The William J. Clinton Administration (1993–2001)

1992 ◽  
Vol 70 (51) ◽  
pp. 3-4
Author(s):  
BETTE HILEMAN ◽  
JANICE LONG

PEDIATRICS ◽  
1994 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-152
Author(s):  
Caroline Breese Hall ◽  
Harold S. Margolis

We appreciate the concerned letter of Dr Jacobs and his thoughtful questions arising both from his knowledge of the recommendations and public health issues, as well as those of private practice. The cost of vaccines is an issue with which we must all be concerned. By highlighting the importance of childhood immunization the Clinton administration has engendered interest and, thus, optimism that efforts toward reducing the cost will be successful. However, we should remember that the many excellent studies that have analyzed the reasons why children are not being vaccinated have shown that cost is not the major factor, but access, difficulties, and obstacles, real and perceived, to obtaining immunizations are.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 70-74
Author(s):  
Korwa G. Adar

There is nothing more fundamental to Africans who are concerned with the future of the African continent than the issues of democracy, human rights, good governance, and the rule of law. These basic human liberties, among other concerns, constitute the central driving force behind what is often referred to as Africa’s “second liberation.” The primary purpose of this article is to assess the Clinton administration’s role in this second liberation, particularly in terms of its involvement in issues of democracy and human rights. This assessment is offered from the perspective of an individual who has been directly involved in the prodemocracy and human rights movement in Kenya. This article focuses on whether the Clinton administration’s policies are still heavily influenced by classic U.S. conceptions of realpolitik, or if enlightened leadership more in line with a neo-Wilsonian idealpolitik—as official rhetoric suggests—has permitted a fundamental departure in favor of a more coherent and tangible democracy and human rights foreign policy stance in the post-Cold War era.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-46
Author(s):  
Donald S. Rothchild

The Clinton administration and its predecessors have had a difficult time assessing the impact of ethnicity and nationalism on international conflict. They are inclined to focus on state power and individual rights considerations, downplaying the importance of the ties of communal identity and the emotive appeals of ethnic self-determination. Then, when ethnic groups do gain political significance, U.S. officials often give the communal concerns a prominence out of proportion with reality. The primary challenge for the Clinton administration is that U.S. liberalism classically has involved commitments that preclude flexibility on communally based demands for self-determination and group rights. Such perspectives can at times complicate the formulation of effective foreign policies for a region only partially integrated into the global capitalist economy, and therefore autonomous for some purposes from U.S. manipulation. What is needed is an involved but pragmatic liberalism that links U.S. conflict management objectives with what Thomas Friedman describes as a “coherent post–Cold War strategic framework.” Without that framework, he writes, “the Americans look like naive do-gooders trying to break up a street brawl.”


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Volman

Studies of U.S. government relations with Africa have generally focused on the role of the executive branch, specifically by examining and analyzing the views and activities of administration officials and the members of executive branch bureaucracies. This is only natural, given the predominant role that the executive branch has historically played in the development and implementation of U.S. policy toward the continent. However, the U.S. Congress has always played an important role in determining U.S. policy toward Africa due to its constitutional authority over the appropriation and authorization of funding for all foreign operations conducted by the executive branch. Furthermore, Congress enacted legislation on several occasions during the Cold War period that directly affected U.S. policy. For example, Congress approved the Clark Amendment prohibiting U.S. intervention in Angola (although it later voted to repeal the amendment) and also passed the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which imposed sanctions on South Africa over the veto of the Reagan administration.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-13
Author(s):  
John F. Clark

Both continuity and change capture the evolving role of the Clinton White House in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Elements of continuity are reflected in a familiar pattern of relationships between the White House and the principal foreign policy bureaucracies, most notably the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and more recently the U.S. Department of Commerce. As cogently argued in Peter J. Schraeder’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era, the White House has tended to take charge of U.S. African policies only in those relatively rare situations perceived as crises by the president and his closest advisors. In other, more routine situations—the hallmark of the myriad of U.S. African relations—the main foreign policy bureaucracies have been at the forefront of policy formulation, and “bureaucratic dominance” of the policymaking process has prevailed. Much the same pattern is visible in the Clinton administration, with the exception of President Clinton’s trip to Africa in 1998. Until that time, events in Somalia in 1993 served as the only true African crisis of the administration that was capable of focusing the ongoing attention of President Clinton and his closest advisors. Given that the United States is now disengaged from most African crises, Africa has remained a “backwater” for the White House and the wider foreign policymaking establishment.


1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 64-69
Author(s):  
Larry A. Swatuk

With fanfare befitting the arrival of a god of the Western material world, U.S. President Bill Clinton toured Southern Africa imparting “words of wisdom” along the way. His aim, we were told, was to see that the United States becomes Africa’s “true partner.” The reason being, according to Clinton, “[a]s Africa grows strong, America grows stronger ... Yes, Africa needs the world, but more than ever it is equally true that the world needs Africa.” To this end, the United States would pursue a mix of political and economic policies that included the African Crisis Response Initiative and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, both designed to foster “stability” and “prosperity” on the continent. Lofty goals, to be sure, but ends whose means are badly in need of interrogation. This article does just that: To wit, does Clinton, on behalf of U.S. policymakers, mean what he says? If so, in naming “peace” and “prosperity,” can he make them? Put differently, does the Clinton administration have the power to introduce order where there was chaos? Or will it only compound existing problems and visit new ones upon those who had few to begin with?


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