scholarly journals Om realisme og konstruktivisme i Piagets læringsteori og genetiske epistemologi

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Oliver Kauffmann

<p>This paper deals with the epistemological foundations of Jean Piaget’s theory of learning and genetic epistemology. The purpose is to estimate the form of Piaget’s constructivism. I take advantage of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s ‘radical constructivist’ interpretation of Piaget. Contrary to von Glasersfeld, it is argued that Piaget at the same time is a realist with respect to the existence of the external world, and a ‘genetic-transcendental constructivist’ in relation to the development of knowledge. I interpret this paradox as Piaget’s acknowledgement of the co-existence of a 3. person and a 1. person epistemological perspective in the scientific investigation of cognition</p>

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (12) ◽  
pp. 962-964
Author(s):  
Pavel Machotka

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-226
Author(s):  
Marina Folescu

Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid's notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same is true of memory, and it offers an answer to the question: what type of conception does it employ?


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (10) ◽  
pp. 25-28
Author(s):  
Abakumova I.V. ◽  
Grishina A.V. ◽  
Godunov M.V.

Modern psychology considers meaning regulation, as an integral mechanism of personal development. A system of personal meanings develops in the processes of under-standing reality. Due to their polymodality personal meanings cannot be good or bad, but they are not the same. When confronted with unknown situations, the unevenness of the emerging personal meanings can lead to match or mismatch with the existing system of mean-ings. Coincidence, as agreement with a new fact, means meaning consonance. Mismatch, as a mismatch between new and existing information, means meaning disso-nance, as a kind of cognitive dissonance. An analysis of modern psychological literature shows that there are two main plans for the action of meaning dissonances: the dissonance of individual meanings in the implementation of real interactions and the dissonance of common mean-ings during the translation of interpersonal meaning formations. It is proposed to consider that meaning ac-quires a personal coloring due to the processes of both consonance and dissonance positioning of meaning con-structs in the meaning sphere of the subject. The revealed dichotomy of the meaning formation processes shows the possibility of manifestation of meanings bipolarity, which is revealed in the process of transition from the internal to the external world and in collisions with oth-er meaning systems. Then it can be assumed that the ef-fect of meaning dissonance manifests itself in two ways: firstly, in terms of real interactions as a discord of indi-vidual meanings, and secondly, in terms of translation of interpersonal meaning constructs as a dissonance of common meanings. In the course of such an external for-mation, meaning becomes already a personal meaning in the consciousness of a particular person.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
William Benzon

Sydney Lamb’s model focuses our attention on the physicality of language, of the signs themselves as objects in the external world and the neural systems the support them. By means of the metaphor of a cognitive dome, he demonstrates that there is no firm line between linguistic and cognitive structure. In this context, I offer physically grounded accounts of Jakobson’s metalingual and emotive functions. Drawing on Vygotsky’s account of language development, I point out that inner speech, corresponding to the common sense notion of thought, originates in a circuit that goes through the external world and is then internalized.


1994 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-503
Author(s):  
Masudul Alum Choudhury

Is it the realm of theoretical constructs or positive applications thatdefines the essence of scientific inquiry? Is there unison between thenormative and the positive, between the inductive and deductivecontents, between perception and reality, between the micro- andmacro-phenomena of reality as technically understood? In short, isthere a possibility for unification of knowledge in modernist epistemologicalcomprehension? Is knowledge perceived in conceptionand application as systemic dichotomy between the purely epistemic(in the metaphysically a priori sense) and the purely ontic (in thepurely positivistically a posteriori sense) at all a reflection of reality?Is knowledge possible in such a dichotomy or plurality?Answers to these foundational questions are primal in order tounderstand a critique of modernist synthesis in Islamic thought thathas been raging among Muslim scholars for some time now. Theconsequences emanating from the modernist approach underlie muchof the nature of development in methodology, thinking, institutions,and behavior in the Muslim world throughout its history. They arefound to pervade more intensively, I will argue here, as the consequenceof a taqlid of modernism among Islamic thinkers. I will thenargue that this debility has arisen not because of a comparativemodem scientific investigation, but due to a failure to fathom theuniqueness of a truly Qur'anic epistemological inquiry in the understandingof the nature of the Islamic socioscientific worldview ...


Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood

Internalism implies that rationality requires nothing more than what in the broadest sense counts as ‘coherence’. The earlier chapters of this book argue that rationality is in a strong sense normative. But why does coherence matter? The interpretation of this question is clarified. An answer to the question would involve a general characterization of rationality that makes it intuitively less puzzling why rationality is in this strong sense normative. Various approaches to this question are explored: a deflationary approach, the appeal to ‘Dutch book’ theorems, the idea that rationality is constitutive of the nature of mental states. It is argued that none of these approaches solves the problem. An adequate solution will have to appeal to some value that depends partly on how things are in the external world—in effect, an external goal—and some normatively significant connection between internal rationality and this external goal.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter offers a response to Quassim Cassam’s ‘Seeing and Knowing’, which challenges some of the conditions Cassam thinks the author has imposed on a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge of the external world. According to Cassam, the conditions he specifies can be fulfilled in ways that explain how the knowledge is possible. What is at stake in this argument between Cassam and the author is the conception of what is perceived to be so that is needed to account for the kind of perceptual knowledge we all know we have. That is what must be in question in any promising move away from the overly restrictive conception of perceptual experience that gives rise to the hopelessness of the traditional epistemological problem. The author suggests that we should explore the conditions of successful ‘propositional’ perception of the way things are and emphasizes the promise of such a strategy.


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