be garnered through a more indirect approach. Much more awareness can be gained into Luther’s view of this topic by turning to the implicit claims that can be discerned within Luther’s theological formulations. This can be done by considering Luther’s theology from various vantage points. Taking different perspectives on his theological understanding can result in obtaining further knowledge into his view of history and its meaning, e.g., that it is marked by paradoxicality, sacramentality, complexity, intensity (of meaning), and totality (of scope). The meaning of history is never completed in the past or the present; past and present meanings continue to be brought into fuller form in the future. Therefore, this theme has not been treated thoroughly until it has included an account of Luther’s impact in this area on future thinkers. The legacy of Luther’s view of history and its meaning is expansive. A report on this aspect of the issue must necessarily be limited. Even a selected narrative, however, can provide a sense of the truth that history’s meaning is an ever-unfolding affair.


Author(s):  
David Kangas

This essay explores the intersection of religion and emotion in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). Emotions—or, more generally, affectivity—play a central role in Kierkegaard's analyses of human existence. Coming after German idealism and Romanticism, and giving extraordinary new life to the heritage of pietism, Kierkegaard finds in the affective life of human beings the key disclosures concerning our being-in-the-world. In addition, Kierkegaardian “religion” takes shape in terms of certain affects and virtues that emerge in face of such existential disclosures. This essay examines how Kierkegaard frames the problem of emotion in terms of his understanding of selfhood. In particular, it looks at the way Kierkegaard's phenomenology challenges an understanding that links emotions to judgments (whether cognitive or evaluative). The latter understanding, an inheritance of Aristotle, depends on a classical ontology that privileges determination, measure, presence, and intentionality. For the “classical” tradition, emotions offer thematic content about the world, guide moral reasoning and decision-making, predispose one toward certain virtues or vices, and can be altered by a resolution toward right thinking.


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