Lessons Learned from Deepwater Horizon Incident - Adapting an Integrated Command System with Governmental Takeover of the Incident Command

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 361-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Marius Ly ◽  
Kathrine Idas ◽  
Rune Bergstrøm ◽  
Egil Dragsund

ABSTRACT Both the Norwegian authorities and the oil industry have completed assessments and evaluations with respect to the lessons learned and experiences gained from the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010. This paper will focus on the establishment of a national system for handling very large oil spills and governmental takeover of the incident command from the responsible operating company. The Norwegian oil industry is subject to preparedness requirements following the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) regulations for petroleum related activities. Based on this, all offshore operating companies must have contingency plans and be able to respond to an oil spill resulting from their own activities. The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) has a duty on behalf of the government to maintain preparedness and respond to major instances of acute pollution and, by law, has the obligation to take command and direct major response operations. On the Norwegian Continental Shelf there have only been two incidents involving the offshore oil industry with the release of crude oil estimated at more than 4,000 m3. The Bravo blow-out occurred in 1977, with a release of oil of approximately 12,700 m3. The Statfjord A release occurred in 2007 during a shuttle tanker loading with a release of oil of approximately 4,400 m3. The Bravo blowout lasted for eight days and resulted in a high focus on oil spill response both within the oil industry and for the authorities. The Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies (NOFO) was established in 1978 as the industry's operational organization within oil spill contingency. In 2013 an updated national risk picture was presented with fourteen defined scenarios. One of these is an offshore oil and gas blow-out spilling approximately 300,000 tonnes and resulting in approximately 3,000 km of polluted shoreline. Together with the lessons identified from the Deepwater horizon response in 2010 there was a need to assess and improve how spills with an extreme nature and magnitude were organized on a national level. Within the framework of the Pollution Control act and HSE regulations a system has been developed in a joint effort between the oil industry and the authorities. The system is based on the already existing integrated command structure in Norway and will be part of the national contingency plan. The system for governmental takeover of the incident command, how the takeover is organized, and how the responsibilities are distributed is described in a bridging document. One of the main issues is how to be prepared to make full use of the Pollution Control Act and international agreements to bring added value to the spill response operations. A decision for governmental takeover will be based on a holistic assessment of the actual oil spill and the environmental consequences, and will build upon the already existing spill response organization established by the responsible operating company.

2020 ◽  
Vol 117 ◽  
pp. 106593
Author(s):  
Melissa Rohal ◽  
Noe Barrera ◽  
Elva Escobar-Briones ◽  
Gregg Brooks ◽  
David Hollander ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (s1) ◽  
pp. s56-s56
Author(s):  
Ashis Shrestha ◽  
Michael Khouli ◽  
Sumana Bajracharya ◽  
Rose House ◽  
Joshua Mugele

Introduction:Patan Hospital, located in Kathmandu Valley, Nepal is a 400-bed hospital that has a long history of responding to natural disasters. Hospital personnel have worked with the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to develop standardized disaster response plans that were implemented in multiple hospital systems after the earthquake of 2015. These plans focused primarily on traumatic events but did not account for epidemics despite the prevalence of infectious diseases in Nepal.Aim:To develop and test a robust epidemic/pandemic response plan at Patan Hospital in Kathmandu that would be generalizable to other hospitals nationwide.Methods:Using the existing disaster plan in conjunction with public health and disaster medicine experts,we developed an epidemic response plan focusing on communication and coordination (between the hospital and MOH, among hospital administration and staff), logistics and supplies including personal protective equipment (PPE), and personnel and hospital incident command (IC) training. After development, we tested the plan using a high-fidelity, real-time simulation across the entire hospital and the hospital IC using actors and in conjunction with the MOH and WHO. We adjusted the plan based on lessons learned from this exercise.Results:Lessons learned from the high-fidelity simulation included the following: uncovering patient flow issues to avoid contamination/infection; layout issues with the isolation area, specifically accounting for donning/doffing of PPE; more sustained duration of response compared to a natural disaster with implications for staffing and supplies; communication difficulties unique to epidemics; need for national and regional surveillance and inter-facility planning and communication. We adjusted our plan accordingly and created a generalizable plan that can be deployed at an inter-facility and national level.Discussion:We learned that this process is feasible in resource-poor hospital systems. Challenges discovered in this process can lead to better national and system-wide preparedness.


Author(s):  
Scott Post

On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oilrig sank in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in an oil spill of 4.9 million barrels, one of the largest environmental disasters in United States history. In response to this disaster, the X Prize Foundation sponsored the Wendy Schmidt Oil Cleanup X Challenge, with a one million dollar top prize for engineers to develop better ways to clean up oil after an offshore oil spill. Inspired by the oil spill cleanup challenge, a class project was developed for students in a junior-level fluid mechanics course to develop and implement an oil-spill cleanup solution. Students had one semester to design and build an oil spill cleanup device. At the end of the semester final testing took place in a 20-foot long water table, which was filled with water 6 inches deep. Then for each team of 3–4 students 100 mL of cooking oil was dispersed into the water table, and they had 20 minutes to recover as much of the oil as they could. The grading for the project was based in part on the percentage of the oil the students could recover in the allotted time. The students employed a wide range of techniques, including skimmers, scoopers, and absorbers. The students also had to write a report explaining how their model solution in the water table could be scaled up to full-scale use in an actual offshore oil spill.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. 3639-3649 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. S. Hayworth ◽  
T. P. Clement ◽  
J. F. Valentine

Abstract. From mid June 2010 to early August 2010, the white sandy beaches along Alabama's Gulf coast were inundated with crude oil discharged from the Deepwater Horizon well. The long-term consequences of this environmental catastrophe are still unfolding. Although BP has attempted to clean up some of these beaches, there still exist many unanswered questions regarding the physical, chemical, and ecological state of the oil contaminated beach system. In this paper, we present our understanding of what is known and known to be unknown with regard to the current state of Alabama's beaches in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Motivated by our observations of the evolving distribution of oil in Alabama's beaches and BP's clean-up activities, we offer our thoughts on the lessons learned from this oil spill disaster.


1987 ◽  
Vol 1987 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
P. Bernard Ryan ◽  
Derek J. S.

ABSTRACT The ROPME sea area as defined in this paper is the scene of some of the world's most intensive offshore oil exploration and production and the associated crude oil refining and tanker terminaling for oil exportation. The potential for oil pollution in the area is high, with its confined nature making it especially vulnerable to the effects of oil pollution. Awareness of this problem is well developed in the region in both government and industry, and good progress has been made in recent years toward preparing for the big oil spill which has so far not materialized, but which most experts consider inevitable at some time. Two distinct groups share the concern for oil pollution. The oil industry has well over 40 companies active in the area in some way. Many of these have a 15 year history of cooperation in oil spill response and continue to play a full role in protecting the environment from the adverse effects of oil pollution. More recently, nations bordering the area have taken an active interest in the problem and have demonstrated an impressive record of commitment and action over the past five or six years. While government and industry have maintained their separate identities, a good working relationship exists between them, and there is good information exchange and practical cooperation between the two groups, most especially at the national level. Future years should see this trend develop even further. A very impressive arsenal of oil pollution response equipment has been built up in the sea area since two major oil spill incidents in 1980. What is especially noticeable now is the proportion of this equipment that is owned and operated directly by the government agencies. This stands in marked contrast to the situation in 1980. In addition to the equipment resources available, the pool of personnel trained in oil spill response technology and methods is rapidly expanding as a result of seminars, workshops, and training courses that are being organized on a regular basis. The development of national and regional legislation to control the main sources of man-made pollution, for example, from tanker operations and offshore exploration and production, is in a very active stage and the oil industry is expected to have clear operational guidelines within the next few years.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 (1) ◽  
pp. 2017425
Author(s):  
Cassidee Shinn ◽  
Joe Stewart ◽  
Yvonne Addassi

California has approximately >10,000 vessels calling its ports each year, and 200–300 facilities state wide, many of which are required to have a California Oil Spill Contingency Plan (Contingency Plan) on file with Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR). Spill Management Teams (SMT), either staffed by Contingency Plan holders' employees or contracted out, and the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) structure must be described in these plans. OSPR introduced an unannounced SMT drill program (Program) in 2012 to ensure that Contingency Plan holders can successfully complete the proper initial notifications, activate their SMT, and use ICS in accordance with their approved Contingency Plan and California Code 820.01, Drills and Exercises. There are multiple goals of this Program, including the enhanced capability of SMTs, OSPR, and other partners. This Program provides continued education and training for Contingency Plan holders and SMTs in an effort to bolster the initial response phase of an actual incident. Through these drills, SMTs must demonstrate that they could make proper notifications and decisions during an actual incident and be staffed with trained personnel in ICS to fill positions before State and Federal representatives respond. Additionally, SMTs should deploy resources listed in their approved Contingency Plans and ensure those resources are up to date, available, and sufficient. Furthermore, drills provide an opportunity for OSPR and SMTs to build relationships through testing these procedures, which should make the initial response more efficient and effective. Lastly, the drills are often conducted with representatives from United States Coast Guard and Environmental Protection Agency, both of which have their own drill programs. Working in conjunction with federal partners ensures continuity and fewer required drills of SMTs. Since the beginning of the Program, SMTs continue to improve their response capabilities, validated by more successfully completed unannounced drills. OSPR has conducted 30 unannounced drills, all of which were on SMTs for marine facilities and vessels. With the expanded authority of OSPR to regulate facilities statewide in 2015, this Program will continue to grow. Ultimately, a more comprehensive Program should lead to enhanced SMT capability statewide, and therefore better protection of the State's natural resources overall. The goal of this poster will be to describe: 1) the history and purpose of this Program; 2) the lessons learned and improvements of SMTs and Contingency Plans; and 3) the expansion of the Program from marine to statewide.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 265-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chantal C. Guénette ◽  
Linn Aasnes ◽  
Odd Arne Folium

ABSTRACT A summary of shoreline cleanup case studies in Norway is presented. Six spills, spanning more than two decades, are reviewed in terms of spill size, oil type, shoreline type, extent of oiling, cleanup techniques that were used, and lessons learned. This evaluation is based on situation reports, follow-up studies, and papers. The lessons learned and recommendations for improving the current response practices are discussed in terms of recent advances regarding current state of knowledge in oil spill behavior and cleanup techniques. These issues are addressed with reference to the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority's stated aim to strengthen shoreline cleanup response capabilities in Norway.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 2098-2111
Author(s):  
Kelly Lynn Schnapp ◽  
Joseph Leonard ◽  
Michael Drieu ◽  
Bryan Rogers

ABSTRACT This paper seeks to better prepare the oil spill response community for incorporating well control into a response organization, based on conditional considerations rather than long and firmly held assumptions. Techniques used to control a well, after a blowout, are more closely related to technical well drilling and control activities rather than to operations intended to address oil in the environment. When oil is released from a well in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), response organizers need to consider various factors influencing the organization that may exist at the time. These include a working knowledge of well control by response leadership; strength of responder relationships; and response complexity (to include authority, stakeholder and public expectations). This is particularly true when incorporating the well control support function in the oil spill response operational planning processes, usually facilitated by the Incident Command System (ICS). Within the last three years, complex well control operations were uniquely incorporated into response organizations during two Government Initiated Unannounced Exercises (GIUEs) and during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident. Three options will be presented. Considerations for incorporating well control into a response organization will be presented using the case studies noted previously and by comparing similar lessons learned from the salvage industry in the late 1990's. Options presented help demonstrate that response organization flexibility is key to a successful response. This paper seeks to illuminate options surrounding placement of well control within an incident command structure based upon unique incident situational realities.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 737-742
Author(s):  
LT Tina M. Burke ◽  
LT John P. Flynn

ABSTRACT In recent years, the usefulness of the incident command system (ICS) has received much attention. Much of the oil industry and several government agencies involved in all types of emergency response have been using ICS for many years. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard formally adopted the national interagency incident management system (NIIMS) ICS as the response management system of choice in February of 1996. The response to the tank barge North Cape grounding was a complex multiagency effort that brought with it many of the issues and problems responders face when dealing with crisis situations. This paper describes the ICS-based organization that was established to respond to the major North Cape oil spill, analyzes the organization compared to standard ICS, and discusses how the ICS framework and principles contributed to the success of the response. It also explains how closer conformity to standard ICS could have remedied many of the issues that later surfaced as lessons learned, resulting in improved response efficiency. The North Cape response provides a vivid example of how ICS is a helpful management tool that, if rigorously learned and applied in a widespread fashion, can greatly enhance the nation's oil spill response posture.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 482-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Lynch ◽  

TheMacondo oil rig explosion and subsequent oil spill was the worst disaster in the US offshore oil industry since 1969. Although some worried that it reflected the greater challenges of deepwater drilling for which the industry was not prepared, investigations have shown that a variety of decisions made, primarily during the drilling of the well, caused the blowout and explosion. Apparently, a corporate culture of cost cutting led to many of these decisions, and it suggests that human failures, both in senior levels where culture is set, and at the lower levels where it affects operations, are the primary challenges that need to be overcome to reduce the likelihood of future disaster.


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