Ethnicity and Gender in Museum Representations of Human Evolution

Scientific representations of human evolution often embrace stereotypes of ethnicity and gender that are more aligned with socio-cultural discourses and norms than empirical facts. The present study has two connected aims: to understand how ethnicity and gender are represented in an exhibition about human evolution, and to understand how that representation influences learners’ meaning making. First, we analysed an exhibition with realistic reconstructions of early hominids in a museum of natural history, to identify dualisms related to the representation of gender and ethnicity that have been recognised in research. Then, we studied the processes of meaning making in the exhibition during an out-of-school educational activity, in which groups of teenaged students explore and discuss the hominid reconstructions. Our results show that the exhibition displays human evolution in the form of a linear sequence from a primitive African prehistory to a more advanced European present. Behind this depiction of human evolution lies stereotypic notions of ethnicity and gender: notions that were incorporated into the students’ meaning making during the educational activity. When students noticed aspects of ethnicity, their meaning making did not dispute the messages represented in the exhibition; these were accepted as scientific facts. Conversely, when the students noticed aspects related to gender, they often adopted a more critical stance and challenged the representations from different perspectives. We discuss the implications of our findings for exhibit design and evolution education more generally. In doing so, we offer our perspectives on the design of learning environments to salvage inherently sexist, racist, imperial science.

Investigating Scientists’ Views of the Family Resemblance Approach to Nature of Science in Science Education

In this paper, we use the “Family Resemblance Approach” (FRA) as a framework to characterize how scientists view the nature of science (NOS). FRA presents NOS as a “system” that includes clusters or categories of ideas about the cognitive-epistemic and social-institutional aspects of science. For example, the cognitive-epistemic aspects include aims and values such as objectivity and scientific methods such as hypothesis testing. Social-institutional aspects refer to a range of components including social values such as honesty about evidence and institutional contexts of science such as research institutions. Characterized as such, NOS is thus a system of interacting components. The initial account of FRA was proposed by philosophers of science and subsequently adapted and extended for science education including through empirical studies. Yet, there is little understanding of the extent to which FRA coheres with scientists’ own depictions about NOS. Hence, an empirical study was conducted with scientists to investigate their views about FRA as well as their views of NOS using the FRA framework. In so doing, the research sought to explore the utility of FRA from scientists’ point of view. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of 17 Taiwanese scientists’ responses to a set of written questions indicates that scientists are in agreement with the FRA account of NOS, and they detail all aspects in their reference to NOS, although the social-institutional aspects are underrepresented in their depiction. Implications for further studies and science education are discussed.

Exploratory Considerations in Chemistry Education—Didactic Modelling for Complexity in Students’ Discussions

Research has shown the importance of dealing with real-life issues and of enabling student encounters with complexity in chemistry education in order to increase student participation. Therefore, this study aims to analyse how complexity evolves in students’ discussions and how this complexity relates to aspects of tentativeness in chemistry. In the study, we analyse how a previously developed didactic model can be refined from the students’ considerations evolving from the present context. The study was conducted as an in situ study in one upper-secondary school. Students’ discussions were recorded on video. The recordings were transcribed and analysed using deliberative educational questions. Two different kinds of considerations emerged in the students’ discussions: factual and exploratory considerations. While factual considerations are an important element of chemistry education, students also need to encounter exploratory considerations. The study proposes a didactic model useful for teachers in didactic analysis and design of activities aiming to support students to unfold complexity through exploratory considerations. One implication is to base activities on real-life issues in order to invite the unpredictability needed for experiencing complexity and the exploratory nature of chemistry. These issues enable students to experience aspects of tentativeness in chemistry and thereby increase their understanding of NOS and chemistry as a knowledge building practice. Furthermore, this might also increase student participation in chemistry education.

Critical Rationalism and Trust in Science

In this paper, I consider whether the critical rationalist philosophy of science may provide a rationale for trusting scientific knowledge. In the first part, I refer to several insights of Karl Popper’s social and political philosophy in order to see whether they may be of help in offsetting the distrust of science spawned by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the second part, I address the more general issue of whether the theoretical principles of the critical rationalist philosophy of science may afford a foundation for building trust in science. Both parts of the discussion, confined for the sake of the argument largely to the repudiation of the concept of good reasons for considering a theory to be true, imply that this question would have to be answered negatively. Against this, I argue that such a conclusion is based on a misconception of the nature of scientific knowledge: critical rationalism views science as a cognitive regime which calls for bold theories and at the same time demands a rigorous and continuous distrust towards them, and it is precisely this attitude that should be adopted as a compelling argument for trusting science.