Life in the Middle

For almost thirty years, political scientists have believed that the US Senate would be less affected by partisan polarization due to the existence of a handful of moderate senators who would act as power brokers between the two sides, yet year after year we see partisan gridlock. Life in the Middle argues that the belief in the powerful, pivotal moderate neglects their electoral circumstances and overestimates their legislative power. Indeed, not all senators are elected under equal circumstances where the modern centrist has to balance between two conflicting constituencies like Susan Collins in Maine, or represents a state where the opposition outnumbers their base like Joe Manchin in West Virginia. Using data compiled from the Congressional Record, the book examines the legislative behavior of moderates and finds that they seldom amend legislation to their preferences, rarely speak on the record, and often lose on final votes. Using unique interview data with nineteen legislative directors and six retired centrist senators, it also finds that the behind-the-scenes conversations mirror the on-stage behavior where centrists are not influential or viewed as pivotal by party leaders. Furthermore, moderates reported less satisfaction with legislative outcomes than their peers. Life in the Middle suggests that lawmaking needs to be re-evaluated as being much more variable and less reliant on the work of moderates and more on party leaders. Indeed, the mainstream concerns about polarization and its negative effects of increased gridlock and ideological legislation may be true.

Atrocities

For the first two years of the war, the government was extremely reluctant to release information about the atrocities being committed by the Japanese. Officials warned returning civilian internees not to speak to the press about the conditions they had faced as Japanese prisoners. The Office of Censorship applauded the media’s restraint in covering the execution of American airmen captured after the Doolittle raid. And even when Ed Dyess escaped from the Philippines with details about the Bataan death march, senior officials prevented his story from being told. The Chicago Tribune, which paid Dyess $21,000, lobbied hard for a policy change, to no avail. Only after Dyess’s tragic death in a plane crash at the end of 1943, followed by a threat to have a friendly legislator read his story into the Congressional Record, did the government finally lift the veil on this dimension of the Pacific War.

Stepping Forward?

The third chapter, based on research from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, FRUS, and the Congressional Record, explores congressional reactions to Nixon’s request for $2.2 billion in emergency military aid for Israel, as well as U.S. efforts to restart the peace process. Despite efforts by Fulbright and several other legislators, along with the Nixon administration’s lack of effort to justify such a massive aid package, Congress passed the emergency aid bill in full. Legislators successfully argued that Israel needed the immense amount of aid in order to feel strong enough to take risks in peace negotiations. But by May 1974, fearful that Israel felt too strong, the Nixon administration started to threaten to cut off all military aid to soften Israel’s position in peace negotiations. The fall of Nixon due to Watergate sapped the power of the White House at precisely the moment when a strong president was needed to advance such an ambitious program of U.S. peace diplomacy. Also important, Kissinger had to work against pro-Israel elements that sought to scuttle his gradual approach to a comprehensive peace.

The Sinai II Agreements of 1975

The fifth and final chapter examines the controversial and secret executive agreements connected to Sinai II, concluded in September 1975, in the context of a congressional effort to restrict the broad use of such agreements. The agreements committed the United States to providing for Israel’s military and economic security and pledged to not advance any steps in the peace process without Israel’s approval. Numerous legislators argued that the agreements marked a fundamental and questionable shift in U.S.-Israel relations and that they resembled treaties, which required Senate approval. Based on research from the Congressional Record, Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives in Washington, D.C., and congressional hearing reports, the chapter shows that legislators felt handcuffed. They felt obligated to pass a resolution to allow for U.S. technicians to man an early-warning station in the Sinai Peninsula in order to preserve the agreement between Israel and Egypt. But by passing the resolution, Congress also authorized, by what Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) called “backdoor” approval, the executive agreements that committed the United States to providing for the future economic, military, and energy needs of Israel, regardless of Israel’s willingness to adhere to the spirit of U.N. Resolution 242.

Johnson, Congress, and the Special Relationship

Using research from the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, FRUS, and the Congressional Record, the first chapter explores U.S.-Israel relations during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency. In 1967, provocative moves made by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and an Israeli first strike plunged the region into war. Legislators took to the House and Senate floors to proclaim the essence of the special relationship—an unwavering American commitment to ensure Israel’s survival. In the aftermath of the war, the Johnson administration decided to abandon existing U.S. policy regarding territorial integrity in the Middle East and support Israeli occupation of Arab lands in order to pressure Arab states to finally recognize Israel and make peace with it. The Johnson administration, like the administrations before it, could not solve the riddle of Arab-Israeli conflict and regarded the war as an opportunity to pursue a different path. The decisions to not push Israel out of the territories and to increase weapons sales to Israel were both justified by the American commitment to Israel’s survival.

What does Congress want from the National Science Foundation? A content analysis of remarks from 1995 to 2018

The U.S. Congress writes the legislation that funds the National Science Foundation (NSF). Researchers who seek NSF support may benefit by understanding how Congress views the agency. To this end, we use text analysis to examine every statement in the Congressional Record made by any member of Congress about the NSF over a 22-year period. While we find broad bipartisan support for the NSF, there are notable changes over time. Republicans have become more likely to express concerns about accountability in how the NSF spends its funds. Democrats are more likely to focus on how NSF-funded activities affect education, technology, and students. We use these findings to articulate how researchers and scientific organizations can more effectively conduct transformative science that corresponds to long-term and broadly held Congressional priorities.

The trend, frequency, and use of scientific sources in the United States Congress.

With the rate of scientific and technological discoveries increasing exponentially there is a growing need for scientific literacy. However elected officials are most often lawyers which rely on experts in the field, or even lobbyists to inform their decision making. A list of the educational background of the United States Congress was created and the changes from the 2018 election highlighted. An analysis of the congressional record was also done showing a recent decline in selected scientific terms. Possible solutions to increase scientific discussion to help instruct legislation is discussed.