Short, Not-So-Sweet, and to (Some) Point

Senators want to differentiate themselves and their agenda, so they have to be strategic about both what to say and when. Senators’ Twitter activity tells us what they value as representatives, but before parsing what senators are talking about, this chapter explains how they are doing it. Senators have to decide how much time and effort they want to put into Twitter, and the chapter dispels the notion that these decisions come down to how old a senator is. The chapter details just how many tweets senators are sending and how senators’ Twitter activity shifts—or not—by demographics like age, gender, party, and seniority. The data reveal that senators’ Twitter activity is not consistently patterned by these common explanations for congressional behavior. The chapter shows that Twitter frequency is variable across different types of senators, suggesting that the important variability is in the messaging rather than just the volume of messages.

Income Inequality and Ideological Positions in the U.S. Congress

Over the past twenty years, there has been much discussion about two of the most important recent trends in American politics: the increase in income inequality in the United States and the increase in ideological and partisan polarization, particularly in the U.S. House. These two national-level trends are commonly thought to be positively related. But, there are few tested theoretical connections between them, and it is potentially problematic to infer individual-level behavior from these aggregate-level trends. In fact, an examination of the literature reveals, at least, three different theoretical outcomes for district-level income inequality on voter and congressional ideological positions. I explore these district-level theoretical and empirical possibilities as well as test them over decades with three different measures of income inequality. I argue and demonstrate that higher district levels of income inequality are related to higher levels of ideological liberalism in the U.S. House. This stands in contrast to the national-level trends, but it tracks closely to traditional understandings of congressional behavior.

Family Ties? The Limits of Fathering Daughters on Congressional Behavior

Scholars have long suggested that familial life can affect political behavior and, more recently, have found that fathering daughters leads men to adopt more liberal positions on gender equality policies. However, few have focused on the impact of fathering a daughter on congressional behavior, particularly in an era of heightened partisan polarization. Using an original data set of familial information, we examine whether fathering a daughter influences male legislators’ (a) roll call and cosponsorship support for women’s issues in the 110th to 114th Congresses and (b) cosponsorship of bills introduced by female legislators in the 110th Congress. We find that once party affiliation is taken into account, having a daughter neither predicts support for women’s issues nor cosponsorship of bills sponsored by women. Our findings suggest there are limits to the direct effects of parenting daughters on men’s political behavior, and that scholars should remain attentive to institutional and partisan contexts.

Unleashing the watchdogs: explaining congressional assertiveness in the politics of US military interventions

This article contributes to a burgeoning literature on parliamentary war powers by investigating the case of the US Congress drawing on both International Relations (IR) research and traditional war powers studies. Applying a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis and case study method, we examine the conditions shaping congressional assertiveness. The article shows that the lack of national security interests and divided government are important conditions for members of Congress to criticize presidential intervention policies. While previous US war powers studies focused on the influence of partisanship, this article holds that domestic as well as international factors influence congressional behavior. A short comparative case study of two US military interventions (Libya 2011, ISIS 2014–15) during the Obama presidency serves to illustrate the findings.

Sub-constituencies and Legislative Responsiveness: Evidence from the States

This article tests whether theories of congressional behavior that link legislative responsiveness to the preferences of sub-constituencies at the expense of party preferences apply to the state level. Using ten years of state-level data and roll-call data from nearly 4,000 individual votes on E-Verify legislation, I examine the competing influences of party and constituency preferences on legislative behavior. The results confirm that state legislatures/legislators are responsive to sub-constituencies, but find that responsiveness plays out in different ways depending on the level of analysis and the political party and constituents in question. These results have important implications for our understanding of legislative representation: because responsiveness to sub-constituencies can yield policy results that are antithetical to stated party goals, what appears to be collective irresponsibility from a party may actually be individual legislators striving to be responsive to those constituents that they anticipate will hold them accountable.