THE PRICING OF DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS - EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN

Even now with the cutting edge businesses and specialized management, a large number of the firms are owned by families in Pakistan. Agency disagreements and issues exist between the management and the owners as well as the minority shareholders and the block holders. To handle these feuds, accountants use discretionary accruals. These accruals help to manage earnings and smooth sharp trends to protect the interest of management and the owners. This study determines whether the investors manage the earnings through discretionary accruals or do they price these accruals when considering the stock price. This study finds significant evidence that the market prices discretionary accruals. We find that the firms with higher number of institutional ownership, high quality audit production and higher number of independent board have significantly higher impact of discretionary accruals on their stock returns as compared to other firms.

Team composition and labor allocation in audit teams: a descriptive note

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to describe, illustrate and provide a deeper understanding of team composition and labor allocation in audit teams by quantifying the exact value of resources at different levels of the audit production. Audit teams have been considered as a black box in audit research. Therefore, this paper reports descriptive statistics on (levels and proportions of) hours and costs allocated to auditor ranks (and the number and value, i.e. billing rates, of auditors for different ranks and the entire team) to shed new light on audit teams.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses a proprietary data set containing disaggregated information on hours, costs and billing rates for each team member in each of 908 audit engagements. The data are provided by a Swedish Big 4 audit firm. The study uses a purely descriptive approach and categorizes auditors into seven ranks. As size and the publicly listed status are crucial determinants of audit production, the paper splits engagements in public and private companies and reports statistics for size quartiles of both public and private clients.FindingsThe paper provides descriptive statistics for (1) client size, (2) audit team members, (3) audit hours, (4) audit costs, (5) proportion of audit hours, (6) proportion of audit costs, (7) billing rates and (8) variation of billing rates. Results show that compared to private clients, the audit firm allocates higher effort from auditors in higher ranks and lower effort from auditors in lower ranks to public clients. Another finding is that allocation varies with client size for private clients, but less so for public clients.Originality/valueIn an area with sparse literature, this descriptive study serves as a first step to improve our understanding and guide future research. It provides concrete support for previously known theory.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Pricing and Effort

SUMMARY We find that auditor industry expertise is both a firm-level and partner-level phenomenon, which suggests that industry expertise captured by accounting firms is dispersed among engagement partners through knowledge sharing and transfers within audit firms. We also find that the higher audit fees by expert auditors are due to more hours and not higher rates. While spending more hours allows expert auditors to extract higher fees in total, the finding that expert firms/partners exert greater effort does not support the suggestion that expert auditors are in general more efficient in audit production. However, we find weak evidence that audit hours for expert auditors are lower in industries and companies with homogenous operations and comparable accounting than in other industries and companies. This finding suggests that knowledge transfers more likely take place in homogeneous and comparable industries, leading to production efficiency that moderates the increase in audit hours charged by experts. JEL Classifications: M4; M42. Data Availability: All data are available from the identified sources.

A discussion of auditor-client co-production of the audit and the effect on production efficiency

This article provides a reflection on the paper and presentation during the FAR Conference of 9 and 10 May 2016 of “Auditor-client co-production of the audit and the effect on production efficiency” by Gaeremynck, Willekens, and Knechel (GWK). The authors examine the effect of auditor-client co-production on the efficiency of an audit, a topic relevant to the whole audit-client financial reporting and assurance supply chain. Using a sample of working papers from a Belgium Big 4 firm, the authors explore the controllable (i.e., managerial) and non-controllable (i.e., environmental) factors that contribute to variations in audit efficiency within the auditor-client coproduction of financial reporting quality. The results suggest that partner tenure positively contributes to the efficiency of the audit engagement, but the audit work prepared by the client, interim-work by the auditor, and the final audit work performed during off-peak season negatively affect audit efficiency. While this may be surprising from an efficiency standpoint, it may be that such measures add to the audit effectiveness to an extent that outweighs any efficiency loss. Audit quality or audit production, after all, is a matter of efficiency and effectiveness. GWK offer a number of important insights for practitioners interested in the delicate balance of managing efficiency and effectiveness. In the paragraphs that follow, we aim to both summarize the GWK research and highlight the importance of the findings to practice.

Costs of Mandatory Periodic Audit Partner Rotation: Evidence from Audit Fees and Audit Timeliness

SUMMARY The constricted mandatory audit partner rotation rules for U.S. public companies have fueled intense debate among the profession, regulators, and policymakers. This topic remains controversial, but neither side has provided evidence of the consequential benefits and costs of mandatory rotation. While rotation effects on audit quality have been examined, we empirically examine its effects on two audit production costs: audit fees and audit timeliness. We find significantly higher audit fees and significantly longer audit report lags in the period immediately following mandatory audit partner rotation. These effects are more pronounced for non-Big 4 auditors, larger clients, and audit offices that are not industry specialists. Moreover, the audit fee and audit timeliness effects persist in successive audit partner rotations, suggesting that client-specific knowledge gained through longer audit firm engagement does not completely mitigate loss of client-specific knowledge at the partner level. Our findings provide new empirical evidence supporting the profession's arguments that mandatory audit partner rotation is costly to multiple stakeholders, including clients, auditors, and investors. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Evidence of Organizational Learning and Organizational Forgetting from Financial Statement Audits

SUMMARY This paper examines the association between audit firm tenure and audit production efficiency. The analyses are based on proprietary audit production data provided by a large international accounting firm. The results document evidence of learning over time. Specifically, repeatedly servicing a client increases production efficiency by reducing the total audit hours expended in an audit engagement. Learning rates vary across different ranks of labor and learning is more pronounced among higher personnel ranks, with lower ranks experiencing little learning. Further, learning rates are not constant over time; there is little incremental learning beyond the initial productivity gains consistent with the concept of the learning curve. Finally, the results show some evidence of productivity losses as audit hours increase for very long tenures consistent with the notion of organizational forgetting. JEL Classifications: M41; M42