Study on Cross-Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism and Compensation Standard
Water resources in China’s river basins are scarce, and the pollution that shrouds them is serious. Constant disputes have emerged between the upstream and downstream sectors due to the contamination of river basins. Moreover, China’s research on ecological compensation mechanisms and compensation standards is still immature at present. Thus, this study establishes a compensation model and introduces the compensation coefficient K, including the compensation coefficient K1 between the upstream and downstream governments and the compensation coefficient K2 between the upstream government and the central government. This paper adopts the Bargain Game Model and obtains the value of K2 through the decision-making process between the central government and the upstream local government. In addition, amendment to the final offer arbitration law is used to acquire the value of K1 by proving the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Then, this paper takes the Taohe River Basin as an example and combines the compensation model to analyze, using the simplified compensation function to determine the amount of emission pollution from upstream to downstream and the compensation that upstream should receive.