Mesilla/Conejos-Médanos Basin: U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Water Resources

Synthesizing binational data to characterize shared water resources is critical to informing binational management. This work uses binational hydrogeology and water resource data in the Mesilla/Conejos-Médanos Basin (Basin) to describe the hydrologic conceptual model and identify potential research that could help inform sustainable management. The Basin aquifer is primarily composed of continuous basin-fill Santa Fe Group sediments, allowing for transboundary throughflow. Groundwater flow, however, may be partially or fully restricted by intrabasin uplifts and limited recharge. The shallow groundwater in the Rio Grande alluvium receives recharge from the Rio Grande and responds to changes in water supply and demand. About 11% of Rio Grande alluvial groundwater volume is recharged annually, an amount that is less than recent withdrawals. Potentially recoverable fresh to slightly brackish groundwater was estimated at 82,600 cubic hectometers in the U.S. portion of the Basin and 69,100 cubic hectometers in the Mexican portion. Alluvial groundwater geochemistry is governed by the evaporative concentration of the Rio Grande and agricultural diversions, whereas deeper groundwater geochemistry is governed by mixing and geochemical processes. Continued refinements to storage estimates, the water budget, and deep groundwater extent and geochemistry can improve estimates of sustainable use and inform alternative water sources.

Transboundary Water Resources Conflict Analysis Using Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: A Case Study—Harirud River

One of the most important environmental issues today is the water crisis and the ensuing security challenges. Of these, transboundary waters pose the most significant security challenges. Resolving these conflicts and agreements over transboundary waters has always faced a variety of challenges, making it difficult to reach a mutually agreed solution. One of the transboundary water conflicts that have been exacerbating in recent years is the conflict between Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkmenistan over the use of the Harirud river water resources. The present paper aims to analyze, using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR), a game theory model, the conflict between the three countries regarding the utilization of the water resources of the border river, Harirud. To this purpose, first, the current state of the conflict was investigated. Then, each of the three countries’ possible options and preferences was defined according to the past and present state of the conflict as well as the possible states. By defining the permissible movements and priorities of each decision maker, the equilibrium of the conflict was obtained. Next, four scenarios were defined, the equilibria were extracted in each scenario, and the results were interpreted. The implementation of the GMCR model algorithm regarding the Harirud water conflict between the three countries indicated that the current state is the most likely outcome of the conflict as none of the parties involved, given their preferences, and is motivated or able to change their strategy to help the conflict to a more favorable state.

Critical geopolitics, the Shanghai cooperation organization and the sino-kazakh water agreements

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), previously known as the Shanghai Five, was formed in June 2001 as a security engagement organization. It is a highly influential organization in the Eurasian continent, and most Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan included - are members of SCO, as well as China. In recent years, the Chinese water diplomacy towards Kazakhstan has advanced in different agreements that are shaping the patterns of water security in Central Asia. The Chinese strategic interest in the development of the scope of the SCO in this region has made Kazakh transboundary water issues to advance in negotiations. However, these agreements have been made in a bilateral scheme, which is considered relatively unequal towards Kazakh interests; therefore, in spite of the Kazakh efforts, the SCO so far has not turned into a water security organization. This paper is going to analyze the current trends in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as well as the Sino-Kazakh cooperation platform, especially regarding transboundary water resources. From the perspective of the critical geopolitics scholarship and its considerations regarding the concepts of hegemony and zones of influence, the idea that the Sino-Kazakh cooperation has advanced following Chinese interests is going to be defended. In conclusion, this paper states that due to the lack of interest regarding Chinese water diplomacy, and despite of Kazakh efforts, the SCO is not in the near future launching great initiatives regarding water security in the region, reinforcing the Chinese diplomacy of bilateral water agreements. Recebido em 14/04/2021Aprovado em 19/09/2021

Regulatory Initiatives of Central Asian Countries in Addressing Transboundary Water Issues

After the collapse of the USSR the Central Asian countries found themselves facing serious regional challenges that hinder constructive interstate cooperation. Among such challenges the problem of transboundary water resources should be highlighted. The lack of a coordinated policy for regulating water flows continues to put the Central Asian countries in a vulnerable position, negatively affecting their national security, socio-economic development and the environmental situation in the region. Throughout their sovereign development the countries of the region tried to solve transboundary water problems by combining external and internal mechanisms. However, a solution to the problem that would meet the national interests of all interested countries was not found.Recently the ruling elites of the Central Asian countries have intensified the process of solving the water problem showing political will. They put forward a number of initiatives. A big role in reviving this issue belongs to Uzbekistan which has opened a new milestone in the settlement of water and energy conflicts in the region. Uzbekistan demonstrates a desire to solve the water problem constructively at the regional level. In this regard the proposals of the President of Uzbekistan Sh.Mirziyoyev acquired great importance in solving the transboundary water problems of Central Asia. In 2018 Sh. Mirziyoyev put forward the initiative to adopt a Regional program for the rational use of water resources in Central Asia. Shortly before that he expressed a desire to participate in the implementation of joint hydropower projects with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Analyzing the current shifts in the water and energy issue we can talk about increasing trust between the countries of Central Asia and the beginning of the formation of a new regional interstate model of relations on the distribution of transboundary water resources.

Comparison of Transboundary Water Resources Allocation Models Based on Game Theory and Multi-Objective Optimization

Transboundary water resources allocation is an effective measure to resolve water-related conflicts. Aiming at the problem of water conflicts, we constructed water resources allocation models based on game theory and multi-objective optimization, and revealed the differences between the two models. We compare the Pareto front solved by the AR-MOEA method and the NSGA-II method, and analyzed the difference between the Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower game model and the multi-objective optimization model. The Huaihe River basin was selected as a case study. The results show that: (1) The AR-MOEA method is better than the NSGA-II method in terms of the diversity metric (Δ); (2) the solution of the asymmetric Nash–Harsanyi Leader–Follower game model is a non-dominated solution, and the asymmetric game model can obtain the same water resources allocation scheme of the multi-objective optimal allocation model under a specific preference structure; (3) after the multi-objective optimization model obtains the Pareto front, it still needs to construct the preference information of the Pareto front for a second time to make the optimal solution of a multi-objective decision, while the game model can directly obtain the water resources allocation scheme at one time by participating in the negotiation. The results expand the solution method of water resources allocation models and provide support for rational water resources allocation.