scholarly journals Perspectives on the Implementation of the 2017 Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-55
Author(s):  
Sabin Guţan

Abstract The adoption of The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by the UN General Assembly in July 2017 is a real success for the international community in the fight against armaments and the danger of an apocalyptic war. Despite the scepticism of many, the treaty entered into force in January 2021, with its 50th ratification. Although this story seems to have come to a happy end, it is only now that the turmoil begins. No nuclear-weapon state has supported the adoption of the treaty and they refuse to recognize its legal power. The implementation of this treaty will be the hardest test for the UN. Nuclear states are the strongest and most decision-making, especially within the Security Council. In this context, the question arises whether the UN will succeed in finding an effective way to persuade nuclear states to give up these weapons or whether we will witness an international “putsch” of nuclear states.

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 129-134
Author(s):  
Boris N. Mamlyuk

Larry Johnson’s timely and important essay challenges both utopian and realist accounts of UN law and practice by reviving the debate over the nature and functions of the UN General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly’s power to deploy certain legal tactics not only to influence collective security deliberations in the UN Security Council, but also, more significantly, to provide some legal justification for multilateral military “collective measures” in the event of Security Council gridlock. One vehicle by which the General Assembly may assert its own right to intervene in defense of “international peace and security” is a “Uniting for Peace” (UFP) resolution, authorized by resolution 377(V) (1950). At its core, a “uniting for peace” resolution is an attempt to circumvent a Security Council deadlock by authorizing Member States to take collective action, including the use of force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. General Assembly resolution 377(V) does not require resolutions to take specific legal form—language that echoes the preambular “lack of unanimity of the permanent members [that results in the Security Council failing to] exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” is sufficient to render a given resolution a UFP, provided the General Assembly resolution calls for concrete “collective [forceful] measures.” For this reason, experts disagree on precisely how many times a UFP has indeed been invoked or implemented, although informed analysts suggest UFP has been invoked in slightly more than ten instances since 1950.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Pedrazzi

On 7 July 2017 a UN Conference, convened in New York by the General Assembly, adopted a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, providing for the first total ban on these weapons intended to be global in scale. The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017. The process and its outcome, were, however, firmly opposed by nuclear-weapon States and by NATO countries, including Italy: they refused to take part in the effort, fearing that it could definitively undermine the stability of the non-proliferation architecture built upon the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty. In reality, the Treaty is consistent with the ultimate purpose of the NPT regime, and the obligations assumed by States under the NPT remain untouched. Its main deficiencies relate to its verification apparatus, and it would be advisable to remedy them through future negotiations. Whether this instrument will enter into force is not clear, although it has the potential to acquire, and surpass, the fifty ratifications necessary. However, the absence of support from nuclear-weapon States risks rendering it irrelevant. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that broad support for this new regime, from non-nuclear-weapons States, as well as from civil society, could contribute to exerting pressure towards the adoption of concrete steps in the nuclear disarmament agenda.


Author(s):  
María José Cervell Hortal

The concept of nuclear nonproliferation was coined in a formal way at the beginning of the 1960s, though the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, would be the text that would consolidate it. After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, humanity was conscious of the danger of these weapons, and nuclear proliferation turned into one of the main problems of the Cold War period; their control and the implementation of strategies to limit them have become a priority since then. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons and deterrence policy were crucial elements in the peaceful coexistence of the two power blocs, and the initiatives to control them grew, as both countries were conscious of the danger that this accumulation could cause. The NPT created two categories of states: the “officially” nuclear ones, which could maintain their weapons (China, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States) and the nonnuclear ones, which were not allowed to acquire or develop them. Two more concepts emerged: vertical proliferation (that of the five official nuclear states) and horizontal proliferation (that of the states that had nuclear weapons but rejected to be a NPT party). Other treaties—multilateral, regional, and bilateral—which also sought to control the nuclear proliferation (see Treaties and Agreements Preventing Nuclear Weapons Proliferation) were subsequently added. The end of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger. In fact, the Security Council considered in 1992 (Document S/23500, 31 January) that the proliferation of nuclear weapons “constitutes a threat for the international peace and security” (p. 4) that permitted it to activate, if necessary, chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter and all the consequences derived from it. With the new millennium, the United Nations Secretary-General described mass destruction arms (nuclear included) as one of the threats to peace and security in the 21st century (see United Nations General Assembly 2005, cited under Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary-General, para. 78). Nowadays, the nuclear question is still of great relevance. The nuclear problems in the 21st century’s international society are wide and varied and include states that withdrew the NPT (North Korea), states that fail to comply with it (Iran), states that have not yet ratified it (Israel, India, Pakistan), and non-state actors (such as terrorist groups), which are more and more interested in the wide destructive power of nuclear weapons. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 7 July 2017 was a significant step, but the low number of state accessions shows that nuclear weapons are still a relevant threat.


Tempting Fate ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Paul C. Avey

This introductory chapter discusses the factors which lead nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) decision makers to discount the prospects for nuclear use and be willing to challenge or resist a nuclear-armed opponent. The NNWS is able to act because it can take advantage of various strategic and material inhibitions against the use of nuclear arms to minimize the likelihood of a nuclear strike. In essence, the NNWS identifies red lines and gambles that, by its not crossing those lines, the costs of nuclear weapon use for the nuclear-armed opponent will outweigh the benefits. The precise strategies available and pursued by the NNWS will vary across cases. In general, though, the more militarily capable the NNWS is relative to the nuclear weapon state (NWS), the more difficult it will be for the NNWS to reduce the incentives for nuclear strikes. This forces a powerful NNWS to behave in a consistently constrained manner, and wars in nuclear monopoly will tend to occur only in the face of large power asymmetries favoring the NWS. This book's argument thus shows that nuclear weapons are neither irrelevant, as some argue, nor do they dictate state behavior. Ultimately, there are a variety of tools available to an NNWS to challenge, resist, and even win limited victories in a war against nuclear opponents.


1978 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 586-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt René Radley

In 1975 the UN General Assembly established a 20-member Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to prepare a program of implementation to enable the Palestinians to exercise the rights recognized in Resolution 3236 adopted by the General Assembly the previous year. Among the rights affirmed in that resolution is “the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted …” The Committee’s report and recommendations were completed and submitted to the Secretary-General for transmittal to the Security Council in June 1976.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 123-128
Author(s):  
Stefan Talmon

In his essay on the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, Larry Johnson suggests that the General Assembly can recommend non-use of force collective measures when the Security Council is blocked because of a permanent member casting a veto. He rightly points out that today there is no longer any need to use Uniting for Peace for such recommendations. The General Assembly can and has recommended so-called “voluntary sanctions” in cases where it found a threat to international peace and security to exist. For example, in resolution 2107 (XX) of December 21, 1965 concerning the Question of Territories under Portuguese Administration, the Assembly, making no reference to Uniting for Peace, urged “Member States to take the following measures, separately or collectively:(a)To break off diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Portugal or refrain from establishing such relations;(b)To close their ports to all vessels flying the Portuguese flag or in the service of Portugal;(c)To prohibit their ships from entering any ports in Portugal and its colonial territories;(d)To refuse landing and transit facilities to all aircraft belonging to or in the service of the Government of Portugal and to companies registered under the laws of Portugal;(e)To boycott all trade with Portugal.”


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 337-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael RAMSDEN

AbstractRussia’s veto in the Security Council of a proposed ad hoc tribunal for the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 disaster prompts consideration of alternative mechanisms to bring the offenders to justice. It is arguable that the General Assembly, drawing upon the text of the UN Charter and the Uniting for Peace mechanism, possesses the constitutional powers to establish the tribunal. The unique features of the General Assembly, comprising the international community, also mean that it is able to act in a way that would facilitate the functioning of an ad hoc tribunal, even in the absence of mandatory powers. Although many practical obstacles lie ahead, an ad hoc tribunal established by a broad coalition in the General Assembly may offer the best hope in securing accountability for the MH17 disaster.


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