Oil and Military Effectiveness

Author(s):  
Rosemary A. Kelanic

This chapter discusses the military value of oil and traces its origins to the historical transformation from coal to oil as the major military fuel during World War I. Oil's superiority over coal was made clear by the conduct of the war, and by its end, all of the major powers understood that oil coercion had emerged as a major international threat. Even countries that lacked oil had no choice but to adopt oil-fueled military technology because coal related transportation was no longer competitive. The chapter then explains how oil deprivation influenced Japan's decision to surrender at the end of World War II in the time and manner that it did. The case illuminates in empirical detail the military devastation inflicted by the Allied blockade, which completely severed Japanese oil access.

Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex examines how the American military has used cinema and related visual, sonic, and mobile technologies to further its varied aims. The essays in this book address the way cinema was put to work for purposes of training, orientation, record keeping, internal and external communication, propaganda, research and development, tactical analysis, surveillance, physical and mental health, recreation, and morale. The contributors examine the technologies and types of films that were produced and used in collaboration among the military, film industry, and technology manufacturers. The essays also explore the goals of the American state, which deployed the military and its unique modes of filmmaking, film exhibition, and film viewing to various ends. Together, the essays reveal the military’s deep investment in cinema, which began around World War I, expanded during World War II, continued during the Cold War (including wars in Korea and Vietnam), and still continues in the ongoing War on Terror.


Head Strong ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 260-277
Author(s):  
Michael D. Matthews

Military research routinely yields spin-offs that are useful in the civilian domain. In the hard sciences, World War I spun off advances in chemistry, and World War II produced advances in physics that changed the world. Military psychological science is no different. Aptitude testing sprung from the efforts of psychologists during World War I to help the military better select and classify incoming personnel. Clinical psychology and human factors engineering were boosted as a result of World War II. The Vietnam conflict led to a better understanding of combat stress and contributed to the including of posttraumatic stress disorder as a diagnostic label. All had direct application to the civilian sector. This chapter considers spin-offs from contemporary military psychological research that will benefit general society including better ways to treat stress and promote resilience, select and train employees, and enhance leadership strategies and cultural skills.


1981 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 441-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip S. Khoury

It is ironic and perhaps telling that the one national independence movement largely ignored by historians of the Arab Middle East is the Syrian nationalist movement. The irony, of course, is that the birthplace of Arab nationalism was Syria; it was to Damascus that Arab nationalists in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere looked for inspiration, guidance, and moral support in the interwar period; and out of the Syrian movement sprang the radical nationalism of the Ba'thists. Intellectual histories of the precursors, birth, and content of Arab nationalism abound, and, insofar as these histories deal with the birthplace of Arab nationalism, they must discuss Damascus and Syria just prior to and during World War I. But once the intellectual birth of Arab nationalism has been discussed, interest in the history of Syria wanes to be revived only after World War II, with the emergence of Ba'thism and the military in politics. What follows is by no means a comprehensive analysis of the nature and organization of the Syrian national independence movement; rather, it is a preliminary investigation of some salient characteristics of the politics of Syrian-Arab nationalism in the early years of the French Mandate.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (3) ◽  
pp. 650-631
Author(s):  
Donald R. Brand

This book argues that the transition from the New Deal to a mobilized wartime economy during World War II restored corporate hegemony in collaboration with a state apparatus dominated by military elites. The purported losers in this transition were New Deal reformers committed to a planned economy and an extensive social welfare state, and groups like labor and small business whose interests were represented by reform elites. Organized chronologically, Waddell's account traces the development of the military-industrial complex from the War Industries Board in World War I to what Waddell asserts is a neocorporatist pattern of governance that had become established by the late 1940s and early 1950s. For the intervening years, he devotes attention to the trade association movement of the 1920s, the National Recovery Administration in the early 1930s, the New Deal turn to Keynesian economics, Harry Truman and the Marshall Plan, and the National Security Act of 1947; but the book focuses on the three periods associated with mobilization for World War II. These three periods are prewar mobilization from September, 1939 to December, 1941; the institutionalization of wartime mobilization from early 1942 through early 1943; and the battles over postwar reconversion that began in 1943 and continued into the immediate postwar era.


2018 ◽  
Vol 165 (2) ◽  
pp. 124-127
Author(s):  
Joanna Harvey

Psychologists first became prominent within the Armed Forces largely as a result of their contributions to military systems, operations and personnel during the First and Second World Wars. In the early years of the 20th century, as psychology was becoming a profession in its own right, its association with the military arose within the emerging concept of ‘shellshock’ during World War I and supporting selection activities in World War II. There are approximately 25 occupational psychologists currently employed within the Ministry of Defence (MoD), operating across all branches of the MoD, within the department of the Chief of Defence Personnel, the UK Defence Academy and a small number at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. The aim of this paper is to discuss the history and current application of occupational psychology within the UK MoD.


2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-8
Author(s):  
W. Howard McAlister ◽  
Jeffrey L. Weaver ◽  
Jerry D. Davis ◽  
Jeffrey A. Newsom

Optometry has made significant contributions to the United States military for over a century. Assuring good vision and eye health of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines is critical to maximizing the military functions necessary to achieve victory. There was little organization or recognition of the profession in World War I, but optometrists were essential in achieving the mission. Recognition of the profession of optometry was still limited in World War II but it was improving, especially with commissioning as officers occurring in the Navy. Through the Korean and Vietnam Wars, optometry grew in stature and strength with all services eventually commissioning all optometrists, and Army optometrists were assigned to combat divisions. Continuing through the more recent conflicts in the middle east, the profession has continued to make an impact and has become an essential part of the armed forces of the United States. Doctors of optometry are now an integral part of the Department of Defense. The nation cannot field an effective fighting force today without the dedicated performance of these officers.


Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith

This chapter evaluates the successes and failures of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) during the second half of the 1920s, in light of the organization's ultimate incapacity to influence foreign policy. By 1926, the CWS was a well-established organization capable of supporting the continuation of poison gas work into the foreseeable future. It had successfully influenced public policy to continue chemical warfare research after World War I. However, the CWS and its supporters failed to convince people to believe that gas warfare was humane. Public hostility toward chemical weapons ultimately led to the signing of international agreements prohibiting chemical warfare. This chapter discusses the CWS's sustained accomplishment during the period 1926–1929, with particular emphasis on its new chemical weapons initiatives in partnership with other departments and branches of the military; the United States' continued support for international efforts to prevent chemical warfare; and the CWS's reorganization into the U.S. Army Chemical Corps after World War II.


2003 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
E Jones ◽  
K C Hyams ◽  
S Wessely

Objectives: To evaluate attempts in the military to screen for vulnerability to psychological disorders from World War I to the present. Methods: An extensive literature review was conducted by hand-searching leading medical and psychological journals relating to World Wars I and II. Recent publications were surveyed electronically and UK archives investigated for British applications. Results: Despite the optimism shown in World War I and the concerted efforts of World War II, followup studies showed that screening programmes did not succeed in reducing the incidence of psychological casualties. Furthermore, they had a counter-productive effect on manpower, often rejecting men who would have made good soldiers. Continued experimentation with screening methods for psychiatric vulnerability failed to yield convincing results during the post-war period. Conclusions: Although well-measured variables, such as intelligence, have been shown to predict success in training and aptitude, no instrument has yet been identified which can accurately assess psychological vulnerability. Previous attempts have failed because of false-positives, false-negatives and reluctance in the target population because of stigma. Early findings suggest that psychological surveillance, if not screening, may yield valuable results when applied to military populations exposed to stress.


2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-128
Author(s):  
Bohdan Hud ◽  
◽  
Oleg Muravskiy ◽  

The author formulates and argues the thesis that the agricultural policy of the new Polish State in Ukrainian territories (Galicia, Polissya, and Volhynia) became an essential element of its ethnic policy. The roots of this policy dated back to before World War I. Polish politicians in Galicia introduced a regulation that big estates should be parceled out in ethnically mixed lands in a way that made the Polish small landowners, not the Ruthenians the primary beneficiaries. Over the course of time, it became a cornerstone of the agricultural policy of the Second Polish Republic. The principles of the land reform, dated back to the 1920s, were discriminating against Ukrainian peasants living in the south-eastern part of the II Polish Republic. First of all, because of the so-called raison d’état, which allowed for the further existence of large landed properties Even the legally defined upper limit – from 300 to 700 hectares – was oftentimes significantly exceeded. Discrimination of the local peasantry during the land division period was additionally intensified through the military settlement policy and civilian colonization of lands with the prevailing non-Polish population. It was generally considered that only Polish peasants could improve the situation in the Eastern borderlands. The growing number of settlers in closed rural communities caused a lack of arable land, and in consequence deepening civil conflicts, as well as favourable conditions for both nationalistic and communist propaganda. Thus, the nationalistic character of the Polish agricultural policy during the interwar period had a negative impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations both then and during World War II.


1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel P. Huntington

“Conventional wisdom” (to purloin a phrase from Galbraith) holds that interservice competition necessarily undermines economy, efficiency, and effective central control in the military establishment. The remedy is further unification, possibly even the merger of the services into a single uniform. The conventional wisdom also holds that political action by military groups necessarily threatens civilian control. The remedy is to “keep the military out of politics.” The pattern of American military politics and interservice rivalry since World War II, however, suggests that the conventional wisdom may err in its analysis of their results and falter in its prescription of remedies.Service political controversy between the world wars had two distinguishing characteristics. First, on most issues, a military service, supported, perhaps, by a few satellite groups, struggled against civilian isolationists, pacifists, and economizers. The Navy and the shipbuilding industry fought a lonely battle with the dominant forces in both political parties over naval disarmament. The Army lost its fight for universal service after World War I, and throughout the Twenties clashed with educational, labor, and religious groups over ROTC and with other groups over industrial mobilization preparation. In the annual budget encounters the issue usually was clearly drawn between service supporters who stressed preparedness and their opponents who decried the necessity and the legitimacy of substantial military expenditures. To the extent that the services were in politics, they were involved in conflicts with civilian groups.


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