Impacts of Trade Protection by Tariffs on Agricultural Imports and Exports by Using GTAP Model: A Case Study in Vietnam

International economic integration has brought high growth to international trade while promoting economic development for many countries around the world. However, in recent times, in the world, there has appeared a trend opposite to trade liberalization, which is protectionism. Advocates for trade protection provide arguments for why countries implement trade-restrictive measures. Those causes are related to national security and defense, solving the trade deficit, creating jobs, protecting the nascent industry and ensuring fair trade. Countries are currently using tariff measures including import and export tariffs, and non-tariff measures. The article studies protectionism, analyzes the impact of trade protectionism by tariffs on Vietnam’s GDP and exports, and makes policy recommendations for the Government of Vietnam.

Labor Market Volatility, Gender, and Trade Preferences

What explains divides in the public’s support for trade protection? Traditional economic arguments primarily focus on individuals’ expectations for increased or decreased wages in the face of greater economic openness, yet studies testing such wage-based concerns identify a different divide as well: even after accounting for wage effects, women are typically more supportive of trade protection. We argue that trade-induced employment volatility and the resulting concerns for employment stability are overlooked factors that help explain the gender divide in attitudes. Due to both structural discrimination and societal norms, we theorize that working women are more responsive to the threat of trade-related employment instability than male counterparts. Using an experiment fielded on national samples in the USA and Canada, we find that most respondents have weak reactions to volatility, but volatility has a significant effect on women who are the most vulnerable to trade’s disruptive effects – those working in import-competing industries and those with limited education.

Asset Specificity, Corporate Protection and Trade Policy: Firm-Level Evidence from Antidumping Petitions in Nineteen Jurisdictions

This letter provides firm-level evidence that policy makers tailor trade policy to suit selected firms. It argues that firms with higher levels of specific assets find it more costly to reorganize production, and are hurt more by international competition. In response, policy makers grant more trade protection to firms with fixed assets. Since protectionism is costly, firms compete for it, which creates diffusion dynamics in which the protection granted to one firm affects the protection granted to others. This claim is tested utilizing the special role antidumping duties (ADDs) play in international trade, and combining petitions for ADDs with financial data on the firms filing them in a unique dataset. Using spatial autoregressive models, the authors find that firms with specific assets are granted more protection. However, diffusion dynamics differ within and between groups of firms producing the same good. This suggests that firms can partly shape their own level of trade protection.