The Interpersonal Neurobiology of Intersubjectivity

In 1975, Colwyn Trevarthen first presented his groundbreaking explorations into the early origins of human intersubjectivity. His influential model dictates that, during intimate and playful spontaneous face-to-face protoconversations, the emotions of both the 2–3-month-old infant and mother are nonverbally communicated, perceived, mutually regulated, and intersubjectively shared. This primordial basic interpersonal interaction is expressed in synchronized rhythmic-turn-taking transactions that promote the intercoordination and awareness of positive brain states in both. In this work, I offer an interpersonal neurobiological model of Trevarthen’s intersubjective protoconversations as rapid, reciprocal, bidirectional visual-facial, auditory-prosodic, and tactile-gestural right brain-to-right brain implicit nonverbal communications between the psychobiologically attuned mother and the developing infant. These co-constructed positive emotional interactions facilitate the experience-dependent maturation of the infant’s right brain, which is in an early critical period of growth. I then address the central role of interpersonal synchrony in intersubjectivity, expressed in a mutual alignment or coupling between the minds and bodies of the mother and infant in face-to-face protoconversations, as well as how these right brain-to-right brain emotional transmissions generate bioenergetic positively charged interbrain synchrony within the dyad. Following this, I offer recent brain laterality research on the essential functions of the right temporoparietal junction, a central node of the social brain, in face-to-face nonverbal communications. In the next section, I describe the ongoing development of the protoconversation over the 1st year and beyond, and the co-creation of a fundamental energy-dependent, growth-promoting social emotional matrix that facilitates the emergence of the highly adaptive human functions of mutual play and mutual love. In the final section, I discuss the clinical applications of this interpersonal neurobiological model of intersubjectivity, which has a long history in the psychotherapy literature. Toward that end, I offer very recent paradigm-shifting hyperscanning research that simultaneously measures both the patient and therapist during a psychotherapeutic interaction. Using the Trevarthen’s two-person intersubjective model, this research demonstrates changes in both brains of the therapeutic dyad and the critical role of nonverbal communications in an emotionally-focused psychotherapy session. These studies specifically document interbrain synchronization between the right temporoparietal junction of the patient and the right temporoparietal junction of the clinician, a right brain-to-right brain nonverbal communication system in the co-constructed therapeutic alliance. Lastly, I discuss the relationship between the affect communicating functions of the intersubjective motivational system and the affect regulating functions of the attachment motivational system.

Social bonding and music: Evidence from lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex

The music and social bonding (MSB) hypothesis suggests that damage to brain regions in the proposed neurobiological model, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), would disrupt the social and emotional effects of music. This commentary evaluates prior research in persons with vmPFC damage in light of the predictions put forth by the MSB hypothesis.

The neurobiology of language beyond single-word processing

In this Review, I propose a multiple-network view for the neurobiological basis of distinctly human language skills. A much more complex picture of interacting brain areas emerges than in the classical neurobiological model of language. This is because using language is more than single-word processing, and much goes on beyond the information given in the acoustic or orthographic tokens that enter primary sensory cortices. This requires the involvement of multiple networks with functionally nonoverlapping contributions.

Neuroscience, Narrative, and Narratology

Cognitive narratology needs a neuroscientifically sound understanding of language. This essay lays out a neurobiological model of narrative that explains how stories arise from and set in motion fundamental neuronal and cortical processes, and it then asks how the aims and methods of narratology should be aligned with what we know about language and the brain. The formalist goal of identifying orderly, universal structures of mind, language, and narrative does not match up well with the probabilistic, reciprocal interactions in the brain through which cognitive patterns emerge from our embodied experiences of the world. Cognitive narratology needs to break with the structuralist legacy still evident in the terminology of frames, scripts, and preference rules and to embrace the paradigm shift proposed by various pragmatically oriented, phenomenological theories of narrative that have contested the formalist program.