Public relations campaign strategy PT. Pelindo 1 in socializing the Porting Business

PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia I (Persero) is a corporation engaged in the maritime and port sector under the auspices of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) headquartered in Belawan, North Sumatra. As a corporation, of course, a campaign is required to inform the business being run so that it is more widely known by the public. As a form of public relations campaign and an effort to socialize its business, Pelindo 1 offers Port Visit activities as a means of learning about the world of ports. This research was conducted to find out how PT Pelindo 1's Public Relations Campaign Strategy in Disseminating its Port Business through the Port Visit program. In this research, it focuses on Port Visit activities with PERHUMAS Muda Medan which was held on February 28, 2020. The type of research that the writer does is descriptive qualitative. In this study, the authors used the theory of Corporate Campaign Theory and AIDDA theory as the basis for campaign marketing. By using the direct observation method where the author participates in the concept-making process and organizing activities as well as the interview method with 5 (five) resource persons, 2 (two) of whom are the Pelindo 1 public relations team, and 3 (three) others are activity participants. The result of this research is that Pelindo 1's PR has made the Port Visit activity a superior program and campaign tool to socialize port business to the community. This is evidenced by the fact that Port visits are registered in the company's Monthly Activity Plan (RKB) and are carried out routinely 2-3 times in a few months. Based on the results of the research, the participants who took part in the Port Visit activity admitted that the concept was not only theoretical but involved directly in the field to see the port area, as well as a fun session as an evaluation stage, making their thinking about the world of the ports and the role and function of ports change not only as a place leaning on ships but serving as a gateway to the world economy.

Do campaign contributions buy favorable policies? Evidence from the insurance industry

To learn about the effects of corporate campaign contributions, we study the potential influence of the insurance industry in US state politics. The insurance industry is one of the biggest players in state politics, and we have collected new data on objective measures of the industry's performance in each state over time. We exploit within-state changes in campaign finance regulations which can significantly restrict the ability of corporate contributors to give money and potentially influence elected officials. Across a range of outcomes and campaign finance reforms, we find little evidence that the ability to make corporate campaign contributions benefits the insurance industry in a state. Some results suggest that the ability to make campaign contributions may benefit the insurance industry in states with elected insurance commissioners, but overall, campaign contributions appear to have a little distortionary effect even in a setting where we would most expect to find it.

The Corporate Elite and the Drug Enforcement Regime

The legislative deliberations of Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative also supported elite theories of the state and showed that corporate campaign contributions and the reciprocal relationships between corporate elites and the federal government also influence American counternarcotic aid flows. This chapter uses the Heckman selection estimator to ascertain whether these outcomes are also generalizable. First, it uses principal component factor analysis to create an index to operationalize C. Wright Mills’ concept of an interlocking directorate, which measures the interconnections among corporate board of directors for the corporations in the data set and their interconnections with policy think tanks and the U.S. government. The statistical findings provide evidence that corporate campaign contributions, corporate inter-locks with think tanks and the federal government, and an interlocking directorate systematically increased U.S. counternarcotic aid to eighty recipient countries. And since drug enforcement policy making toward Colombia and Mexico also demonstrated that congressional funding for the drug war is a source of corporate revenues, the chapter concludes by utilizes a time-series cross section statistical analysis that shows that increasing levels of counternarcotic aid flows increases corporate capital accumulation again confirming that the case study findings are generalizable.

Should Corporations Have A Right To Finance Political Campaigns?

Although on election day each vote carries equal weight, in the U.S. there is a strong correlation between policy and the preferences of the affluent, and a weak correlation between policy and the preferences of the middle class or the poor. This state of affairs can result from unequal input into the democratic process. If a democracy allows unlimited private financing of political campaigns, then prior to elections wealthy citizens or businesses can gain greater influence than others on the political discourse. In addition, there is a danger that elected representatives − who wish to be re-elected − would decide in ways that serve the interests of their big donors. In this article, I discuss an important aspect of money’s influence on politics, namely whether corporations should be allowed to participate in the financing of campaigns. This issue produced intense disagreement over the last several years, following the U.S. Supreme Court decision which held that restrictions against corporate campaign finance are unconstitutional since a corporation’s right to freedom of political speech is no less than a citizen’s right to freedom of political speech. Since in my opinion the Court’s position is seriously mistaken, I find it important to look at the arguments the Court provides and try to refute them.