A Typology of Human Morality

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Genetic Constitution ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamic ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
Behavioral Game

This chapter suggests a typology of human morality based on gene–culture coevolution, the rational actor model, and behavioral game theory. The basic principles are that human morality is the product of an evolutionary dynamic in which evolving culture makes new behaviors fitness enhancing, thus altering our genetic constitution. It is thus predicated upon an evolved set of human genetic predispositions and consists of the capacity to conceptualize and value a moral realm governing behavior beyond consequentialist reasoning.

Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Individual Choices

AbstractIt is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of individual choices. However, we must abandon the notion that rationality implies self-regarding behavior and the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforced by third parties.

A Multidisciplinary Framework to Model Complex Team-Based Product Development

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Takai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Product Development ◽  
Decision Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Analysis ◽  
Design Decision ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Model Complex ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Team Project

This paper investigates a multidisciplinary framework that simulates design decisions in a complex team-based product development in which engineers simultaneously work in a team project and individual projects. The proposed framework integrates cooperative and noncooperative design models with (1) equilibrium analysis, (2) uncertainty modeling based on behavioral game-theory results, and (3) decision-making using decision analysis. In the proposed framework, noncooperative design is used to simulate engineers’ decisions about team project commitment and to analyze potential free-riding; cooperative design is used to model design outcomes when engineers collaborate in the team project; equilibrium analysis and behavioral game-theory results are used to infer about other engineers’ decisions; and decision analysis is used to calculate expected values of decision alternatives. The proposed framework and the design decision-making model are illustrated using a pressure vessel design as a team project conducted by two engineers: a design engineer and a materials engineer.

scholarly journals Progress in Behavioral Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin F Camerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Values ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Experimental Findings

Behavioral game theory aims to predict how people actually behave by incorporating psychological elements and learning into game theory. With this goal in mind, experimental findings can be organized into three categories: players have systematic 'reciprocated social values,' like desires for fairness and revenge. Phenomena discovered in studies of individual judgments and choices, like 'framing' and overconfidence, are also evident in games. Strategic principles, like irrelevance of strategy labels and timing of moves, iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and backward induction, are violated. Future research should incorporate these findings, along with learning and 'pregame theory,' into formal game theory.

Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (04) ◽  
pp. 1750021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Benndorf ◽  
Dorothea Kübler ◽  
Hans-Theo Normann
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Labor Market ◽  
Empirical Distribution ◽  
Similar Distribution ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Text Types ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Text Model

The level-[Formula: see text] model is a workhorse in behavioral game theory. For comparisons across experiments and predictions in future studies, it is crucial to assess the empirical distribution of [Formula: see text]-levels. We present a revelation game suitable for this purpose. In a labor market context, workers can choose to reveal their productivity at a cost, and players’ strategies reveal their level of reasoning in terms of a [Formula: see text]-level. We find that the most frequently observed reasoning levels are [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. In our game roughly 30% of the players are [Formula: see text] and 25% are [Formula: see text]. We compare our results to other experiments that identify level-[Formula: see text] distribution, foremost to the money request (or 11–20) game. Despite various differences to the 11–20 game, our revelation game suggests a very similar distribution of level-[Formula: see text] types.

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