scholarly journals The abandonment of the Spitzenkandidaten System: (Un)sustainable democracy in the EU?

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-80
Author(s):  
Carlos Espaliú Berdud

In the process of the parliamentarisation of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon took a further step forward by introducing into the founding treaties - Article 17.7 TEU- the need to take into account the elections to the European Parliament for the appointment of the President of the Commission. Nevertheless, the European Parliament has been trying to impose its interpretation of Article 17.7 TEU, which has been coined into the Spitzenkandidaten doctrine, according to which the head of the party winning the elections should be elected as Commission President. The Parliament succeeded in imposing its vision with the occasion of the appointment of Juncker in 2014. Nevertheless, by not proposing Manfred Weber, the leader of the most voted party in the 2019 elections, as President, the European Council has prevented the consolidation of the 2014 precedent. Article 17.7 of the TEU also expresses the desire to bring the European elections closer to the citizens, so that their opinion is taken into account when the President of the Commission is elected. And it seems that both the results of participation in 2019 and the perception of the voters show that the Spitzenkandidaten system has been useful for that purpose. In any event, I consider that the fact that citizens voted in the 2019 elections in the belief that their votes would be decisive in appointing the President of the Commission and, in the end, it was not elected an Spitzenkandidaten as head of the Commission, is a very serious lack of consideration for citizens. Received:  03 February 2021Accepted: 25 March 2021

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-508
Author(s):  
Robert Böttner

The Treaty of Lisbon introduced general and special passerelle or bridging clauses into primary law. They can be used to alter voting arrangements from unanimity to qualified majority in the Council or from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure. This is to enable a shift to more supranational decision-making without the need for a full-fledged treaty revision. The European Parliament called on the European Council and the Council to make use of the passerelle clauses, also to involve Parliament as a co-legislator under the ordinary legislative procedure. The former Commission had started a discussion on the use of the passerelle clauses in four policy areas and it appears that the incumbent Commission President has endorsed this ambitious project. This article aims to explore the potential and the shortcomings of the bridging clauses as part of the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty and discusses the enhanced cooperation procedure as a possible alternative.


Author(s):  
Uwe Puetter

The chapter focuses on the implications of Brexit on the EU inter-institutional balance, and inter-state relations, and argues that not much change is to be expected here. According to Puetter, the UK already dramatically reduced its engagement inside the EU institutions. It isolated itself within the European Council and it was the only Member State together with Hungary to vote against the appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President in 2014. The UK lost influence in the European Parliament as a result of David Cameron’s decision to take the Conservative party out of the European Peoples’ Party. Brexit may make room for greater roles for countries like Italy and Spain, yet, the German–French axis will probably remain dominant. Puetter suggests that the inter-institutional equilibrium within the EU will not change. Brexit is unlikely to shift the balance from the European Council back towards the European Commission.


Management ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 473-487
Author(s):  
Andrzej Czyżewski ◽  
Sebastian Stępień

Summary The objective of the paper is to present the results of negotiations on the EU budget for 2014-2020, with particular emphasis on the Common Agricultural Policy. Authors indicate the steps for establishing the budget, from the proposal of the European Commission presented in 2011, ending with the draft of UE budget agreed at the meeting of the European Council on February 2013 and the meeting of the AGRIFISH on March 2013 and then approved by the political agreement of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Council on June 2013. In this context, there will be an assessment of the new budget from the point of view of Polish economy and agriculture.


1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix ◽  
Christopher Lord

THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY attempted to balance two principles of representation in their redesign of the institutional structures of the European Union: the one, based on the indirect representation of publics through nationally elected governments in the European Council and Council of Ministers; the other, based on the direct representation of publics through a more powerful European Parliament. There is much to be said for this balance, for neither of the two principles can, on its own, be an adequate solution at this stage in the development of the EU. The Council suffers from a non-transparent style of decision-making and is, in the view of many, closer to oligarchic than to democratic politics. On the other hand, the claims of the European Parliament to represent public sentiments on European integration are limited by low voter participation, the second-order nature of European elections and the still Protean nature of what we might call a transnational European demos. The EU lacks a single public arena of political debate, communications and shared meanings; of partisan aggregation and political entrepreneurship; and of high and even acceptance, across issues and member states, that it is European and not national majority views which should count in collective rule-making.


Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio

This chapter examines the party system of the European Parliament (EP). In the early 1950s, members of the EP decided to form party-political groups instead of national blocs to counterbalance the dominance of national interests in the European Council. Since then, the party groups have gradually, but consistently, consolidated their positions in the EP. The chapter first considers the shape of the EP party system, the structure of the party groups, and the role of national parties within them. It then looks at the Spitzenkandidaten (lead candidates) initiative, whereby the Europarties put forward their own candidates for the Commission President in the 2014 elections. It also discusses coalition politics and parliamentary committees as well as electoral accountability in the EP and concludes with an overview of the state of research on the EP party system, emphasizing the need to understand how coalitions are formed in the committees and the plenary.


Author(s):  
Petr YAKOVLEV

The decision on Britain’s secession from the European Union, taken by the British Parliament and agreed by London and Brussels, divided the Union history into “before” and “after”. Not only will the remaining member states have to “digest” the political, commercial, economic and mental consequences of parting with one of the largest partners. They will also have to create a substantially new algorithm for the functioning of United Europe. On this path, the EU is confronted with many geopolitical and geo-economic challenges, which should be answered by the new leaders of the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


Subject Bulgaria’s assumption of the EU presidency. Significance European Council President Donald Tusk and Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker used the official inauguration of Bulgaria’s six-month stint in the EU presidency to demonstrate support for Bulgaria and its Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, and thus deflect widespread scepticism and criticism of Bulgaria’s EU trajectory since accession in 2007. Their hosts responded by underlining their unflinching support for EU institutions and initiatives (notably on migration quotas), and playing up Bulgaria’s stabilising role regarding the Western Balkans and Turkey. Impacts During its EU presidency, Bulgaria’s establishment will be most attentive to criticism coming from EU institutions and leading EU countries. The presidency will focus on showing Bulgaria in a positive light, while avoiding drawing attention to its reform deficit. Bulgaria's influence over problem areas and countries is limited and contingent on factors mostly beyond its control.


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