9. The Budget

This chapter examines the European Union’s budgetary procedures with an eye towards elucidating the characteristics of budgetary politics and policy-making. Where EU money comes from, how it is spent, and the processes by which it is distributed are the subjects of intense political bargaining. Budgets matter politically, because money represents the commitment of resources to the provision of public goods and involves political choices across sectors and regions. The chapter first provides a thumbnail sketch of the EU budget before looking at the major players involved in the budgetary process. It then considers budgetary politics over time, focusing on two phases, one dominated by budgetary battles and the other by ordered budgetary decision-making, and shedding light on the EU’s large-scale budgetary response to the Covid-19 pandemic which marks an important step within the evolution of the EU budget. Finally, the chapter also provides an assessment of how the EU manages a larger budget.

PROBLEMS AND VECTORS OF DEVELOPMENT STATE FINANCIAL CONTROL AT LOCAL LEVEL

In the article it isinvestigated the necessity to improvet he state financial control as animportant factor of realization of financial lyand budgetary politics of Ukraine and its economic development and identified key shortcomings of its functioning. Based on the research, the main vectors of the development of state financial control at the local level in the conditions of decentralization of power and reform of local government are determined.

Guns Yield Butter? An Exploration of Defense Spending Preferences

The popular notion of a trade-off between social and defense spending—or guns versus butter—appears often in elite discourse, popular media, and empirical studies of budgetary politics. Yet, there are good reasons to suspect that the public’s preferences for these types of spending do not reflect that trade-off. I develop a theory that whether social and defense spending preferences are competing or complementary depends on if the respondent views the government as an important contributor to job creation. Using data from fifty-nine surveys in twenty-seven countries from 1985 to 2008, I show that favoring government-financed job creation makes a respondent much more likely to view social and defense spending as complementary. Indeed, aside from the anomalous case of the United States, preferences are consistent with guns yield butter instead of guns versus butter. This theory has important implications for the thermostatic model of policy responsiveness and theories of budgetary politics.

Kennedy’s Keynesian Budgetary Politics and the 1962 Public Works Acceleration Act

Public works spending was an integral component of John F. Kennedy’s fiscal policy. Drawing on a wide range of archival evidence from the Kennedy Presidential Library, we show how the administration worked to pass a $2.5 billion infrastructure bill that would give the presidency unilateral authority in determining where and when those funds would be spent. Contrary to recent accounts that emphasize Kennedy’s role in promoting massive tax cuts in 1963–64, the 1962 Public Works Acceleration Act was a key fiscal instrument that Kennedy advocated prior to the administration’s push for tax reform. Moreover, the public works policy was strictly Keynesian—designed as a proactive countercyclical “stabilizer” that would generate budget deficits in order to make up for slack in a recession. Kennedy’s plan faced stiff resistance in Congress and the history of the law offers important lessons for why infrastructure programs are often disregarded as countercyclical instruments.