On India as a Responsible Nuclear Weapon State: Does the ‘No First Use’ Doctrine Need a Review?

2021 ◽  
pp. 002088172110244
Author(s):  
Jay B. Desai ◽  
Bharat H. Desai
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Explosion ◽  
Nuclear Weapon State ◽  
Nuclear Tests

India conducted Operation Shakti (Pokhran II) nuclear tests during 11–13 May 1998 that ushered her into the cherished nuclear weapons club. It was well calibrated decision to formally choose the nuclear path through the first peaceful nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha (Pokhran I) that was conducted on 18 May 1974. It was significant that without joining the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, India managed to gatecrash into the nuclear weapons capability. It led to articulation of the No First Use (NFU) doctrine on 4 January 2003 (Ministry of External Affairs [MEA], 2003). In the wake of 16 August 2019 pronouncement of the Indian Defence Minister on possible review of the NFU, this article seeks to probe the question: Does the NFU doctrine require any such review? It comprises the rational, the promise of NFU, counterforce strategies, NFU with respect to tactical nuclear weapons and associated problems with First Use and NFU.

scholarly journals Perspectives on the Implementation of the 2017 Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-55
Author(s):  
Sabin Guţan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
International Community ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Legal Power ◽  
Nuclear Weapon State ◽  
Un General Assembly

Abstract The adoption of The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by the UN General Assembly in July 2017 is a real success for the international community in the fight against armaments and the danger of an apocalyptic war. Despite the scepticism of many, the treaty entered into force in January 2021, with its 50th ratification. Although this story seems to have come to a happy end, it is only now that the turmoil begins. No nuclear-weapon state has supported the adoption of the treaty and they refuse to recognize its legal power. The implementation of this treaty will be the hardest test for the UN. Nuclear states are the strongest and most decision-making, especially within the Security Council. In this context, the question arises whether the UN will succeed in finding an effective way to persuade nuclear states to give up these weapons or whether we will witness an international “putsch” of nuclear states.

Introduction

Tempting Fate ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
State Behavior ◽  
Large Power ◽  
Nuclear Weapon State ◽  
Power Asymmetries ◽  
The Face ◽  
Weapon Use

This introductory chapter discusses the factors which lead nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) decision makers to discount the prospects for nuclear use and be willing to challenge or resist a nuclear-armed opponent. The NNWS is able to act because it can take advantage of various strategic and material inhibitions against the use of nuclear arms to minimize the likelihood of a nuclear strike. In essence, the NNWS identifies red lines and gambles that, by its not crossing those lines, the costs of nuclear weapon use for the nuclear-armed opponent will outweigh the benefits. The precise strategies available and pursued by the NNWS will vary across cases. In general, though, the more militarily capable the NNWS is relative to the nuclear weapon state (NWS), the more difficult it will be for the NNWS to reduce the incentives for nuclear strikes. This forces a powerful NNWS to behave in a consistently constrained manner, and wars in nuclear monopoly will tend to occur only in the face of large power asymmetries favoring the NWS. This book's argument thus shows that nuclear weapons are neither irrelevant, as some argue, nor do they dictate state behavior. Ultimately, there are a variety of tools available to an NNWS to challenge, resist, and even win limited victories in a war against nuclear opponents.

Korean Nuclear Crises: Is There A Way Forward?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muzaffar Ganaie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
North Korea ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Nuclear Weapon State ◽  
Policy Challenge ◽  
Positive Results

<p><i>North Korea’s nuclear programme remains a key foreign policy challenge for United States. After its first nuclear test in 2006, Pyongyang has made an impressive progress in developing a credible nuclear deterrent through series of nuclear and missile tests. The diplomatic efforts to dissuade North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have not yielded positive results so far, as Pyongyang has not only developed a credible deterrent but continues to expand and strengthen it. The failure of Hanoi Summit, latest in the series of diplomatic initiatives to end the series has depended pessimism regarding future negations. Experts are skeptical about finding a diplomatic solution to the crises and the demand to explore other alternatives <sup>_____</sup> limited surgical strike, regime change, treating North Korea as de-facto nuclear weapon state <sup>_____</sup> to end the crises has intensified in recent years. However, dealing with the threat though these tools is highly risky and diplomatic outreach is the most preferred course to end the crises.</i></p>

Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam

2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
The United States ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Nation States

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.

scholarly journals Nuclear Disarmament without the Nuclear-Weapon States: The Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty

Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Müller ◽  
Carmen Wunderlich
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Weapon ◽  
Nuclear Disarmament ◽  
The Road ◽  
Common Basis ◽  
Global Zero ◽  
Nuclear Arms

The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (tpnw) represents a daring act of self-empowerment: nuclear have-nots produced an international disarmament treaty without the involvement of the nuclear-weapon states or their allies. In this essay, we assess how the new treaty relates to the existing nuclear order and its four central norms: constraints on use, political restraint, non-proliferation, and disarmament. We discuss the tpnw's origin in and impact on this contested order. At the heart of contestation are two security concepts: deterrence versus the immediate ban of nuclear arms, which result in fundamentally different ideas on how to pursue the road to “global zero.” Whether or not the tpnw and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are compatible depends on how the opponents handle their controversies. The key is to overcome the emotionalized polarization and rediscover a common basis in order to prevent damage to the existing nuclear order and bring forward nuclear disarmament in practice.

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