Prisoner-on-prisoner drug searches in prisons in England and Wales: ‘Business as usual’

Prisoner reported drug and contraband searches in adult men’s prisons in England and Wales represented almost a quarter of reported and recorded ‘sexual assaults’ from 2004 to 2014. These searches are more likely to involve multiple perpetrators and weapon use than other types of sexual assaults and are most frequently carried out in the relative privacy of a cell. The research presented here is based on an analysis of Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (formerly the National Offender Management Service) Incident Recording System data, providing insights into the proportion of recorded sexual assaults which are related to drug searches. This analysis enables a distinction to be made between prisoner-on-prisoner drug and contraband searches and other sexual assaults. Analysis shows that prisoner-on-prisoner searches are frequent, often pre-meditated, brutal and appear to be an accepted aspect of everyday prison life.

Hate Crime Victimization and Weapon Use

Prior research has suggested that hate crimes hurt more, in that they are more physically severe than other crimes. A separate body of research has focused on the role of weapons in exacerbating violence; yet, no research has considered the role of weapon use in bias crime victimization. Following this, this research examines the relationship between weapon use, bias motivation, and victimization in the United States. On one hand, weapons may play an important role in hate crime by exacerbating violence. On the other hand, weapons may be unnecessary for facilitating hate crime violence, given the animus associated with bias motivation. Using data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System, we find that bias crimes are both (a) less likely than nonbias crimes to involve weapons and (b) more likely than nonbias crimes to involve serious or lethal victim injury. These patterns are particularly pronounced for antisexual orientation hate crimes.

New Perspectives on Risk Factors for Non-fatal Strangulation and Post-assault Imaging

Strangulation has long been associated with death in the context of sexual assault and intimate partner violence (IPV). Non-fatal strangulation (NFS) during sexual assault, which refers to strangulation or choking that does not result in death, is common and has been associated with IPV and with bodily injury; however, other factors associated with NFS are unknown. The current study examined demographic and sexual assault characteristics associated with NFS among women who received a sexual assault medical forensic exam (SAMFE). A second purpose of this study was to explore factors associated with receiving follow-up imaging orders after NFS was identified during a SAMFE. Participants ( N = 882) ranged in age from 18 to 81 ( M = 28.85), with the majority identifying as non-Hispanic White (70.4%) or Black/African American (23.4%). A total of 75 women (8.5%) experienced NFS during the sexual assault. Of these, only 13 (17.3%) received follow-up imaging orders for relevant scans. Results from a logistic regression analysis demonstrated that NFS was positively associated with report of anal penetration, intimate partner perpetration, non-genital injury, and weapon use during the assault. Results from chi-square analysis showed that among sexual assaults involving women who experienced NFS, those whose assaults involved weapon use were over four times more likely to receive imaging orders compared to assaults without weapon use. These findings have implications for criminal justice, and if incorporated into danger assessments, could potentially reduce fatalities linked to sexual assault and/or IPV. Additional work is needed to ensure that all assaults with NFS trigger a referral for imaging regardless of other assault characteristics.

Introduction

This introductory chapter discusses the factors which lead nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) decision makers to discount the prospects for nuclear use and be willing to challenge or resist a nuclear-armed opponent. The NNWS is able to act because it can take advantage of various strategic and material inhibitions against the use of nuclear arms to minimize the likelihood of a nuclear strike. In essence, the NNWS identifies red lines and gambles that, by its not crossing those lines, the costs of nuclear weapon use for the nuclear-armed opponent will outweigh the benefits. The precise strategies available and pursued by the NNWS will vary across cases. In general, though, the more militarily capable the NNWS is relative to the nuclear weapon state (NWS), the more difficult it will be for the NNWS to reduce the incentives for nuclear strikes. This forces a powerful NNWS to behave in a consistently constrained manner, and wars in nuclear monopoly will tend to occur only in the face of large power asymmetries favoring the NWS. This book's argument thus shows that nuclear weapons are neither irrelevant, as some argue, nor do they dictate state behavior. Ultimately, there are a variety of tools available to an NNWS to challenge, resist, and even win limited victories in a war against nuclear opponents.

Cross-Cultural Reactions to Peacekeeping Robots Wielding Non-Lethal Weapons

Robots may represent a safer alternative to using only human peacekeepers. However, it is unclear how civilian populations will react to such robots given the cultural diversity of affected civilians and the possibility of non-lethal or lethal weapon use by robot peacekeepers. We investigated compliance rates to simulated armed peacekeeping robots by native and expatriate Americans, Chinese, and Japanese. We predicted that compliance to robot demands would vary as a function of lethal weapon availability, robot patrol orders, and cultural background of the participants. One hundred and forty participants representing seven cultural groups performed a virtual shopping task. They were randomly interrupted six times by an anthropomorphic robotic peacekeeper requesting personal items. Participants decided to “comply” or “not comply” with the robot after each interaction and indicated their trust of the robot. Results showed that participants were more likely to comply with robotic peacekeepers wielding backup lethal weapons than those armed with only a non-lethal weapon. Chinese participants residing in America complied most; Americans living in China complied least. Older participants and those with greater nonlethal weapon familiarity showed more positive attitudes towards weapons. These results suggest that lethality, culture, and familiarity may influence interactions with armed robotic peacekeepers.