The Rise of the State: Broadband Policy in New Zealand 2000-2011

<p>Between 2000 and 2011, changes in government policy significantly increased the role of the state in telecommunications markets in New Zealand. In both regulatory and investment activities, the historic approach of liberal market regulation was transformed into active intervention. This changed approach aimed at speeding access to high-speed broadband services. There was a remarkable lack of political debate between the major political parties as to the objective being sought, or direction of policy towards greater intervention in order to achieve it. This research outlines in broad terms the background to the debates underpinning policy change, and the history of New Zealand’s approach. It outlines in detail the key policy changes made. In the regulatory domain, four key changes are discussed. These are: the implementation of sector-specific legislation (Telecommunications Act 2001); the decision not to unbundle the copper local loop (2004); amendments to the Telecommunications Act strengthening the regulator and imposing ‘operational separation’ of Telecom (2006); and the ‘structural separation’ of Telecom and the debate on regulatory forbearance (2011). By the end of the case period, these changes meant that generic competition law had been replaced by sector-specific legislation, a specialist regulator with broad powers to monitor and regulate the industry, and a leading solution to discrimination issues with the complete ownership separation of network and services in copper and fibre-optic telecommunications networks. In the investment domain, five key stages are discussed. These are: Project PROBE (2001-4), the Broadband Challenge (2005), the Broadband Investment Fund (2008), the Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative (2009) and the Rural Broadband Initiative (2009). Together these saw public spending on telecommunications infrastructure rise from nothing in 2000, to a combined package in the two final (and current) initiatives of around $1.6bn of public funds. This money combines with private investment to deliver fibre-optic broadband infrastructure to three-quarters of homes, and significant improvements to the availability of higher-speed broadband in rural and remote parts of New Zealand. Increasing levels of government intervention in these markets was an opportunity for considerable political contest. Instead the case period 2000-2011 is characterised by similarities rather than differences between National and Labour. The thesis suggests that an explanation for this similarity arose from the perceived importance of high-speed broadband infrastructure for New Zealand’s economic prospects, and a shared analysis by Labour and National that market provision would not suffice. This imperative defeated temptations to politicise the project.</p>

The Rise of the State: Broadband Policy in New Zealand 2000-2011

<p>Between 2000 and 2011, changes in government policy significantly increased the role of the state in telecommunications markets in New Zealand. In both regulatory and investment activities, the historic approach of liberal market regulation was transformed into active intervention. This changed approach aimed at speeding access to high-speed broadband services. There was a remarkable lack of political debate between the major political parties as to the objective being sought, or direction of policy towards greater intervention in order to achieve it. This research outlines in broad terms the background to the debates underpinning policy change, and the history of New Zealand’s approach. It outlines in detail the key policy changes made. In the regulatory domain, four key changes are discussed. These are: the implementation of sector-specific legislation (Telecommunications Act 2001); the decision not to unbundle the copper local loop (2004); amendments to the Telecommunications Act strengthening the regulator and imposing ‘operational separation’ of Telecom (2006); and the ‘structural separation’ of Telecom and the debate on regulatory forbearance (2011). By the end of the case period, these changes meant that generic competition law had been replaced by sector-specific legislation, a specialist regulator with broad powers to monitor and regulate the industry, and a leading solution to discrimination issues with the complete ownership separation of network and services in copper and fibre-optic telecommunications networks. In the investment domain, five key stages are discussed. These are: Project PROBE (2001-4), the Broadband Challenge (2005), the Broadband Investment Fund (2008), the Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative (2009) and the Rural Broadband Initiative (2009). Together these saw public spending on telecommunications infrastructure rise from nothing in 2000, to a combined package in the two final (and current) initiatives of around $1.6bn of public funds. This money combines with private investment to deliver fibre-optic broadband infrastructure to three-quarters of homes, and significant improvements to the availability of higher-speed broadband in rural and remote parts of New Zealand. Increasing levels of government intervention in these markets was an opportunity for considerable political contest. Instead the case period 2000-2011 is characterised by similarities rather than differences between National and Labour. The thesis suggests that an explanation for this similarity arose from the perceived importance of high-speed broadband infrastructure for New Zealand’s economic prospects, and a shared analysis by Labour and National that market provision would not suffice. This imperative defeated temptations to politicise the project.</p>

Crossing the Wires: the Interface between Law and Accounting and the Discourse Theory Potential of Telecommunications Regulation

<p>Regulating telecommunications is complex: international experience indicates that there is no 'successful' regulatory framework due to the balancing of industry and regulatory interests (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 13). The New Zealand 'light-handed' regulatory experiment failed and the 1999 General Election presented an opportunity for change in telecommunications. The Labour-led Government in implementing a policy of 'responsible re-regulation' enacted the Telecommunications Act 2001, signalling the passage of "landmark telecommunications legislation ..." (Swain, 2001d). Within the Telecommunications Act 2001, 'cost' assumed a central regulatory role. It is this move to cost that this thesis considers in identifying, developing, and critiquing the interface of law and accounting. The thesis examines the increasing call for accounting information in law and regulation by interrogating the use, presentation, and reception of accounting to examine the interface between law and cost in the regulation of telecommunications. The Telecommunications Act 2001 incorporates total service long run incremental costing as the 'costing technique' for interconnection access and annual net costing for the Telecommunications Service Obligation. Through interrogating 'cost' as an accounting technology, in contrast to the economic and legal conception of cost as a simple, objective concept, the thesis illustrates the role of cost at methodological, technical, and political levels, and the challenges that this poses for telecommunications regulation. The thesis articulates the relevance of discourse theory to the interface of law and accounting. Consequently, the thesis investigates the formation and discursive enunciation of standpoints of political identities characterised by antagonism and uncertainty. This includes identifying attempts by interested parties, including industry actors, stakeholders, and the Government and its agents, to articulate 'new' discourses centred on nodal points around 'cost'. The rhetorical analysis examines how actors articulate the metaphorical element of 'cost' in agitating for particular costing methods to be included in the legislation. The empirical analysis examines the process of rhetorical condensation as arguments for and against the incorporation of total service long run incremental costing and net costing came to signify the complete failure of the light-handed regulation. Then, by examining the politics following the enactment of legislation, this condensation is unpacked. The analysis of the contestation over interpreting and implementing the regulation illustrates displacement of the 'common' signifier resulting in confusion and disappointment in relation to the aims of the new regulatory regime.</p>

Crossing the Wires: the Interface between Law and Accounting and the Discourse Theory Potential of Telecommunications Regulation

<p>Regulating telecommunications is complex: international experience indicates that there is no 'successful' regulatory framework due to the balancing of industry and regulatory interests (Laffont & Tirole, 2000, p. 13). The New Zealand 'light-handed' regulatory experiment failed and the 1999 General Election presented an opportunity for change in telecommunications. The Labour-led Government in implementing a policy of 'responsible re-regulation' enacted the Telecommunications Act 2001, signalling the passage of "landmark telecommunications legislation ..." (Swain, 2001d). Within the Telecommunications Act 2001, 'cost' assumed a central regulatory role. It is this move to cost that this thesis considers in identifying, developing, and critiquing the interface of law and accounting. The thesis examines the increasing call for accounting information in law and regulation by interrogating the use, presentation, and reception of accounting to examine the interface between law and cost in the regulation of telecommunications. The Telecommunications Act 2001 incorporates total service long run incremental costing as the 'costing technique' for interconnection access and annual net costing for the Telecommunications Service Obligation. Through interrogating 'cost' as an accounting technology, in contrast to the economic and legal conception of cost as a simple, objective concept, the thesis illustrates the role of cost at methodological, technical, and political levels, and the challenges that this poses for telecommunications regulation. The thesis articulates the relevance of discourse theory to the interface of law and accounting. Consequently, the thesis investigates the formation and discursive enunciation of standpoints of political identities characterised by antagonism and uncertainty. This includes identifying attempts by interested parties, including industry actors, stakeholders, and the Government and its agents, to articulate 'new' discourses centred on nodal points around 'cost'. The rhetorical analysis examines how actors articulate the metaphorical element of 'cost' in agitating for particular costing methods to be included in the legislation. The empirical analysis examines the process of rhetorical condensation as arguments for and against the incorporation of total service long run incremental costing and net costing came to signify the complete failure of the light-handed regulation. Then, by examining the politics following the enactment of legislation, this condensation is unpacked. The analysis of the contestation over interpreting and implementing the regulation illustrates displacement of the 'common' signifier resulting in confusion and disappointment in relation to the aims of the new regulatory regime.</p>

Competition In The Canadian Telecommunications Industry: Past, Present And Potential Ways Forward

<div>Undoubtedly, the Canadian telecommunications industry is at a critical juncture with respect to competition. Telecommunications services are becoming increasingly essential for Canadian citizens to effectively participate in the economy, democracy and society more broadly. As such, it is critical to explore the various policy mechanisms that can deliver all Canadians an affordable and high quality experience as mandated in section seven of the Telecommunications Act. The study focuses on potential ways to cultivate a meaningfully competitive telecommunications environment that can better represent public interest. Drawing on a litany of international and domestic regulatory decisions, both past and present, in conjunction with academic journals, Candian Radio-television and Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) regulatory proceedings and contemporary news articles, the paper demonstrates that the lack of meaningful competition in the Canadian telecommunications industry is limiting positive outcomes for Canadian citizens in regards to affordability, choice and coverage.</div>

Competition In The Canadian Telecommunications Industry: Past, Present And Potential Ways Forward

<div>Undoubtedly, the Canadian telecommunications industry is at a critical juncture with respect to competition. Telecommunications services are becoming increasingly essential for Canadian citizens to effectively participate in the economy, democracy and society more broadly. As such, it is critical to explore the various policy mechanisms that can deliver all Canadians an affordable and high quality experience as mandated in section seven of the Telecommunications Act. The study focuses on potential ways to cultivate a meaningfully competitive telecommunications environment that can better represent public interest. Drawing on a litany of international and domestic regulatory decisions, both past and present, in conjunction with academic journals, Candian Radio-television and Telecommunication Commission (CRTC) regulatory proceedings and contemporary news articles, the paper demonstrates that the lack of meaningful competition in the Canadian telecommunications industry is limiting positive outcomes for Canadian citizens in regards to affordability, choice and coverage.</div>

Distance (Media policy/ Meta journalism)

The variable “distance” reflects the competitive relationships that exist between media organizations and outlets in terms of journalistic, economic and media policy interests, which can lead to reporting differences in media self-coverage (Pointner, 2010). This is due to the special situation that in the case of media self-coverage, both the reporting unit and the covered subject originate from the media sector. Several studies have shown that media organizations strategically use self-coverage to pursue their own interests, to legitimize their actions or to differentiate themselves from their competitors (Beck, 2001; Gilens & Hertzman, 2000; Hackett & Uzelman, 2003; Kemner, Scherer, & Weinacht, 2008; Lichtenstein, 2011; Löblich, 2011; Maier & Dogruel, 2016; Müller & Donsbach, 2006; Pointner, 2010; Snider & Page, 1997; Uzelman, Hackett, & Stewart, 2005; Weiß, 1986). Field of application/Theoretical foundation The variable serves as an indicator of potential conflicts of roles, interests and objectives at organizational level, which can lead to unbalanced or biased reporting. Example study Pointner (2010) Information on Pointner, 2010 Research interest: The study examines whether and how economic interests of media companies are reflected in the reporting on media companies. Object of analysis: A sample (one artificial day per month, all articles covering media companies) was drawn from four national German daily newspapers. Time frame of analysis: January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2006 Information about variable Level of analysis: article Coding logic: The relationship between the reporting unit and the covered subject is recorded on two levels. First, a distinction is made with regard to the media sector, i.e. whether the reporting concerns a subject originating from the same sector (intramedial, e.g. print observes print) or from a different sector (intermedial, e.g. print observes broadcasting). Within the intramedial level, a further distinction is made with regard to the organizational affiliation: Codes indicate whether the reporting relates to the own company (direct self-observation), affiliated companies of the own company (indirect self-observation), one or more direct competitors operating within the same media sector in the same media submarket (direct competitor observation), affiliated companies of competitors (indirect competitor observation) or media companies of other genres within the own media sector (general observation) (Pointner, 2010). For the implementation, it is recommended to first code the outlet in which a contribution appears, as well as separately code the outlet and the media sector that is the main subject of the coverage. Based on this, the assignment can be made with the help of an affiliation list of the outlets and affiliated companies of the publishing houses, media companies or media sectors investigated. However, it should be mentioned that in connection with the horizontal diversification of media companies into other media sectors and increasing convergence, the differentiation into intramedial and intermedial as well as direct and indirect is becoming increasingly difficult. Values: intramedial direct self-observation intramedial indirect self-observation intramedial direct competitor observation intramedial indirect competitor observation intramedial general observation intermedial Intercoder reliability: Holsti’s coefficient of .94 across categories (6 coders), not specified for individual category Codebook not available References Beck, K. (2001). Medienberichterstattung über Medienkonzentration. Publizistik, 46(4), 403-424. doi: 10.1007/s11616-001-0121-3 Gilens, M., & Hertzman, C. (2000). Corporate Ownership and News Bias: Newspaper Coverage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. The Journal of Politics, 62(2), 369-386. doi: 10.1111/0022-3816.00017 Hackett, R. A., & Uzelman, S. (2003). Tracing Corporate Influences on Press Content: a summary of recent NewsWatch Canada Research. Journalism Studies, 4(3), 331-346. doi: 10.1080/14616700306486 Kemner, B., Scherer, H., & Weinacht, S. (2008). Unter der Tarnkappe. Publizistik, 53(1), 65-84. doi: 10.1007/s11616-008-0006-9 Lichtenstein, D. (2011). Kommerzialisierung des Medienjournalismus? Eine empirische Untersuchung zum „Fall Berliner Zeitung“. M&K Medien & Kommunikationswissenschaft, 59(2), 216-234. doi: 10.5771/1615-634x-2011-2-216 Löblich, M. (2011). Frames in der medienpolitischen Öffentlichkeit. Publizistik, 56(4), 423-439. doi: 10.1007/s11616-011-0129-2 Maier, D., & Dogruel, L. (2016). Akteursbeziehungen in der Zeitungsberichterstattung über die Online-Aktivitäten des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks. Publizistik, 61(2), 145-166. doi: 10.1007/s11616-016-0258-8 Müller, D., & Donsbach, W. (2006). Unabhängigkeit von wirtschaftlichen Interessen als Qualitätsindikator im Journalismus. In S. Weischenberg, W. Loosen, & M. Beuthner (Eds.), Medien-Qualitäten: Öffentliche Kommunikation zwischen ökonomischem Kalkül und Sozialverantwortung (pp. 129-147). Konstanz: UVK. Pointner, N. (2010). In den Fängen der Ökonomie? Ein kritischer Blick auf die Berichterstattung über Medienunternehmen in der deutschen Tagespresse. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Snider, J. H., & Page, B. I. (1997). Does Media Ownership Affect Media Stands? The Case of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University (IPR working papers 97-12). Uzelman, S., Hackett, R. A., & Stewart, J. (2005). Covering Democracy's Forum: Canadian Press Treatment of Public and Private Broadcasting. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 22(2), 156-169. doi: 10.1080/07393180500072053 Weiß, H.-J. (1986). Rundfunkinteressen und Pressejournalismus. Abschließende Analysen und Anmerkungen zu zwei inhaltsanalytischen Zeitungsstudien. Media Perspektiven, 2(86), 53-73.

Low Hanging Fruit: How Sports Talk Radio Hosts Discuss Racism

Talk radio has grown exponentially in the United States. The growth in talk radio was ignited by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which allowed station owners to purchase more stations without antitrust scrutiny. One of the most popular formats on the radio is sports talk radio. Sports talk radio provides a unique entry point to understand how callers and hosts discuss racism in sport. The purpose of this study is to advance our understanding of race on the radio by examining how sports talk radio hosts discuss racism. The researcher interviewed 15 sports talk radio hosts over the phone to better understand how they discuss racism on the airwaves. After reviewing the transcripts and going through several rounds of data analysis, three themes were discovered: We can smell it, race is not always about race, and Black/White binary.