A Game Theory Application of the Rational Actor Model to the Russo-Georgian War of August 2008

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-120
Author(s):  
Gela Pochkhua
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
Theory Application

The Unification of the Behavioral Sciences

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Complexity Theory ◽  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Journal Articles ◽  
Behavioral Sciences ◽  
Unified Framework ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Graduate Curriculum ◽  
Rational Actor

The behavioral sciences include economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and political science, as well as biology insofar as it deals with animal and human behavior. These disciplines have distinct research foci, but they include four conflicting models of decision making and strategic interaction, as determined by what is taught in the graduate curriculum and what is accepted in journal articles without reviewer objection. The four are the psychological, the sociological, the biological, and the economic. These four models are not only different, but are also incompatible. That is, each makes assertions concerning choice behavior that are denied by the others. This means, of course, that at least three of the four are certainly incorrect. This chapter argues that in fact all four are flawed but can be modified to produce a unified framework for modeling choice and strategic interaction for all of the behavioral sciences. The framework for unification includes five conceptual units: (a) gene-culture coevolution; (b) the sociopsychological theory of norms; (c) game theory, (d) the rational actor model; and (e) complexity theory.

Behavioral Game Theory and Contemporary Economic Theory

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Incentive Compatibility ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Individual Choice ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
Individual Choices

AbstractIt is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of individual choices. However, we must abandon the notion that rationality implies self-regarding behavior and the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforced by third parties.

A Typology of Human Morality

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Genetic Constitution ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamic ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
Behavioral Game

This chapter suggests a typology of human morality based on gene–culture coevolution, the rational actor model, and behavioral game theory. The basic principles are that human morality is the product of an evolutionary dynamic in which evolving culture makes new behaviors fitness enhancing, thus altering our genetic constitution. It is thus predicated upon an evolved set of human genetic predispositions and consists of the capacity to conceptualize and value a moral realm governing behavior beyond consequentialist reasoning.

Divergent Perspectives in Global Health Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Prah Ruger
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Health Policy ◽  
Global Health ◽  
Global Public Good ◽  
Global Health Governance ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Health Governance ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
Global Health Policy ◽  
Self Interest

The global health governance (GHG) literature frames health variously as a matter of security and foreign policy, human rights, or global public good. Divergence among these perspectives has forestalled the development of a consensus vision for global health. Global health policy will differ according to the frame applied. Fundamentally, GHG today operates on a rational actor model, encompassing a continuum from the purely self-interest-maximizing position at one extreme to a more nuanced approach that takes others’ interests into account when making one’s own calculations. Even where humanitarian concerns are clearly and admirably at play, however, the problem of motivations remains. Often narrow self-interest is also at work, and actors obfuscate this behind altruistic motives.

Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960–1972

1973 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Russell
Keyword(s):  
International Monetary System ◽  
Policy Formation ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Interaction Patterns ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Rational Actor ◽  
The Impact

The main hypothesis of this article is that transgovernmental interaction among central banks and finance ministries of industrialized countries was as significant in economic policy formation as intergovernmental interaction. Elite interview data indicate, however, that the international consultative process among deputy central bank governors and deputy finance ministers conformed more closely to the intergovernmental image of international politics than had been expected. Both interaction patterns within the deputies’ consultative group and the impact of international consultations upon national economic policies could be explained moderately well in terms of a unified rational actor model. Examination of the transgovernmental interaction does suggest ways to systematically modify and improve interpretations based upon the rational actor model. In addition, the degree of politicization of issues may prove to be a reliable guide when deciding whether the transgovernmental dimension of an issue requires detailed study.

scholarly journals Evolution of Game Theory Application in Irrigation Systems

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 271-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianthi V. Podimata ◽  
Panayotis C. Yannopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Irrigation Systems ◽  
Theory Application

scholarly journals Comparative Models of Capitalism in the Areas of Financial System and Corporate Governance – the Diversity of Capitalism Approach Perspective

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-76
Author(s):  
Paweł Pisany
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Systems ◽  
Financial Reforms ◽  
Institutional Complementarity ◽  
Capital Markets Union ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Regulatory Challenges

Abstract This article presents and assesses the methodology and results of a comparative analysis conducted by Bruno Amable in financial systems and corporate governance in the context of current policy and regulatory challenges. The article, which is based on a literature review and game theory examples, first describes and evaluates the methodology and final classification given by Amable. The role of Amable’s core concept; namely, institutional complementarity, is underlined. A game theory application in comparative institutional studies is then presented, including the author’s own “institutional game.” Finally, we assess Amable’s achievements in financial systems and corporate governance, concluding that they are valuable, innovative and useful despite some (perhaps justified) criticisms of the framework Amable used. In particular, the value of introducing institutional complementarity into comparative studies should not be underestimated. The analysis presented here suggests that Amable’s methodology may also be applicable when designing current financial reforms in the EU, especially European Capital Markets Union (CMU), because it can broaden policy maker’s horizons and promote consistent solutions.

scholarly journals Effective decisions for individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises: the features of the game theory application

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 370-379
Author(s):  
Oksana Korolovych ◽  
Olha Chabaniuk ◽  
Natalia Ostapiuk ◽  
Yurii Kotviakovskyi ◽  
Nelia Gut
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Control Moment ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Antagonistic Game ◽  
Target Company ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
Detailed Assessment

The conditions for doing business at this stage are often similar in a game in which you need to calculate your actions a few steps ahead. At the same time, it is important to highlight several possible current options and make the necessary decision at the control moment. Moreover, each of the options formed should be justified, understandable and take into account the risk factors and available resources.Today, the main problem of assessing and minimizing the risk of “unfriendly takeover” is due to the fact that in most cases the raider is a player who acts quite legitimately and relies on the loopholes of the current legislative framework. Therefore, it is easier to identify possible actions of the raider and to avoid them within the limits of the reverse game than to deal with the consequences.The purpose of the research is to study the specificity of the individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” by using elements of game theory.It has been taken into account that the effect of individualization in assessing the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises can possibly be achieved on the basis of the application of game theory, the elements of which provide simulation of the unfriendly takeover process within the mathematical description of the inherent combinations of attack/defence as if they actually occurred in time both within one state of the external environment and for their given set.The results allowed forming mathematical decision-making models based on the elements of the antagonistic game “raider-target enterprise” and “raider games with the external environment”, which proved the possibility to: 1) identify possible functions of wins/losses; 2) combinations of attacks that can be neglected (that is, from the point of view of the rationality of decisions, will be rejected by the raider); 3) the ranking of the raider’s “attack combinations” for the reliability of their use during “unfriendly takeover”. Under such conditions, the target company can provide not only a detailed assessment, but also an effective minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” and allocate the best combination of protection.

scholarly journals Mathematical Game Theory in Civil Engineering Fire Safety

2019 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 03034
Author(s):  
Olga Shikuskaya ◽  
Galina Abuova ◽  
Ivan Vatunskiy ◽  
Mikhail Shikulskiy
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Fire Safety ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Problem Solution ◽  
Space Planning ◽  
Planning Decisions ◽  
Development Scenarios ◽  
Mathematical Game ◽  
Theory Application ◽  
Theory Use

In the analysis of the project documentation of a two-storeyed sports complex it was established that despite compliance of the project to all standards in the fire safety field, under certain conditions there is a danger of a delay of full people evacuation from the gym room in case of fire that can entail people’s death. For the purpose of ensuring fire safety several versions of space-planning decisions were considered. The scientific literature analysis showed efficiency of game theory use in the field of fire safety, however in the field of fire safety in construction it was not applied yet. Game theory Application (games with the nature in the conditions of uncertainty) for the revealed problem solution was proved. Three possible scenarios of emergence and development of the fire and four alternative space-planning decisions were considered. For all development scenarios of the fire time of critical values achievement of dangerous fire factors was defined. All necessary evacuation schemes are made and calculations are executed. On the calculated parameters basis the payoff matrix was constructed. An optimal variant of space-planning decisions was chosen. Research results showed expediency and efficiency of game theory application in the field of fire safety in construction.

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