Should Have Known
This chapter argues that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. In particular, S should have known that p when (i) another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, (ii) the satisfaction of these expectations would require that S knows that p, and (iii) S fails to know that p. I argue that these three conditions are sometimes jointly satisfied. There are (at least) two main sources of legitimate expectations regarding another’s epistemic condition: participation in a legitimate social practice; and moral and epistemic expectations more generally. In developing my position on this score, I will have an opportunity (i) to contrast practice-generated entitlements to expect with epistemic reasons to believe; (ii) to compare the “should have known” phenomenon with the phenomenon of culpable ignorance; and finally (iii) to suggest the bearing of the “should have known” phenomenon to epistemology itself.