Ronald Dworkin and the Curious Case of the Floodgates Argument

This article juxtaposes a jurisprudential thesis and a practical problem in an attempt to gain critical insight into both. The jurisprudential thesis is Dworkin’s rights thesis. The practical problem revolves around judicial resort to the floodgates argument in civil adjudication (or, more specifically, a version of this argument focused on adjudicative resources, which is dubbed here the FA). The analysis yields three principal observations: (1) Judicial resort to the FA is discordant with the rights thesis. (2) The rights thesis is instructive in one way but mistaken in another. While Dworkin has highlighted some valid and sound reasons against judicial policymaking, his conclusive exclusion of judicial policymaking from civil law adjudication is erroneous. Civil law adjudication, it is argued, is an arena of ineliminable tension between principle and policy. (3) The FA is a type of policy argument particularly vulnerable to objections against judicial policymaking. There should, therefore, be a (rebuttable) presumption against judicial resort to it.

History of Education Policymaking in India, 1947-2016

This book chronicles the history of education policymaking in India. The focus of the book is on the period from 1964 when the landmark Kothari Commission was constituted; however, to put the policy developments in this period into perspective major developments since the Indian Education Commission (1882) have been touched upon. The distinctiveness of the book lies in the rare insights which come from the author’s experience of making policy at the state, national and international levels; it is also the first book on the making of Indian education policy which brings to bear on the narrative comparative and historical perspectives it, which pays attention to the process and politics of policymaking and the larger setting –the political and policy environment- in which policies were made at different points of time, which attempts to subject regulation of education to a systematic analyses the way regulation of utilities or business or environment had been, and integrates judicial policymaking with the making and implementation of education policies. In fact for the period subsequent to 1979, there have been articles- may be a book or two- on some aspects of these developments individually; however, there is no comprehensive narrative that covers developments as a whole and places them against the backdrop of national and global political, economic, and educational developments.

The Interaction of Judicial and Legislative Policymaking

Chapter 4 systematizes the different ways that judicial policymaking can have an impact on European legislation. Identifying the codification of case-law principles in secondary law contributes to research on the EU in two important ways: it shows how EU legislation is embedded in case-law development, and that the impact of case law cannot be reduced to the question of compliance with single rulings. A differentiation is made between several types of judicial ‘shadow’ over the legislative process. Then the Services Directive and the regulation on the mutual recognition of goods are analysed. The principles of case law that were motivated by the specific circumstances of individual cases constrain the design of general rules. Secondary law cannot modify constitutional principles. At best, the legislature can hope to signal its political preferences to the Court.

Introduction

An intergovernmental treaty that has specific aims for cooperation has a very different thrust than national constitutions, which are designed to allow political order and to safeguard individual rights. I argue that the literature in political science on the ECJ is too focused on showing how member states can influence the Court. It overlooks the supranational outcomes that ensue when the Treaty contains policy prescriptions, while being constitutionalized through supremacy and direct effect. Through its case law, the Court provides additions to the Treaty. To demonstrate the importance of judicial policymaking through case-law development and codification, three steps are fundamental to the book’s argument. First, we have to understand both case-law development and the impact of the Court. Secondly and thirdly, we must ask how the ECJ’s case law may make a difference to policymaking at both the European and member-state levels.

Courts and Social Policy

How do courts affect social policy? Answering this question is deceptively complex. Part of the challenge stems from the sheer scope of contemporary judicial policymaking, particularly in the United States, where litigation reaches into nearly every nook and cranny of the American welfare state and casts a shadow on policy issues ranging from marriage equality to healthcare reform. Another obstacle is that scholars remain deeply divided on fundamental questions about the nature of judicial decisions and how their policy effects should be studied. These disagreements, in turn, have engendered three very different approaches to studying the role of courts in social policy that often talk past each other. The dominant approach views judicial decisions as prescriptive rules—legal commands from the bench—and asks to what extent do judicial decisions change policy? This view implies that judicial decisions are “treatments” whose efficacy should be tested by measuring shifts in policy outcomes from the pre- to post-treatment period or across treatment and control groups. An alternative tradition envisages judicial decisions as a potential resource, which can be used by activists as leverage in building movements and pursuing agendas in multiple forums. Here, the core question is not whether court decisions produce abrupt policy shifts, but how activists use them to challenge the status quo, mobilize interests, and generate pressure for policy change. A third approach sees legal precedent as a constitutive framework that shapes and constrains policymaking and its politics over time. The test for whether law matters under this approach centers on the degree to which judicial decisions influence the developmental trajectories of policy and politics, which includes consideration of paths not taken in the policymaking process. That is not to say that the literature is wholly discordant. Despite their significant conceptual differences, these approaches tend to converge on the general idea that judicial policymaking shares many attributes with other policymaking processes: the implementation of judicial decisions, like statues and regulations, is contested and subject to capture by sophisticated interests; litigation, like lobbying, is a form of mobilization that seeks to translate policy grievances into effective political demands; judicial precedents, like other policies, generate policy feedbacks. Identifying similarities among judicial policymaking and its counterparts is a signature achievement in the study of courts and social policy, which has largely dispelled the “myth of rights” and simplistic notions that the law is somehow removed from politics. Yet it arguably has an unintended effect. Normalizing judicial policymaking—making it seem like other types of policymaking—threatens to render it less interesting as a distinct topic for research. This article suggests the time has come for all of the various research traditions in the field to return to foundational questions about what makes judicial policymaking distinctive and systematically study how these particular tilts and tendencies influence the continuing colloquy that drives the policymaking process.